Main article: Countries of the world
Population
Migration
2023: Labour migration reduced by 16% to 652,000
Labor migration from Tajikistan in 2023 decreased by 16% compared to 2022 - from 775.6 thousand to 652 thousand people. This is evidenced by the data of the Ministry of Labor, Migration and Employment of the Republic, which were published in mid-February 2024.
According to TASS with reference to the materials of the department, the flow of labor migrants who left for work from Tajikistan to Russia, according to the results of 2023, decreased by 15%, to 627 thousand people. This decline occurred largely due to the weakening of the ruble against the dollar, as well as the conduct of a special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, according to the Ministry of Labor of Tajikistan.
According to the ministry's estimates, 554,804 men (15% less than a year earlier) and 97,210 women (20% less than in 2022) went to work abroad in 2023. In 2023, a little more than 590 thousand labor migrants returned to Tajikistan, which is 7% higher than a year ago.
Russia remains the leader in the number of labor migrants from Tajikistan. In second place in 2023 is Kazakhstan, where about 18.4 thousand Tajiks came to work. 6.5 thousand migrants from Tajikistan entered other countries combined.
According to the Minister of Labor, Employment and Migration Gulnora Khasanzoda, more than 100 Russian companies in 2023 applied for the organizational recruitment of over 20 thousand workers from Tajikistan. In addition, from 1 to 10 companies from Turkey, Belarus Kazakhstan, Poland, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are interested in inviting labor from Tajikistan. But all of them require appropriate qualifications in those specialties that are in demand, she explained.
Hasanzoda also said that in 2023 Tajikistan was included in the work permit system (EPS) in South Korea, which will diversify the flows of labor migration from the country.[1]
2021: Net outflow over 4 years
2018: Population growth since 1989 by 67% to 8.6 million
Pamirs in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region and Politics of Britain
The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region occupies more than half of the territory of all Tajikistan, and at the same time is the most sparsely populated and poorest region. Pamirs live there - a people professing Ismailism - one of the branches of Shiism, in contrast to most of the Sunni Tajiks. This itself is an extremely united nation with a strong awareness of communal solidarity. It rests on widely branched family-clan ties based on religious principles and customs.
After the collapse of the USSR, the region, which had wide powers under Soviet rule, also hoped to gain independence. For this reason, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan in 1992, which ended only in 1997 with the signing of a peace treaty on the terms of autonomy.
For 2022, GBAO is a legally autonomous, but actually deprived of all rights, area. There is no support from the leadership for the region. Against this background, a crisis of confidence of the local population in the authorities arose.
The areas of settlement of the Pamirs were previously part of the Big Game, a geopolitical rivalry between the Russian and British empires for dominance in South and Central Asia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Back in those days, the British realized the concept of the "Independent Pamir." It implies the unification of the historical areas of residence of the Pamirs into a unitary state under the control of Britain. In theory, it includes:
- GBAO (Tajikistan)
- Tashkurgan-Tajik Autonomous County (China)
- Badakhshan Province (Afghanistan)
- Chitral District and Gilgit-Baltistan Province (Pakistan)
One of the main actors in this theory of expanding the influence of the British for 2022 is the head of foreign intelligence at MI6, Richard Moore. Thus, the British strengthen their influence in the post-Soviet space and prevent the implementation of any integration processes within the framework of any associations, be it the EAEU or the SCO.
In Tajikistan, the British use a different tool to advance their interests. We are talking about Aga Khan IV, the Ismaili billionaire, the founder of the Aga Khan Development Network, through which he finances various projects mainly in Central Asia. See Aga Khan Foundation for details.
Government
Main article: Government of Tajikistan
Parties
- NAT (National Alliance of Tajikistan) - an organization of emigrating oppositionists
- Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) - recognized as a terrorist organization
2024: Arrests of opposition politicians and change of leadership of three out of seven political parties ahead of announcement of President Emomali Rahmon's successor
From May to July 2024, the leadership of three out of seven political parties changed. At the same time, the first persons of the Party of Economic Reforms (PART) and the Socialist Party (SPT) were updated in just three days: at extraordinary congresses held, respectively, on July 20 and 23. Rustam Kudratov and Abdukhalim Gafforov, who previously participated in the presidential elections, left their posts.
Earlier in May, the chairman of the opposition Democratic Party (DPT), Saijafar Usmonzoda, was arrested and accused of attempting a coup. Together with Usmonzodu, the deputy head of the Social Democratic Party (SDPT) and critic of President Rakhmon Shokirjon Khakimov, as well as former acting President and ex-head of the Supreme Council Akbarsho Iskandarov, and ex-Foreign Minister Khamrokhon Zarifi were arrested. After that, even for 20 years, Gafforov, who headed the SPT, left "of his own free will."
The post of President of Tajikistan has been occupied by Emomali Rahmon for almost 30 years, and in total, with the chairmanship of the Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan, the politician has been at the helm for longer than President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko.
The successor is the eldest son of the president, ex-mayor of Dushanbe and chairman of the National Council Rustam Emomali. Despite the rich managerial experience and meetings with the President of Iran and the President of the PRC, he is not charismatic and is more interested in football than politics. In 2019, it was reported that Emomali Jr. was diagnosed with bowel cancer.
The second candidate is the eldest daughter of Ozod Rahmon, who heads the administration of the President of Tajikistan. In her asset, in addition to acumen and perseverance, there are good relations with the head of the GKNB Saimumin Yatimov. But the big question remains Tajikistan's perception of a woman as a strong leader.
The transit of power has been expected since 2018, when the country's parliament lowered the age limit for presidential candidates from 35 to 30 years. However, then the COVID-19 pandemic and protests in Kazakhstan forced to slow down the process.
Now the arrests of experienced politicians mean that the final decision on a successor has still been made, the Rybar channel suggested, and in the presidential elections of 2027 we will see a new face at the head of the country.
Economy
Main article: Economy of Tajikistan
Crime
Prisons
2019: The minimum age for children to be jailed is 14
2018: Number of prisoners
Drug crime
2022: Drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan to Russia
Ferghana Valley is a mountainous hard-to-reach area, which is chosen by drug dealers and smugglers. The Batken-Isfana highway runs at the southwestern end: by 2022, all the main skirmishes between the Kyrgyz and Tajiks occur in this section.
Most of the local population (regardless of the country of residence) closely cooperates with various groups. Often this is the only way to somehow survive.
Only the indigenous citizens of the region know this area well - including secret mountain routes used to transport various smuggled goods north to Kazakhstan and Russia.
The drug trafficking route, despite the use of secretive paths in mountainous areas, could not be used without the knowledge and assistance of the authorities.
Border conflicts between Tajik and Kyrgyz military personnel occur almost regularly after the collapse of the USSR. Both countries share more than 900 kilometers of a joint border, but only half are fully demarcated.
As of September 2022, 70 disputed sites remain. Both countries refuse to seek a compromise. And this only applies to controversial areas: conflicts also arise due to interethnic hatred and disputes over water.
The absence of a clear border between states and, as a result, the desire of each of the parties to snatch as "fat" a piece as possible is a stumbling block.
Even a couple of tens of meters in favor of one of the countries will significantly increase the cost of tariffs for "transit travel," that is, a bribe.
Despite statements Talibs about the fight against production drugs in, Afghanistan export volumes after their coming to power by 2022 increased several times.
Habibullo Vohidzoda, director of the drug control agency in Tajikistan, said that since the Taliban came to power, the level of seized narcotic substances from Afghanistan has tripled (three tons against one).
The most active in the cultivation of opiates is the province of Badakhshan, from where the route to Russia originates.
The main and more risky is transit from Afghan Ishkashim through the capital region of Tajikistan, Rawat in the Sogdi region and Kyrgyz Batken and Osh in the direction of Kazakhstan.
Despite the fact that both Tajik and Kyrgyz security forces are already firmly sitting on "subsidies" from smugglers, there is a possibility of seizure of cargo. For this reason, there is another route.
The second route runs through the Vakhan corridor of Afghanistan and the Pamir tract in the Gorno-Badakhshan region (GBAO) of Tajikistan and subsequently the familiar Osh to the territory of Kazakhstan.
However, due to the difficult terrain in the GBAO, a large amount of cargo cannot be carried along this path. It is less cost-effective in contrast to the route through the Fergana Valley.
After entering the Kazakh territory, caravans use the sparsely populated desert regions of the country for invisible movement to the Russian border.
There, in poorly protected areas or also through bribery of certain persons, the goods reach their destination in the Chelyabinsk (Troitsk) or Orenburg (Novotroitsk) regions, and then diverge throughout Russia.
Health care
Maternity leave
in2020: Duration of guaranteed paid sick leave from 3 to 5.9 months
Education
2023:200 Russian-language schools
In terms of the number of Russian-speaking schools Kazakhstan , it occupies a leading position among the Central states: in Asia 2023, their number reached 3,606. For comparison: in the neighboring Uzbekistan a little more than a thousand, Kyrgyzstan in - 751, in - Tajikistan 200, and in - 71. Turkmenistan
2022: Mishustin allocated 5.7 billion rubles to create Russian-language schools in Tajikistan
In December 2022, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order that allocated 5.74 billion rubles for the creation of Russian-language schools in Tajikistan. Educational institutions will open in the cities of Dushanbe, Kulyab, Khujand, Bokhtar and Tursunzad. The funds are planned to be donated from the Russian Federation to the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development.
In September 2022, the president RUSSIAN FEDERATION Vladimir Putin with his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rahmon opened five schools Russian with language instruction in Tajikistan. Schools are located in different regions of the country and are named after heroes and cultural figures: Russia Yuri Gagarin, Mikhail Lomonosov, Anton Chekhov, Dmitry Mendeleev, Konstantin Ushinsky.
Putin announced the opening of the cultural center of Tajikistan in Moscow. In 2021, the Russian authorities allocated $150 million for the construction of Russian-language schools in Tajikistan.
{{quote 'Of course, the curriculum will be adapted to the needs of Tajikistan, but it will be a Russian program. It will be a joint team and children will receive a good quality education, - said Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Alexei Overchuk during his visit to the republic. }} In September 2022, Emomali Rahmon then said that in Tajikistan there are 39 schools with instruction in Russian, in which about 27 thousand schoolchildren study, as well as more than 160 mixed Tajik-Russian schools, in which about 70 thousand schoolchildren study.
The Russian side, with the involvement of the Eurasian Stabilization and Development Fund, provides free of charge at the expense of the federal budget funding for preparatory and installation and construction work and equipping schools with educational and educational means, medical products, and other equipment.[2]
2019: Number of years of education by citizens over 25
Ecology
2021: Fourth highest air pollution
In March 2022, Greenpeace, in collaboration with the development company AirVisual, compiled an annual rating of the countries of Europe and the world with the cleanest air. In Tajikistan, the level of air pollution at the end of 2021 amounted to 59.4 PM2.5 (mkg/m³). Read more here.
History
2024: Development of a military base in Tajikistan with the participation of China
In August 2024, the British The Daily Telegraph published material about a secret Chinese military base based on new satellite images. The purpose of its construction, according to the newspaper, is to contain the activity of the Afghan Taliban. The British raise concerns about the growth of Chinese influence in the country.
At a press conference on August 8, First Deputy Interior Minister of Tajikistan Abdurahmon Alamshozoda said that rumors about the construction of a base in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) with the participation of the PRC do not correspond to reality. Beijing They also deny everything. Prior to that, the last time the construction of such a base was discussed in October 2021.
In 2021, Dushanbe announced that the base in GBAO will appear in the future. But it was about the base of special forces of the UBOP of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan, and it was supposed to be built with Chinese money in the Ishkashim region.
The base, the existence of which is denied by the deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tatarstan and claims The Daily Telegraph, is located in the Murgab region near the village of Shaimak, has been under construction by China for almost 10 years, and there are already Chinese servicemen. The presence of the facility was confirmed to journalists by Tajik sources. Probably, we are talking about two different bases, or under the cover of the first, the second is being built, the Rybar channel wrote.
In the Chinese military presence in Tajikistan, Beijing and Dushanbe have mutual interest.
The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region has long created problems for the central government: in a region that differs both ethnically and religiously from the rest of the country, serious unrest has repeatedly arisen. The last time the Pamirs broke out in May 2022, the riots were suppressed. Gorny Badakhshana and sinophobia. Admitting the Chinese to the region, Dushanbe expects that Beijing will help in suppressing separatism.
In addition, Gorny Badakhshan borders the Afghan Wakhan Corridor - a narrow strip of land giving China a common border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan actively supports armed opposition to the Taliban regime. And an inclusive government that demands the creation of Dushanbe, and which should include representatives of Afghan Tajiks, has not yet been created.
The PRC, in addition to containing potential Taliban aggression against Tajikistan, is interested in ensuring that the region does not become a source of Islamist threat to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and in protecting its investments.
It is beneficial for Russia to share the burden of responsibility for security in the region with Beijing.
2022
Assignment of neutral status of the Tort-Kocho territory in Kyrgyzstan on the border with Tajikistan
In November 2022, President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov, during a parliamentary meeting, said that the Tort-Kocho area on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border would receive neutral status.
Upon ratification of the agreement, both countries will be obliged to ensure the free passage of Kyrgyz citizens to Leilek, and Tajik - to the enclave of Vorukh. The neutral zone will be defined in square meters.
What is the essence of the contradictions?
In 2009, Adukhan Madumarov, who served as secretary of the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan, during a working meeting signed a protocol with his Tajik counterpart on the transfer of the Tort-Kocho land plot with an area of 5 hectares and a length of 275 m for rent to Tajikistan for 49 years.
Inside Kyrgyzstan, this was regarded as a betrayal of national interests, and due to public resonance, the plan remained on paper. The document signed by Madumarov was not ratified by parliament and visited by the president, so it did not have any legal force.
Nevertheless, Dushanbe still considers the protocol to confirm the ownership of the land plot to Tajikistan. It was due to the lack of regulated legal status that conflicts regularly arose there.
What is the importance of Cake-Kocho?
This route has great importance for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, since it can be reached from Bishkek to Isfana directly. The loss of Tort-Kocho will de facto mean the isolation of Leilek and part of Batken districts from the main territory of the country.
For Tajikistan, control over Tort Kocho will become a lever of pressure on its neighbors on the issue of demarcation and delimitation of borders. It is the territorial dispute that is the main cause of conflicts in recent years.
Attempts to make peace are faced with the aggression of a particularly patriotic part of the population of both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which require a solution to the issue by force.
In addition, maintaining a fire hazard situation and the possibility of inciting a conflict between CSTO and SCO members right at the side of Russia and China is an extremely convenient option for Western countries. The potential focus of tension can always be used at the right time as an "ace in the sleeve." Therefore, Western states, through a huge network of NGOs and NGOs, as well as proxies in the political circles of both countries, will not allow the issue to be settled peacefully, the Rybar telegram channel noted.
Taliban ambitions for Tajik Badakhshan
In July 2022, news appeared about the formation of the Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan organization (Taliban Movement of Tajikistan).
Tajik Mahdi Arsalan became the leader of the Taliban-controlled faction. His real name is Muhammad Sharipov, he is a native of the Rashta Valley of Tajikistan. Earlier, the militant headed the Jammaat Ansarullah group, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan.
This organization was established more than a decade ago to fight the Emomali Rahmon government by warlords of anti-government Islamist forces from the 1992-1997 Tajikistan Civil War.
With the Taliban coming to power in August 2021, members of Jammaat Ansarullah were entrusted with managing the Tajik-Afghan border in five districts: Kuf Ab, Hwahan, Maimai, Nusai and Shikai.
Why are Protalib groups escalating the situation at the border?
Among the radical members of the movement, there is the idea of "uniting" the Tajik peoples of Badakhshan under the banner of the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." There were more reasons for this due to the unwillingness of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon to establish relations with his neighbors and assist the leader of the resistance Ahmad Masud.
And with the beginning of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine among Taliban warlords in northeastern Afghanistan, the idea of invading Tajikistan was revived with renewed vigor. In their opinion, the protracted conflict will weaken Russia and will not allow it to get into another one on the southern borders of the CSTO.
The leadership of the "Emirate" constantly states that "the Taliban will never go beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and will not allow other groups to use the territory of the country as a bridgehead for external aggression." However, the Taliban speak to the public only what is convenient for them, the Rybar telegram channel noted.
The conflict in Central Asia with the tightening of the Russian Federation into it is what the collective West is striving for. This is evidenced by attempts to overthrow the authorities in Kazakhstan, conflicts in Tajik Badakhshan and Uzbek Karakalpakstan.
Tajik Armed Forces liquidate Pamir leaders
Residents of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) perceive the activities of the Tajik leadership as directed specifically against ethnic Pamirs who have lived in the area for centuries. Already regular military operations with any even insignificant rally finally approved this opinion.
The lack of any support was the reason that for 2022 the GBAO has the highest unemployment rate (more than 80 percent). Prices for essential products are 30-40 percent higher than across the country due to logistics difficulties in hard-to-reach areas.
Because of this, the male part of the population leaves to work in other countries, including Russia. On average, more than 40 percent of the country's GDP comes to the treasury of Tajikistan annually from earnings from labor migration.
However, the COVID-19 pandemic, sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation in connection with the start of a special operation in Ukraine and the tightening of migration policy in Russia greatly affected the level of revenues to the state budget from migrant remittances.
This created the prerequisites for a deterioration in the economic situation throughout the country, including in GBAO, whose population is very dependent on earnings in Russia.
The presence of a huge number of soldiers further heats up the situation in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, keeping the local population in constant tension. Since 2012, a significant military contingent has been located in the region. Almost all cities of GBAO have additional checkpoints. All residents are being monitored. In the event of even a minimum risk of regular protests in the GBAO, the Internet and cellular communications are immediately turned off, which cuts off the population from the outside world.
In mid-May 2022, the Tajik Armed Forces carried out a counter-terrorist operation in Khorog in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). The main result was the murder on May 22 of the informal leader of the Pamirs Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, a field commander during the civil war (1992-1997).
Despite the announced completion, the security forces continued to search for and detain all those involved, according to the government, in the riots in Khorog.
Two more alleged leaders of criminal gangs - Khursand Mazorov and Zoir Rajabov - were liquidated during the next operation on June 12.
1991: All-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR
On March 17, 1991, an All-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR was held - the only one in the history of the USSR.
The issue of preserving the USSR as an updated Federation of equal sovereign states and republics of the former USSR was discussed.
1975
1945: Polygamy of collective farm chairmen
Memorandum of the Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee O.P. Mishakova on the situation of women in the republics of Central Asia after the end of World War II of September 18, 1945
"The Komsomol Central Committee has many other facts indicating great abnormalities in the situation of women in Central Asia.
Here, especially in rural areas, polygamy still takes place. According to Komsomol workers in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other republics, this crime against Soviet laws is often committed by the chairmen of collective farms. Some of them have become very rich in recent years; using their position, they almost eliminated all democracy on collective farms and established almost feudal orders. Individual chairmen have 2-3 wives each, force girls to cohabit, and for disobedience threaten ordinary collective farmers and collective farmers with the summons of the military registration and enlistment office and sending them to the labor front. District party and Soviet organizations are very poorly fighting these phenomena.
Komsomol workers of all Central Asian republics unanimously declare such facts.
Early marriages are common in Central Asia. Girls under the age of 16 are often married. In rural areas of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, girls are often sold for feces.
Early marriages are one of the main reasons for the huge dropout of female youth from educational institutions. Most often, the girl is forced to leave school by her family. "