Khodorkovsky Mikhail Borisovich

Biography

2003

The article uses the reflections of political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky on Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky (MBH), published by him in an article for the publication "Elephant" on June 6, 2011^[1].

Was Khodorkovsky's persecution political?

And yes, and no.

If we argue in the categories of public policy (parliamentary elections, financing of the opposition, etc.), the case is non-political. MBH helped Yabloko in agreement with the Kremlin, and the SPS and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - right at the initiative of the Kremlin (the then presidential administration, headed by Alexander Voloshin). At the same time, if we have not forgotten, on April 18, 2003, Khodorkovsky brought to our attention that he intends to financially support United Russia in his personal capacity.

Alternative funding for the SPS was then needed by the Kremlin to somewhat erode Chubais's monopoly influence on this party. As for the Communist Party, in late 2002 - early 2003. the federal authorities had two unjustified fears against the Communists.

Fear first: that the Communists will get too much in the elections. Because of this, various cyclopean constructions such as "Putin should lead the Communist Party" were born in the heads of near-government thinkers - in April 2003, Vitaly Tretyakov published a program article of this content in Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

Fear two: that the Communists will receive a lot of money from the disgraced oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Such negotiations have really been going on since the fall of 2002, the main counterparties of the BAB from the communist side were party treasurer Viktor Vidmanov and editor-in-chief of the Zavtra newspaper Alexander Prokhanov. Subsequently, Prokhanov and Co claimed that they did not even want damned birch money at all, but simply provoked the Kremlin to be sent a "permitted" sponsor faster. So it most likely was. Adjusted for the fact that no one was going to refuse Berezovsky's money at a secret level. In any case, the same Prokhanov received a large sum from a London exile for the development of the Zavtra newspaper.

To overcome both fears, it was necessary to strengthen control over the Communist Party at the organizational and financial level. This is what MBH was asked to do, delegating its representatives like Sergei Muravlenko and Alexei Kondaurov there. Officially, it was called "they participate in communism on their own initiative and at their own expense." Well, such as "Yukos" as a corporation has nothing to do with the support of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and no one took away human rights from the citizens of the Russian Federation Kondaurov and Muravlenko - including the right to invest in politics part of what is acquired by unsustainable labor. Since then, Alexander Prokhanov began to go on excursions to the Yukos facilities and publish multi-letter articles in the genre "Stain not with blood, but with oil."

So initially, not only Voloshin, but also President Vladimir Putin completely legalized all this communist financing. Another thing is that at a certain point in historical time - at the beginning of the fall of 2003 - Putin seemed to disown his consent. Which was not the reason, but only the reason for the escalation of the attack on MBH and his empire.

But, if you look at the fatal and beautiful 2003 through a magnifying glass of hardware policy, Khodorkovsky's case is political in its purest form. Since it is directly related to important undercover games - a key element of Russian politics of those times.

By the beginning of 2003, the people who brought Putin to the throne (Alexander Voloshin, the "family" of Boris Yeltsin, etc.), it became clear that some "St. Petersburg Chekists," whom the second president pulled out of his personal bins, began to intensify dangerously. Initially, these people were not really taken seriously. The de facto "family" team was in power in its purest form. Putin played the role of a representative figure and a "Mongolian cosmonaut," who does not need to press unnecessary buttons so as not to disturb the System. Although since January 2000, when Vladimir Putin moved to the main Kremlin cabinet, dozens of "grandchildren of Karl Marx" and "children of Lieutenant Schmidt" have crawled around Russia: classmates, friends and relatives of the newly-minted president - these half-witnesses failed to get anything serious. And even Putin's personnel breakthrough of March 2001, when Boris Gryzlov headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Sergei Ivanov - the Ministry of Defense, did not significantly change the hardware and political picture.

A sharp outbreak of lobbying for Novoputians happened in the spring of 2002, when the owner of Mezhprombank (now bankrupt) Sergei Pugachev, in alliance with the president of the oil company Slavneft"," Mikhail Gutseriev suddenly wanted to take this company for himself. Although, according to the staffing table of the System, it was not due to him at all, but. To Abramovich Order was brought quickly and harshly: Pugachev went to figs, Gutseriev was fired, and Slavneft was where Abramovich should have been.

Nevertheless, Voloshin and Co could not but worry about the hardware growth of some figures, for the "family" group of completely redundant and therefore unacceptable. For example, Igor Sechin, who, as head of the presidential office and a longtime confidant Putin, has increasingly lured the president into his seductive networks. Or Yuri Zaostrovtsev, deputy director of the FSB for economic security, who at that time seriously aimed at the post of chairman of the State Customs Committee (SCC) of the Russian Federation and was a centimeter from the appointment (failed).

So the idea arose to play a combination, as a result of which Vladimir Putin would have to remove his not-so-zealous security officials from the big game. A cruel joke was played with the Kremlin authorities by their invariably inductive thinking: if something worked well in the past, it will work perfectly in the present. As a result, the 1996 scenario was elected, known in history under the working title "box from under the xerox" (then, as we remember, Boris Yeltsin overnight sent Korzhakov-Barsukov-Soskovets into political oblivion): first the situation is brought to the boiling point, there is a dangerous threat of discrediting the president personally and the authorities as a whole, after which the head of state makes the only correct (possible) personnel decisions.

But to draw the combination, a new xerox box was needed. Or rather, a ram. A powerful player who would draw the attention of Putin and the world to the inadmissibility of neosiloviki and thereby cause fire on himself. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was elected to the role of a ram box.

Voloshyn Abramovich team deliberately did not send MBH to prison. They were sincerely sure that Khodorkovsky would not sit down, because, according to the rules of the game, this is simply impossible. In any case, it will not sit down without the consent of the Voloshyn involved in all the most important decisions of this level. But what happened - it happened. The owner of Yukos was going to be used as a heavy weight, which was designed to demolish Igor Sechin. And it turned out a little the other way around: Sechin managed to duck, the weight swept over his head, crashed against the wall and hit Voloshin himself painfully on the opposite path.

But this is already a matter of autumn 2003. And at the beginning of the year everything looked - for MBH and his friends - much more rosy and optimistic. The takeover of Sibneft by Yukos was in full swing. At the same time, it was decided that Khodorkovsky receives all sorts of corruption materials from Kremlin/near-Kremlin friends about Putin's close entourage and makes them public. Including - throws in the face of the president himself. The security forces begin to snap. Next, see the 1996 scenario: Putin will have to choose between the future and the past, progress and corruption, the "most transparent" company in the country and the shadow bigwigs from Rosneft. By and large, between strengthening a positive reputation in the elites and its hopeless damage. Putin is smart, he must choose the first. Victory will be ours.

And Khodorkovsky was almost perfect for the role of a ram. Young, beautiful, rich, with clearly maturing, but not yet formed political ambitions. He does not understand anything in politics, but is already eager to fight. Such a person could be well managed by motivation.

Was it possible to do without the involved ram? No, you can't. It wouldn't be technical. There are issues that are not discussed and are not resolved in direct dialogue, one on one. Voloshyn and Abramovich could not risk their friendship with Putin. They should have jumped out of the ambush at the peak of the conflict, not before.

Various observers said a lot that MBH fell victim to its plans to transform Russia into a parliamentary republic. According to Stanislav Belkovsky, the significance of this factor is greatly exaggerated. Although he is sure of two things:

• a) such developments under the wing of Yukos were really carried out - in any case, until July 2, 2003, the day of the arrest of Platon Lebedev, dozens of people closely associated with the company walked around Moscow and excitedly talked about the upcoming parliamentary majority and Khodorkovsky Prime Minister; after July 2, these conversations abruptly stopped;
• b) the idea that Khodorkovsky could become prime minister in a semi-parliamentary republic also proceeded from the then presidential administration - it was necessary to test the idea "on cats." So the richest man in the Russian Federation then served not only as a ram and a box, but also as a cat.

The inflection point was reached on February 19, 2003. When Khodorkovsky, at a meeting with the president in the Kremlin, transparently hinted at the kickbacks that accompanied the deal between Rosneft and Severnaya Neft. Putin's backlash proved furious. The fact is that Vladimir Vladimirovich is a very fair person. He lives by concepts and tries never to retreat from them.

In fact, he answered the following to Khodorkovsky. Dear Mikhail Borisovich, Here you are hinting that my people stole something. Yes, maybe they stole it. But what, did you take your Yukos at an honest competitive auction at market value? No? But Yukos is now worth $40 billion! And mine, if any sperm, then a miserable $100-150 million. But we do not raise the question of revising the "big privatization." We are on guard of all our common interests. Including yours, Mikhail Borisovich. It seems that in the 3 years of my presidency, no one offered you to share? I didn't get into your business, did I? Then why are you hustling your nose into my business, which you have nothing to do with? Let's decide on the shore. Or we are all honest people: both you and me and Sechin too. And we do not follow each other's hands. Or we are all thieves and crooks. But then I can prove that you are also a thief and a crook, and I have such means.

This is the message. He was not heard. Neither Khodorkovsky nor those who used him as a weight (box, kitty). All of them remained captive to their sweet-mouth script and believed that everything would work out well.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky went to prison, becoming a hostage and victim of a power struggle between the two most influential apparatus groups in Russia in 2003. In this sense, the Yukos "case is undoubtedly political.

Arrest on embezzlement and tax evasion charges

Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested by the Russian authorities on charges of embezzlement and tax evasion on October 25, 2003.

Why did Khodorkovsky sit down?

In the opinion of Stanislav Belkovsky, he simply did nothing to not sit down.

After the first aggravation of the conflict - July 2, 2003, the day of the arrest of Platon Lebedev - Khodorkovsky had an indefinitely long time (at least several months) to agree. Translate political conflict into a kind of hardware and economic pact.

But MBH, apparently, did not want any agreements. First, because he highly appreciated the likelihood of his own victory in the conflict. But not only. Khodorkovsky, as far as can be judged by his long-term behavior, is a person of a resource approach who always evaluates whether he has the strength to win. On his side then were the head of the presidential administration Voloshyn and Prime Minister Kasyanov. A serious enough resource to keep fighting. In addition, around MBH then reigned permanent humanitarian (expert-journalistic) hysteria on the topic: not a step back! the enemy will be defeated! The atmosphere of this hysteria also played a role in the fate of Yukos and the decisions that were made at that time by its still-owners.

Second, he didn't really seem to believe he would sit down. That a person of this level of influence and fame can be easily arrested. In any case, while Voloshin remains in the Kremlin. And there is no need to reproach Khodorkovsky for naivety: then most elite Russians thought the same way.

Khodorkovsky and Voloshin somewhat underestimated the enemy in terms of the ability to make decisions and bring them to life.

Remember Jurassic Park? Scientists arrive on Foggy Island, where female dinosaurs bred in a test tube live. The population of terrible animals is under control: after all, females cannot reproduce on their own. Scientists did not take into account one thing: that in the long absence of males, these females are able to independently change the sex. And turn into real male predators. With the subsequent devouring of smart scientists in whole or in part. Here is something similar happened to individual "Putin security forces" in 2003. Contrary to scientific forecasts.

Igor Sechin and Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov understood well: there is no need to ask Putin, imprison Khodorkovsky or not imprison. We must first do the job, and then defend the result. Because defensive psychology is much more organic for the second president of the Russian Federation than offensive psychology.

So they came to the situation on October 25, 2003. The arrest did not happen by chance on Saturday early morning in Novosibirsk. It was necessary to take MBH when in Moscow - a deep night of the day off. That is, when the opportunities to contact someone and change something sharply were minimal.

Could Khodorkovsky agree with the Kremlin after his arrest and get out of prison?

Theoretically - yes. Practically - no.

Having inflicted the worst blow, Sechin and Co were simply obliged to bring the matter to the end, that is, to the complete defeat of Yukos and its owner. They acted strictly according to Machiavelli, which they did not read: "People should either be caressed or destroyed, for man can take revenge for little evil, but for great evil he cannot;... the resentment inflicted must be calculated so as not to be afraid of revenge. "

In addition, another oligarch with political ambitions, Vladimir Gusinsky, unwittingly blocked Khodorkovsky's path. In 2000, he signed a secret "protocol No. 6" in Butyrsky SIZO on the transfer to the state (Gazprom) of all its media assets in exchange for freedom and a considerable (at that time) amount of $300 million. After that, having left prison, he immediately disavowed the agreement, made the secret protocol public and actually accused the state of the Russian Federation of racketeering. And then he won the court against Russia in the ECHR. Putin's people were clearly not going to step on the "Gusinsky rake" in the Yukos case.

Yes, of course, soon after the arrest of MBH, a bunch of intermediaries appeared: some sincerely wanted to help, others were notorious scammers - who offered different options for how to "resolve" the situation. Among such intermediaries were not only small crooks, but also people influential, rich or at least famous. From Vladislav Surkov, who at the end of 2003 seriously believed that he could convince Putin to be resigned (and was ready to receive only 30% of Yukos for this, no more). Until the same Vladimir Gusinsky, who already in 2005-2006. convinced MBH to silence, not to write or say anything publicly, not to pretend to be a politician, and then you can weave a secret intrigue with subsequent release.

But - nothing happened, since it was obviously impossible.

People who were absolutely honest and conscientious tried to engage in "breaking up." For example, Viktor Gerashchenko, who became the chairman of the board of directors of Yukos in 2004. He went to this position for a reason: the banker was blessed by one of his old Kremlin friends, making it clear that happiness (the release of Khodorkovsky and the salvation of the company in exchange for something) is possible. But Gerashchenko did not take into account that:

• a) in our times, old Kremlin friends can flutter quite irresponsibly;
• b) Sechin is able to disavow any Kremlin friends. As a result, Heracles, like everyone else, failed to save the Yukos and release the prisoners.

Of course, Sechin and Co did not expect such life and intellectual resilience from MBH. They believed that soon after leaving for Krasnokamensk, the ex-oligarch would disappear somewhere in the snows of endless Siberia and would be completely forgotten. In any case, the Kremlin PR campaign was designed to convey to the people and the world just such a message. The campaign was coordinated, of course, by Surkov, to whom Putin has already explained that there is no need to help alleviate the fate of MBH. At the same time, Surkov in an interview with Der Spiegel called Khodorkovsky a teacher and generally insured himself in every possible way "for every firefighter." The fact that Khodorkovsky remained on the Russian and world proscenium 8 years after his arrest and 6 years after the first sentence is a great merit of the prisoner and the failure of the Kremlin.

2005: Negative business attitude towards the figure of Khodorkovsky

If we understand the elites of people involved in the adoption of the most important decisions, then rather, negatively. The ratio of large and related capital to MBH was quite accurately formulated in its time (2005) by Alfred Koch:

... "as for Khodorkovsky. Why did the business community betray him. The fact is that a significant part of the establishment, especially the intellectual establishment,... learned that Khodorkovsky was a Democrat after he was imprisoned. Before that, he was considered (with varying degrees of intensity of emotions) a lucky businessman, or a deft rogue. In different formulations, but, in principle, everyone meant the same thing. Therefore, what really represents the Menatep group, which then turned into Rosprom, and then into Yukos, etc., is quite well understood in the business community. If, say, take me, then I, as you know, supported Khodorkovsky as part of a group of comrades. Moreover, Newsweek magazine held such a "business game" - the trial of Khodorkovsky, where I played the role of a defender, and Mikhail Yuriev played the role of a prosecutor. I don't know if I succeeded well or badly, but in fact, a few weeks earlier we had anticipated the controversy that happened between Mikhail Leontyev and Boris Nemtsov in Vladimir Solovyov's program "To the Barrier!" Almost all these arguments were confirmed. I can say that Khodorkovsky always fought with our team. The famous example of confrontation is 1997, when, without receiving Svyazinvest, a company of persecution was launched against us, Khodorkovsky took the side of Berezovsky and Gusinsky. And always then he took a position that was against our team. And only in the 2003 elections did he find an opportunity to interact with us and support us. Therefore, inside is a business community, which has a very, very bad attitude towards Khodorkovsky as a businessman. Almost no one considers him a person worthy of support. Khodorkovsky always braved two theses. The first: "If we had a state, I would have been in prison for a long time." And the second, "Mine is mine, and yours is let's talk." We, as a business community, do not want to take rubbish out of the hut - these are our internal showdowns - and, especially, attack a person who is in prison. The RSPP supported him, the SPS supported him. Chubais, Nemtsov, Koch, Gaidar also personally supported. Instead, he wrote all sorts of letters about the fact that we ruined the liberal idea, etc. The fact is that it is necessary, as M. B. Khodorkovsky teaches us, to behave rationally. These howls will not give any sense. And what would happen if the business community supported him, what do I have little faith in? And for the reasons I listed, in my opinion - respectful, and because there is no point in swearing with the authorities because of Khodorkovsky, who is no more dear to this business community than any other. "

2011: Media appearance

In May 2011, a certain fuss was growing around Mikhail Khodorkovsky (and Platon Lebedev).

Many noted that the most famous prisoners of the Russian Federation could be shown on federal television. And not just to show, but in a context favorable enough for them. On May 24, 2011, on the day the Moscow City Court considered the cassation appeal against the famous Khamovnichesky verdict, on NTV at 19:00 the news about the fate of Khodorkovsky-Lebedev was the main one and was broadcast for 4 minutes. On "First" and "Russia," of course, there were no such generosity, but here, too, the plots from the Moscow City Court were given quite clearly. At the same time, Khodorkovsky himself was in the frame with fragments of his cassation speech - the country's main TV channels paid more attention to his position than to prosecutors.

The climax was, as you know, the Central Television program (NTV, May 29), the host of which Vadim Takmenev directly said about Khodorkovsky: the attitude towards this person "is already changing." Where it changes, it was clearly not said. Among Khodorkovsky's best friends, as well as in the community of his worst enemies, the attitude towards the prisoner seems to remain unchanged. Among the people - yes, MBH has become somewhat more popular, but not much.

No matter how special sensitivity the channel's general director Vladimir Kulistikov shows, and the authors of Central Television are bold, the MBH theme on sub-Kremlin TV cannot go on the air without direct high sanctions.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at his Skolkovo press conference said that Khodorkovsky, after leaving prison, would not be dangerous for society. Undoubtedly, this statement does not formally contain anything that would indicate the imminent release of the ex-owners of Yukos. But, on the other hand, all sorts of conversations immediately began.

And the former deputy prosecutor general, the "thunderstorm of the oligarchs" Vladimir Kolesnikov, now vegetating in the State Duma with a simple "United Russia," suddenly cried out that the super-prisoners had wound up and it would be time to release them. It is said that Mr. Kolesnikov was closely associated with Yukos back in 2002-2003. for example, he helped the company fight the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation and its then head Vitaly Artyukhov. What was subsequently forced to hide for a long time. And now - the secret has escaped from the fibers of the soul. But this is not an exhaustive explanation. The former "thunderstorm of oligarchs" is a systemic person, and there will be no screaming about anything.

Against this background, there was a story with the Khodorkovsky-Lebedev parole, to which both top prisoners seem to have the right. Observers noted that MBH and his accomplice filed for parole quickly and decisively as never before. And some well-informed sources began to spread strange rumors that the prisoners would be free almost in late June - early July 2011. Regardless of whether they are transported from Moscow to Siberia or not.

One way or another, in the story around Khodorkovsky-Lebedev there is one deadline, which is definitely impossible to miss. This is the election of the President of the United States, which in any weather will be held in November 2012. The Washington administration practically does not hide the fact that at the APEC summit in Yokohama (November 2010), and at the G8 meeting in Deauville (May 2011), President Barack Obama posed a "Khodorkovsky" question to his colleague Dmitry Medvedev and hinted at the need for his positive solution. And that Medvedev, they say, in his inherent manner answered his friend Barack with some slurred encouraging signals.

2013: Release from detention

On December 19, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin at an annual press conference announced that Khodorkovsky, according to his petition, would soon be pardoned. Putin explained Khodorkovsky's pardon with humane considerations related to his mother's illness. The next morning, the decree was signed, and Khodorkovsky was released. In total, the businessman spent more than 10 years in prison, according to accurate press estimates - 3709 days.

2022: Restoration of the media network after blocking of publications by Roskomnadzor

In November 2022, RT found out that the US State Department allocated about $1 million to the Free Russia Foundation, which is related to Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Later, the US State Department deleted information about the allocated funds of the Khodorkovsky Free Russia Foundation. This is somewhat unusual because the States used to not be shy about their satellites promoting American interests under the guise of "supporting civil society."

After blocking its main media resources "Open Russia" and "MBH. Media "Roskomnadzor, Khodorkovsky continued to build a media network in the country.

One of the most famous existing sources in 2022 is the Chtad Telegram channel, which promotes an agenda that is openly hostile to Russia.

There is no doubt about the position of the editorial board - at the beginning of the SVO, Khodorkovsky's resources were openly reposted by the most odious Ukrainian sources, in which Russian troops were called "orcs."

With the support of ChTD, the Lesson Theme channel was created, which allegedly tells "about teenage life at school."

Authors using jokes and memes convey their political position to young people, ridiculing, for example, new school lessons "Conversations about the Important."

Khodorkovsky's network includes several other small resources that criticize Russia: the sites Skat Media, Siren, Kholod magazine, a couple of YouTube channels and other sources. Many came to work in these media from the defeated headquarters of Alexei Navalny or the structures of Khodorkovsky himself.

In addition, some of his former employees remain in Russia and during the conflict in Ukraine organize small anti-war protests under the auspices of the Vesna movement.

2024: Conversion of property to state revenue

The property of the former head of Yukos Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the ex-head of MFO MENATEP Platon Lebedev worth 9.9 billion rubles was officially converted into state revenue. This was announced on June 7, 2024 by the Prosecutor General of Russia Igor Krasnov.

According to Krasnov, earlier property acquired by Khodorkovsky and Lebedev in the elite cottage village of the Odintsovo district of the Moscow region was already turned into state revenue. The cost of these facilities was estimated at 9 billion rubles. In addition, property in the amount of 900 million rubles was confiscated to pay off debt obligations.

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Bloomberg

In addition, according to the Prosecutor General, the court is considering another claim of the Prosecutor General's Office regarding the appeal to state revenue of more than 1 billion rubles in accounts controlled by Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. According to the court, the hearing in this case will take place on June 13.

According to the Interfax news agency, the appeal of the property of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev to the state is part of a large-scale campaign to return assets acquired through criminal proceeds. This process aims to restore justice and strengthen the rule of law in the country. Measures for the return of property are actively supported by state bodies and the public. The campaign also includes tougher legislation and enforcement practices on corruption and money laundering.

According to Krasnov, earlier Mikhail Khodorkovsky was found guilty in several criminal cases related to the theft and legalization of criminal proceeds. In 2024, he was again put on the wanted list. Plato Lebedev was also convicted of financial crimes and spent considerable time in detention.^[2]

Notes