Nuclear Power Plants of China

Main article: Economy of China

Low capital expenditures for NPP construction

China is able to accelerate the world's fastest expansion of nuclear power. The country can add up to 10 reactors a year, the CNNC chairman said in March 2024.

2023

Average delay in construction of NPP power units - 2 years

Floating NPP project postponed due to risks of sabotage by the United States

The Chinese government has decided to postpone the project to locate a floating nuclear power plant in the South China Sea after sabotage on the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines. Chinese regulators fear a likely sabotage operation against nuclear power plants by the United States, the South China Morning Post reported in May 2023.

2022: Number of operating reactor plants - 55

2021

Plan to build 150 reactors over 15 years

In 2021, China revealed the scale of its plans for nuclear power, a drive that has taken on new resonance given the global energy crisis and calls for action made at the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow.

China plans to build at least 150 new reactors in the next 15 years, more than the rest of the world has built in the past 35 years.

The effort could cost $440 billion; already in the middle of this decade, the country will surpass the United States as the world's largest nuclear power generator.

China's' artificial sun 'sets new record

At the end of May 2021, it became known that Chinese researchers working on a nuclear fusion project managed to hold plasma with a temperature of 120 million degrees Celsius for almost two minutes. This became a new record. Read more here.

Rosatom bypassed competitors from the USA and France in the PRC nuclear market

As of May 2021, almost all manufacturers of nuclear stations are present on the Chinese market.

Against the background of such a meticulous transfer of documentation, technologies and licenses by France and the United States (see below), Russia's position in the Chinese market looks more advantageous. The Russian atomic monopolist, Rosatom Corporation, built nuclear units in the PRC, but with one unqualified condition: no transfer of critical nuclear technologies. Russia builds everything itself or does not do everything at all - "but you will not wait for the drawings."

This position did not exclude reasonable cooperation with the Chinese side in general construction or infrastructure issues, but the "heart" of any nuclear power plant was certainly supposed to be Russian. Which, of course, did not particularly like Beijing - after all, in this case, most of the surplus value from any contract remained in our country, and the Chinese simply received a reliable and cheap power unit. Blackmail from the PRC: look, they say, with the French and Americans, our conditions are much more "sweet," - also did not act. Rosatom's negotiators have always stood their ground.

In an attempt to influence Russia, the Chinese even went to a temporary stop of cooperation on the Tianwan nuclear power plant: after the construction of the first four power units with reactors VVER-1000 Beijing decided to build the fifth and sixth units with reactors APR-1000 French-Chinese design. But this initiative cannot be called particularly successful (see below) - therefore, for units 7 and 8 of the Tianwan nuclear power plant, Rosatom again became a contractor. It will now supply its newest 3rd generation VVER-1200 reactors at these sites.

The same reactors will be built for units 3 and 4 at the Xuidapu nuclear power plant, where they will most likely coexist with the Chinese Hualong One reactors, planned to replace the American developments that have not "taken off" in China - AR1000 reactors.

It turns out that the seventh unit of the Tianwan nuclear power plant and the third unit of the Suidapu nuclear power plant for Russia and Rosatom will become not only "regular construction sites," but also a clear symbol of how our country bypassed both the United States and France in the Chinese nuclear technology market. Moreover, having played this competitive game on its own terms, without making unnecessary concessions in favor of Beijing, and skillfully "bending" it^[1].

Westinghouse failure

The second largest foreign player in the nuclear market in the Middle Kingdom after the French was the American Japanese conglomerate, WestinghouseToshiba which fell into a situation similar to the French. In exchange for allowing Americans into its national market, Beijing demanded Westinghouse in 2008 the full transfer of documentation, licenses and technology for their new third-generation reactor, the AR1000.

As a result, with great difficulties, Westinghouse was able to build four power units at two nuclear power plants in China, along the way, also getting into the corporate bankruptcy procedure in 2017 - and eventually becoming a division of the Japanese corporation Toshiba. As a result, there are no new plans for the construction of AP1000 in China, and the planned sites for their construction, in particular the first and second units of the Xuidapu nuclear power plant, are now being considered for the placement of Hualong One reactors.

This situation can create a unique precedent in the history of the construction of nuclear power plants, when the third power unit of the Suidapu nuclear power plant from the Russian VVER-1200 reactors can be built faster than the first and second units, where the PRC got into a mess with the American AR1000.

One way or another, as in the case of the French, Beijing managed to "cut the sheep completely and without a trace" with the Americans. In 2009, another major Chinese nuclear market player, SNPTC Corporation, entered into an agreement with Westinghouse to develop a promising third-generation reactor that was to compete with EPR-1600. The designed reactor, which was based on AR1000, was originally called CAP-1400, but a few years later the Chinese renamed it Guohe One in order to even cut off any connection with its American predecessor in the name.

And the owners of the company designing and building the Guohe One reactors did not let the Americans in. 55% in the joint venture capital was allocated for SNPTC, and 45% of the American share was eventually transferred to another Chinese company, China Huaneng Group, after Westinghouse's bankruptcy.

As of May 2021, there are two units with Guohe One reactors in the PRC in the process of construction, but their construction is at the very initial stages, since official confirmation in the PRC permitting bases appeared only in April 2021.

Launch of the first unit at the Chinese Hualong One reactor and the development of a joint venture with the French

The most massive reactor in the nuclear power to power China plant is the Chinese version of the French 1 gigawatt pressurized water-water reactor, which received the name CPR-1000 in the PRC. In 2021, 22 blocks of this design operate in this country, built under the license of the French company, which Areva later changed its name to Framatome.

The main drawback of this reactor is that it belongs to the outdated II generation and inherits technology back in the 1970s, so since 2011 Beijing has refused to build new CPR-1000.

Since Framatome agreed to the transfer of all documentation and related licenses for its reactor model, China was able to bring it to the modern level of the III generation. The improved CPR-1000 reactor was named ACPR-1000, which subsequently went through another stage of improvement and changed its name to purely Chinese - Hualong One.

However, the transition to the "Chinese rails" did not go so smoothly. Starting the construction of the first ACPR-1000 back in 2013 and laying six blocks at once, Beijing has so far been able to launch only four of them. In addition, since 2015, he planned to build another 10 units with an improved Hualong One reactor, but there were also difficulties. Only one Hualong One was put into commercial operation at the Fuqing nuclear power plant - this happened on January 31, 2021.

In an attempt to maintain influence on the Chinese, Framatome even went to the direct transfer to the PRC of the technologies of its newest III generation reactor - EPR-1600. In 2018-2019, two units with these reactors were put into operation at the Taishan nuclear power plant with the help of the French. The construction of two more blocks at the same station will have to be carried out by a joint Sino-French venture, in which the Chinese partner, CGNPC, will have a 55% stake, and Framatome will have only 45%.

In addition, the joint venture is going to promote EPR-1600 technology in foreign markets, so Beijing's dominance in this "nuclear mesaliance" looks even more convincing.

2020: China ranks 4th in uranium enrichment market

2018

US plans to stop China's nuclear power development

On September 15, 2018, the American The Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed American officials, reported that the United States intends to strengthen control over the export of nuclear technology to China.

"The strengthening of control will be aimed at prohibiting China from acquiring nuclear technology not within the framework of a bilateral agreement"[2] the[2].

If this is true, then this means that the United States in its trade wars with China intends to expand restrictive measures to such an important industry as nuclear power. The most unpleasant thing for China is that in this case America has a completely correct justification for the alleged restrictive actions. The fact is that in 1985 the PRC and the United States signed the so-called 123 Agreement for a period of 30 years, the validity of which in 2015 was extended for the same period.

"Agreement 123" is the short, "everyday" name for part "a" of Article 123 of the American Atomic Energy Act, passed in 1954. In accordance with this part of the law, the United States transfers its atomic technologies to other countries only if they agree to a number of restrictions.

The Gold Standard is a ban on uranium enrichment on the territory of a partner country and the transfer of SNF either by the United States itself or its designated allied countries, a ban on the transfer of technology to third parties. A feature of the "Agreement 123" with the PRC was a deviation from the "gold standard" - China immediately got the opportunity to cooperate on SNF with France, and uranium enrichment work was not prohibited for it.

The "Agreement 123" signed by China allowed him in the mid-1990s to begin negotiations with Russia on the construction of the Tianwan nuclear power plant and on the construction of a uranium enrichment plant in China using our technologies, on the same basis China signed a protocol of intent with the American company Westinghouse in 2007 to build four AR-1000 reactors. It was possible to build only two, late in terms and exceeding the contractual estimate. But over the years, China has developed the technology of SAR-1400 reactors (China AP-1400) and, under an agreement with Westinghouse, received the right to build these reactors in third countries.

The 123 Agreement allows the United States to impose restrictions on these clauses of the treaty between China and the private company Westinghouse at any time, thereby violating all China's plans to export its atomic technologies to it. The 123 Agreement gives America the right to demand that China stop importing French and Russian technology, which could become a serious problem for the PRC. Under the agreement with France, a project is being developed for the construction of a plant for the processing of spent nuclear fuel in China using French technologies. Rosatom continues to work on the third and fourth power units of the Tianwan NPP.

Time will tell whether the WSJ message is true, what China's reaction will turn out to be.

Agreement with Rosatom for the construction of 4 power units

On June 8, 2018, Rosatom announced a major package of agreements with China, including the construction of four nuclear power units using Russian technology and a number of additional projects. The Russian state corporation will supply the PRC with equipment for two more units at the Tianwan nuclear power plant, and also received a contract for two units at the new site in Xuidapu. In the second case, Rosatom actually gets a project originally intended for the American Westinghouse.

In particular, the state corporation finally agreed on the completion of the Tianwan nuclear power plant (a framework contract for the seventh and eighth units with a total capacity of about 2.4 GW) and the construction of two similar units at the Xuidapu site in Liaoning province in northeastern China. In addition, the package includes the supply of components and fuel for the Chinese project of a fast neutron reactor CFR600 and elements for radioisotope energy sources RITEG for the lunar program of China.

Since the 1990s, the PRC has been the largest, at least in terms of volumes, foreign customer of the Russian nuclear industry. Thus, the contract for the construction of the first two units at the Tianwan nuclear power plant, although it is now recognized as "planned-unprofitable," along with the Iranian order for the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, played an important role in preserving nuclear technologies in the Russian Federation. Later, Beijing ordered two more blocks from the Russian Federation on Tianwan, as well as a uranium enrichment plant. In the 2010s, Rosatom expected that Chinese orders would continue, talks were reported on fast neutron reactor technologies, the possible construction of a new nuclear power plant in the north of China, and the purchase of floating nuclear power plants. But despite the intensification of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing since 2014, after the introduction of Western sanctions, new contracts were postponed.

The head of Rosatom, Alexei Likhachev, commenting on the new package of agreements in China, separately noted that "all financing of these projects is carried out by the Chinese side on its own," adding that under the concluded contracts, only at the first stage of equipment supply will amount to $5 billion. Contracts for the construction of nuclear power plants were concluded according to the standard scheme of cooperation between the Chinese and the state corporation.

According to this scheme, the customer undertakes a significant part of the construction of stations, the Russians buy the equipment of the "nuclear island," turbine equipment, a number of engineering services and the like. This leads to the fact that Rosatom's revenue under Chinese agreements is lower than in other foreign projects, but the advantages of PRC orders are now paid with "real money" - without state loans from the Russian Federation or other external financing schemes. According to a Kommersant source in the industry, the supply of equipment is one of the most high-margin parts of the order for the construction of nuclear power plants.

It is curious that at the second site, Suidapa, the Chinese will actually face Rosatom with one of its key competitors - the American Westinghouse. Initially, this eight-unit nuclear power plant was to be built by a company from the United States. The Rosatom report says that the agreement on Suidap does not exclude the construction of additional blocks by the state corporation on the site. But until now, there has been no experience of coexistence in the framework of one nuclear power plant of Russian and American design units.

The head of the independent portal AtomInfo.ru Alexander Uvarov considered Rosatom's new entry into the Chinese market "a great achievement." In recent years, the local market has been closed to external players due to high domestic competition: Beijing has its own proven nuclear technologies, such as Hualong One and CAP1000, the expert says. He calls the contracts for fast reactors "breakthrough," since this technology has not yet been exported.

"If the supply of technology to China is successful, then European countries may also have interest in them," said Mr^[3]

.

Permit for fuel loading at the world's first AP1000 NPP in Sanmen

On April 27, 2018, the China State Nuclear Energy Technology Corporation (SNPTC) and CNNC Sanmen Nuclear Power Company Limited (SMNPC) reported that the world's first AP1000 nuclear power plant unit in Sanmen (Zhejiang province, China) had received permission to load fuel from China's National Nuclear Safety Authority (NNSA) and commenced initial loading.

"Today we have reached an incredibly important milestone for Westinghouse and our AP1000 technology," said Westinghouse President and CEO Jose Emeterio Gutiérrez. - "This is another significant step in the delivery to our customer of the world's first AP1000 power unit, demonstrating to the world the benefits of our advanced passive protection technology."

Block 1 of the Sanmen Nuclear Power Plant has successfully pass through all necessary functional tests, technical and safety checks, as well as through approvals with Chinese regulators. The fuel loading process will be followed by the achievement of initial criticality, initial synchronization with the power grid and conservative, step-by-step, power output in test mode until testing is reliably and successfully completed at maximum power.

"This important stage in the implementation of the project means the start of the final commissioning program for Block 1 of the Sanmen nuclear power plant," said David Durham, senior vice president of Westinghouse's new projects business. "I am confident that our teams will continue to work at the highest level - both in Sanmen and on the Haiyan and Vogtl projects, providing our constant support to existing power units around the world."

The plan of generation growth by the end of the year by 6 GW due to the commissioning of 5 power units

The National Energy China Administration (NEA) issued power engineering specialists an Energy Work Guidance Opinion for 2018 in March 2018, which noted that the increase in the installed capacity of nuclear generation by the end of 2018 will be almost 6 GW. This is due to the commissioning of five new nuclear power units:

• Sanmen-1 and Haiyang-1 with nuclear reactors AP-1000s,
• Taishan-1 with nuclear reactor EPR-1750,
• Tianwan-3 with a nuclear reactor VVER-1000 and
• Yangjiang-5 with nuclear reactor ACPR-1000.

Power units Sanmen-1, Haiyang- EPR-1750 1 and Taishan-1 have already undergone a hot run-in. The Tianwan-3 reactor was connected to the national energy system in December 2017, and its commissioning is scheduled for the end of 2018. In addition, the Chinese government plans to additionally start construction of six to eight nuclear power units during 2018. By 2020, it is planned to achieve the set goal of increasing the total installed capacity of nuclear generation from the current 35 GW to 58 GW^[4].

2017: Westinghouse reactors in China never launched

Winter 2016 - the expansion of some external containment materials in Westinghouse projects turned out to be higher than the design one. And such episodes in different areas arose almost weekly, and by that time, as you know, the work on the construction of the AR-1000 in the United States was finally overwhelmed. The Americans could only hope that the Chinese and Benjamin would somehow stretch out, somehow finish, somehow save their reputation.

SNPTC in early 2017 was given the main task - to launch Sanmen-1 and Haiyan-1, the Chinese leadership has already ceased to understand what the final price of the American miracle of technology will be. The attitude towards both AR-1000 and Westinghouse itself in China is becoming more skeptical, since attempts to start reactors in 2017 did not bring success. In August, hot tests were passed, but they did not start loading fuel - there are suspicions that the problems with biological protection were too big^[2].

Officials and the media are China silent, the Western press musing a letter from an environmental activist who in November 2017 called for a thorough rechecking of what was built. Westinghouse's European plants reported that they produced two batches of fuel for Chinese AR-1000 - the initial and first reboot, in January 2018, hot runs of the second units at both nuclear power plants took place, but there was no permission to load fuel either. Most likely, a series of control rechecks will follow - the Chinese do not want to take risks, so the presentation of the "world's most advanced reactor of the leading American" company will have to continue to wait.

2015: Continued problems in the construction of nuclear power plants in China. Rescheduling by Years

In early March 2014, representatives of the KYAN arrived in China to listen to the claims of their Chinese colleagues about the technical parameters of the AR-1000. American experts tried to fulfill the role of lawyers - everything is fine, everything is in order, all 18 '000 changes and additions to the project expressed during its licensing in the United States, Westinghouse has already taken into account, you can safely finish the work. The Chinese, however, did not react to the demonstration of snow-white smiles - instead, they dumped another carriage and a small trolley of claims. As a result of the negotiations, the parties concluded that being two and a half years late is not a deadline, but an extra year to eliminate Westinghouse will only benefit. Support columns will be replaced, steel base plates will be welded, the transport lock will be redone - well, and so on. To say that SNPTC was upset - not to say anything, and this time it was not about money, something more terrible and terrible happened - the company was disrupting the plan of the five-year plan, which ended in 2015. It was so terrible that SNPTC did not even protest against this nonsense - the company's management almost kneeled before the Americans with pleas to launch at least at 23:59 on December 31.

In general, the Chinese bravely fought the skill and professionalism of the American company, but they lost this battle. It remained to agree to climb the scaffold with its head proudly raised - in January 2015, SNPTC officially announced that the launch of Sanmen-1 was postponed to 2016. The representative of the company, who read this text, hardly escaped a heart attack and stroke, although the comment of the CPC Central Committee tore into pieces of the heart of the SNPTC leaders, the bell buzzed in his heads:

"The

PRC authorities are definitely very disappointed."

But, surprisingly, the Earth did not run into the celestial axis, the execution sentences did not take place either, and the embezzled SNPTC began to confess in May 2015: in 2016 it is also unlikely, but in 2017 - for sure. And in general, it cannot be ruled out even that normally working pumps will come from America in the summer, and we are already doing everything else in China itself. This was pure truth - the case, cover, block of the protection control system were produced, everything was carefully delivered and mounted and, it would seem...

It turned out that it seemed that the pumps did not arrive in the summer, because they simply did not pass factory tests. No, not checks by the customer or the KYAN - even the naked American eye saw cracks in the shoulder blades in a centimeter wide. The CPC Central Committee did not give statements on this matter - it seems that the set of censorship words is over.

In October, the factory OTK in America "gave the go-ahead," the pumps sailed to the Chinese coast. We do not know this secret route - they arrived at the place of the RCP only in December, but this was still a victory, since this time they passed all the tests. Chinese customers immediately confirmed the order of all other pumps and began to pray to their Chinese gods so that American partners could cope with this work in the foreseeable future. The gods were complacent - the pumps began to go according to a new schedule, and in the first half of the year they were able to be installed in regular places, the nuclear scientists began cold running the reactor at Sanmen-1, in July the same stage was successfully carried out at the first reactor of the Haiyan NPP.

2013: China sends back defective equipment from US

In the winter of 2013, the deadline for the delivery of Xianmen-1 was finally postponed to the beginning of 2014, officially setting the Fukushima accident as the reason, although they had previously said that American technology was so good that the project did not require AR-1000 adjustment. Well, then in the American project on Chinese territory, the French accent began to be heard more and more clearly - in the fall of 2013 it turned out that the first block would be completed in 2014, but somewhere in November-December, one and a half years later than the contract term. Such frankness was due to the fact that since the beginning of 2013, the head of the Chinese division of Westinghouse had changed - the head of the company at that time, Danny Roderick, could not stand what Shaw people were doing at the venues, and persuaded him to accept the post of his old friend Jeff Benjamin, who worked at Rolls-Royse.

Benjamin was able to reveal the mystery of constant deadlines and cost increases - it was all about... discipline of the Chinese responsible for civil works and installation of equipment. They just did the work on time - that's what a surprise! There are drawings - we cook reinforcement, pour concrete, hand over the stage of work. In a week - we get the next change in the project, break up the concrete, dismantle the reinforcement, mount the reinforcement, pour the concrete. The equipment arrived - we are installing according to the schedule. A couple of weeks after the assembly are American specialists for... equipment quality checks - well, they did not have time to do this earlier. Defect, dismantling, often - dismantling is also construction (the unit was installed, partitions were completed on the floor, ceilings were made, they went higher, the equipment could no longer be pulled out of the existing door windows). The Chinese would work as expected - without haste, with absenteeism, drunkenness, staff turnover - everything would be in order, but here is such a bad luck! Benjamin tried to put at least some order, but it turned out so-so - changes in the project still appeared, they still did not always have time to check the equipment coming from different parts of the world.

In December 2013, another batch of four RCPs from Curtiss Wright arrived from America to China, in January an audit revealed another marriage on two of them - and the pumps sailed back. At the same time, the deadline for delivery also sailed away - now for 2015, but the Chinese, with cheerful voices, reported that already three Chinese plants were ready to produce the same RCPs on their own. But - then, for now, it is necessary that expensive American teachers from Westinghouse finish fulfilling their obligations. The Chinese stood on the pier, smiled and waved after the floating steamer with pumps that were not completely alone on board - along with them they also sent "home" squirrels, clumsily made by SPX. There was an explosive in them, as it were, but they did not want to explode, and these cartridges had to put into operation the reactor safety systems in case of accidents.

2012: Westinghouse calls on Chinese with experience in building US nuclear power plant

At the beginning of 2012, the Chinese leadership was forced to admit the fact of a double rise in the price of AR-1000 projects, clumsily explaining this by a catastrophic change in the yuan against the dollar. SNPTC suspected that the rise in price can be stopped if you hurry up with the localization of equipment production. The Americans agreed and in the summer of 2012 handed over all the necessary documentation, after which the Chinese nuclear scientists realized that it would not be possible to overcome the increase in cost over the next five years. Taking into account all the changes made to the project according to the requirements of the KIAN, the Chinese accepted from Westinghouse 140,000 (one hundred forty thousand - in words) text documents and drawings. The weight of this engineering and bureaucratic miracle was 20 tons - it was far from easy for Chinese nuclear scientists to figure out what exactly they got.

So the rest of 2012 passed - the Chinese tried to figure out the carriage of documents, the Americans tried to solve the problem of the RCP, and time passed. At the end of the year, the Americans lost their nerves - Westinghouse officially admitted that the launch of Xianmen-1 would be postponed for at least six months. The frankness of the Americans had reasons related not only to China - Westinghouse in 2012, after much torment, received a license to build a AR-1000 in the United States. And a number of leading engineers of the company began to fight their own bosses for the gentlemen-leaders... persuaded the Chinese to go to the States, since there was simply no one to build there, and the Chinese had already gained experience in building a AR-1000 in China. That is, arriving in China in 2009 as teachers, in 2013 the Americans already understood that it was more expedient to become students. Westinghouse management, however, did not go to such a breakdown in reputation. As a result, the police caught drug addicts and alcoholics at construction sites in the States, the car with the reactor vessel flew downhill, and so on. This is what the engineers could not listen to - after all, the Chinese would go to such a job only after an interview with the CPC Central Committee, they would work for "five points with a plus"...

2011: China forced to abandon increased safety measures at Westinghouse nuclear power plant

China's state supervisors have been closely monitoring how the U.S. Nuclear Oversight Commission (NIC) is licensing the AR-1000 project. Chinese experts understood that the KIAN had more experience and qualifications, so almost one to one transferred these requirements to Westinghouse and to facilities being built in China. But at the same time, they also understood that the fulfillment of some requirements for Westinghouse was impossible. The KYAN demanded to change the design of the containment (external reactor shell) so that it was able to withstand the crash of an aircraft on it, the Chinese estimated how long Westinghouse would kill to do this, and even observing its main idea - the modularity of the design. A containment of individual modules, which must be mounted on the construction site so that planes jump off it? And the Chinese felt sorry - we will not have falling aircraft, we also cross out modularity, cast it from pre-stressed concrete, we were trained in this at the TAES. Westinghouse engineers were only delighted with this relaxation, the situation at both sites began to develop a little more vigorously. The project became increasingly "Chinese."

Construction continued, in the summer of 2011, the first reactor vessel arrived from South Korea at the Sanmen NPP site. One could hope that the problems of the initial stage managed to outgrow, that everything would improve, but the situation around the RCP became sharper and angrier. The tests that took place throughout 2010 and most of 2011 revealed more and more shortcomings - bearings warmed up, the case overheated. Curtiss Wright in the fall of 2011 officially informed SNPTC that the delivery of the first batch of pumps, which eliminated all the identified shortcomings, will occur with a delay of at least six months - until the second quarter of 2012, but Westinghouse continued to promise that everything would be fine that the start of the reactors will be strictly on schedule, in 2013. It is difficult to say on what such enthusiasm was based, because after three series of unsuccessful tests it was obvious that the Chinese would be as picky as possible when testing the next version of the RCP. For Westinghouse, such a failure was fraught not only with a blow to reputation - it led to direct financial losses, the amount of the contract with Curtiss Wright was $223 million, which had already been paid, threatened and fines for failure to meet deadlines.

2009: Americans fail in timeline and budget to build nuclear power plant in China

In 2007, Westinghouse secured the signing of the protocol of intentions for the construction of four AR-1000 reactors in China at once. The lack of reference units did not interfere with the confident statements of the United States that the commissioning of reactors will take place in 2013 - the affairs of American nuclear scientists confidently went uphill, to everyone's envy. As of March 2018, the launch of the AR-1000 in China has not yet taken place.

In 2007, under a contract with the Americans in China, they created a new nuclear concern State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC). The concern had to adopt the technology, localize the production of all components of nuclear units in China, and obtain from its specialists a level of qualification that would allow the further development of this technology. They agreed with the Americans almost amicably: they transferred the technology to the AR-1000 Chinese customer with the right of the latter to build a AR-1000 with a "Chinese accent" on the territory of the Celestial Empire, with the right to export a project only modified to a capacity of 1300 MW and higher. It is said - done, the parties have each started their work. The Americans had to show, "as it should," the Chinese - to plan and try to learn high craft.

This, excuse me, the serious part of the article ended, because then we will describe what representatives of the "most advanced and highly developed power" did in China when trying to build power units based on the AR-1000 reactor. We will try to give as few comments as possible, we will simply list the facts. And one more important point - China remains a fairly closed country, the terms of the contract were initially covered with a "commercial secret," therefore, not always what happened on construction sites could be found out from the official press. Part of the information is the result of the work of experts who studied the provincial and even municipal press, who communicated with Chinese nuclear scientists at all kinds of international meetings.

To begin with, Westinghouse told the Chinese that Shaw Group Inc.

After solving all organizational issues, 2008 became the start of construction, the commissioning of power units was provided for in 2013-2014. Earthworks at the Sanmen nuclear power plant in Zhejiang province started in February 2008, while the Chinese watched with some surprise as the Americans scattered contracts for the production of hulls, covers and containers (steel shells), steam generators, pumps and other equipment in white light - South Korean and Japanese factories and others came into play. There were only two US representatives on the list - Westinghouse undertook to independently manufacture the drives of the protection control system unit, and Curtiss Wright contracted under its strict control to produce RCP (main circulation pumps) for all reactors - 4 for each and two as spare.

In April 2009, at the Sanmen site, it came to pouring the first concrete, and then they finally decided on the second nuclear power plant - the Americans had to start work at the Hayanang nuclear power plant in Shandun province. Chinese experts, having studied the drawings of the reactor vessel and looking at how their production was organized at the factories of the South Korean Doosan Heavy Industries, in the same year identified the future domestic manufacturer - Shandong Nuclear Power Equipment Manufacturing Co. However, the suspicions of the Chinese that a contract was signed for the construction of a reactor that did not have a reference block in the United States themselves began to not only appear, but also gradually grow stronger - only the lazy did not talk about how the American nuclear supervision drives Westinghouse with the AR-1000 project. However, the changes and additions requested by the supervisory authorities in relation to the concrete "shirt" of the reactor began at + 30 meters - the Chinese still had time to see how all this would end.

In the summer of the same 2009, work began on the Haiyan site - the difference was only a few months. The fact that the pause was so short, as it later turned out, was a strategic mistake - without filling the bumps on the head reactor, the Americans did not get experience, could not find weaknesses, shortcomings. Look at how Rosatom works with the VVER-1200 reactor. The first of them was launched at the Novovoronezh NPP in 2016, and only in 2018 are the final stages with the same reactor at the Leningrad AES-2. The work of the manufacturers of all equipment has been debugged, errors in the organization of technological processes have been taken into account - all this has reduced the cost of the power unit, the following reactors will gradually make it possible to compensate for overspending that occurred during the construction of the very first. The Americans tried to squeeze into the contract amount, knocking down supplier prices at the expense of wholesale orders, replicating any miscalculation with a coefficient of 4, and then were forced to correct all this, disrupting the deadlines and inevitably spending extra money. As a result, they saved on everything that did not slow down to affect, and in the most tragic way.

On September 15, 2009, concrete work began on Haiyan, and on September 24, scaffolding collapsed - five corpses, 21 injured in the hospital. The Americans tried to make Chinese builders work in three shifts with salaries of $200 − 300, and even saving on elementary safety rules. The central Chinese press tried to silence this episode, but did not have time to "close the mouths" to the journalists of the provincial media - the information gradually began to leak out.

At the end of 2009, the alarm bell became more clearly heard - the US supervisory authorities rejected the sample of the main circulation pump, demanding a multiple increase in reliability. To comply with the project, the RCP was required, capable of working inside the reactor for the entire period of operation - 60 years without replacing gaskets, gears and other things, but in the presence of high pressure and radiation levels. The Americans promised to come up with something, hoping that there was a margin of time - civil construction was underway at the facility, the construction of the nuclear island should have begun much later.

The Chinese did not inflate the scandal this time either, but the click on the nose of the States received a thorough one. China continued negotiations with Pakistan, the parties moved to conclude a contract for the construction of six reactors for Islamabad by Chinese atomic scientists at once.

"Do not like that we are dragging atomic technologies into a country that has atomic weapons and has not signed the NPT? We look at your relationship with India - we see no differences. I don't like that these are our technologies, our reactors? We look at the results of the RCP inspections - sorry, we doubt the quality of the work under the contract. "

The calculation turned out to be accurate - not a word of objection from Washington was heard.

Of course, the Chinese could continue to try to keep quiet about the problems that have grown around AR-1000, but they turned out to be too significant. The interim results were summed up in the summer of 2010 - chaos at construction sites, clarifications and changes in the project, safety violations, and so on. It became obvious that at the units of the Sanmen NPP, the delivery period should be moved by two years, the estimate growth will be 50%, and according to unofficial estimates of independent experts, the price has risen 2.5-3 times. This, we repeat, after the first year of work. The Chinese again did not inflate the scandal - they simply began negotiations with Orano (formerly Areva) about the EPR-1600.

2006: Westinghouse gets contract in China for 4 AR-1000 reactors for $5bn

In the fall of 2004, China, the charter to beg Russia for the transfer of technology, decided to "throw the ball," announcing an international tender for the construction of four reactors, injecting the consent of applicants for the transfer of technology into the conditions. Rosatom preferred not to notice the tender, but it was at that time that the Japanese-American company Westinghouse and the French Orano (formerly Areva) appeared to participate - their obligation suited them. And the reasons for such malleability were very serious - both the United States and France by that time had not built new nuclear power plants either abroad or at home for 20 − 25 years. If AREVA could still boast of its victory in the 2003 tender in Finland, Westinghouse had nothing at all but drawings and 3D models of the AR-1000 reactor. At the same time, both companies were completely confident that the proposed design solutions meet all safety requirements and are economically very profitable.

The Chinese were in no hurry, the results of the tender were announced by the end of 2006. For these two years, AREVA has brilliantly demonstrated how wonderful it can work and what it does with the initial price. Was there great confidence China that Westinghouse's offer in terms of technology and security was no worse, and the Americans' ability to fulfill the terms of a possible contract would be better? It is difficult to say, but the political and accounting situation was then extremely beneficial for the Chinese. To begin with, they assured the Americans that China would need from 20 to 30 new reactors in the near future, and then began to closely look at how the negotiations on the "123 Agreement" between the United States and India were going.

After the 1974 nuclear bomb test, nuclear-supplying states (NSGs) blocked the supply to India of any technology and materials related to atomic technology, and India refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Indian politicians assured the world community that their country also needs about 30 new reactors, the Americans, with difficulty breathing from an attack of greed, undertook to resolve all the problems with the NSG - and a series of negotiations began.

But, whatever the result of the final version of the "123 Agreement," the Americans had to negotiate with the NSG, and with the IAEA, and with the parties to the NPT, and even with the UN Security Council. In all organizations, China's "weight" is very significant, so the upcoming bidding for its agreement with US efforts in relation to India pleased Beijing with the obvious prospects in negotiations with Westinghouse. The game turned out to be a win-win - the Americans were invited to agree once with the Chinese and get two wins at once - contracts for the construction of reactors in both China and India. True, it is not very clear at what point the Americans should have sung the liberals' anthem about the effectiveness of private business - the interests of the private company Westinghouse in the international arena were defended by almost the entire State Department, vice president and president of the country, leaders of the Senate and Congress.

Areva in November 2006 refused to continue the struggle, and in December Westinghouse received a coveted contract: two reactors in Zhejiang province and two reactors in Guangdong province, the total amount is $5.3 billion, the execution period is 5 years.

Few people heard the calm voice of the expert of the nuclear industry Andrei Cherkasenko:

"Victory on such terms will undermine the position of the American company in the Chinese market for the construction of reactors. These four blocks will be Westinghouse's last construction in China. "

It was said in December 2006, and after 12 years we see that Cherkasenko was 100% right.

1992: Agreement between Rosatom and China on the construction of power units with VVER-1000 reactors at the Tianwan NPP

In 1992, China signed an intergovernmental agreement with the Russian Federation on the construction by Atomstroyexport of two power units with VVER-1000 reactors at the Tianwan nuclear power plant (TAES). The reason for this friendliness was, among other things, that Russia was the only owner of uranium enrichment technology using gas centrifuges, which many times exceeded the technologies available to both France and the United States. Together with the agreement on reactors, there was also an agreement on the construction of a centrifugal uranium enrichment plant in China. The plant in China has been built, cascades of centrifuges have been mounted and launched, that's just how the sixth generation centrifuges stood there, and Rosatom is already mastering the tenth in 2018. The "focus" was that Russia did not transfer the technology itself, and Russia did exactly the same with VVER-1000 - despite the armful situation in our nuclear industry that developed in the dashing nineties, the technology of these reactors was never transferred to Chinese customers. Our proposal to China can be read as - "We are ready to solve your problems with electricity generation, but the technologies we offer will remain ours."

1985: The launch of the first nuclear power plant, work with France and the signing of the "123 Agreement" with the United States

Main Article: U.S. Atomic Cooperation with Other Countries (Agreement 123)

The first nuclear power plant in China was commissioned only in 1985. Despite the first successes of domestic nuclear scientists, through whose efforts the first-born nuclear power engineer of China gave current - a 300-megawatt reactor at the Qinshan nuclear power plant, even then the Chinese leadership relied on borrowing technologies - the growth in demand for electricity did not allow to waste time on creating completely "its" technology.

Since the time of Khrushchev, relations between China and the USSR have been extremely strained, American technologies were also not suitable for China both from a political point of view and for purely technical reasons - very shortly before that, on March 28, 1979, a serious accident occurred at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, there were no safer reactor projects in the United States at that time. England stopped updating its nuclear power plant fleet even earlier, Germany did not have SNF processing technology, but France had them - this country became a kind of "donor" for Chinese nuclear power.

By the mid-1980s, France was not only building reactors, it managed to master the processing of SNF and the production of MOX fuel, which America could not boast of. However, China chose to carefully comply with the "rules of the game" - they needed nuclear power, and not to find out whose button is larger, the questions of prestige were pushed into the background.

After the start of cooperation with French nuclear companies, China went to sign the 123 Agreement - among other reasons, NATO allies the United States and France wanted at least in this way to insure that China does not use the resulting technologies for the development of the nuclear defense complex. The signing of the Agreement took place in 1985 - from that moment China "became one of the civilized peoples," all the formalities necessary for the adoption of Western atomic technologies were observed.

"Agreement 123" China and the United States signed for a period of 30 years, so Westinghouse's participation in the tender for the construction of nuclear power plants in China was completely "legitimate." A feature was the retreat from the "gold standard" - China immediately got the opportunity to cooperate on SNF with France, and uranium enrichment work was not prohibited for it. The ban on enrichment made no sense at all - China is among the countries with nuclear weapons. But China did not rush to adopt the diffusion method enrichment technology - its nuclear scientists were aware of the USSR centrifuge technology and they did not spend money and effort on what is economically much less profitable.

The "Agreement 123" signed by China allowed him in the mid-1990s to begin negotiations with Russia on the construction of the Tianwan nuclear power plant and on the construction of a uranium enrichment plant in China using our technologies. The states "ate" everything - and work with SNF with France, and the construction of a nuclear power plant and an enrichment plant with Russia. The Americans could not intercept the French and Russian initiatives - they simply had nothing to offer in these areas.

Notes