U.S. Atomic Cooperation with Other Countries (Agreement 123)

Very often we are told about what the "123 Agreement" is and what its importance is for the development of nuclear power in certain countries and for the world nuclear project in general. The 123 Agreements once demonstrated the superiority of American nuclear technologies, when it was the States that determined in which country nuclear power plants were allowed to appear, and in which it was necessary to change laws and policies in order to be awarded "communion" to the most high-tech industry. But these times are over, the system of the unipolar world is collapsing before our eyes, and it is not just about the growing resistance of all those dissatisfied with this system. The states themselves are "tired" of the role of world leader, they do not cope with the efforts that are necessary to confirm this status. The process of "increasing technological fatigue" is most clearly visible in the history of the 123 Agreements.

2023: Washington bans South Korea from building nuclear power plants in Czech Republic

The US government has slowed down the implementation of the project of the South Korean company Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) to build a nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, Business Korea reported on April 6, 2023.

According to industry sources, KHNP submitted the information to the U.S. Department of Energy on December 23, 2022, to obtain approval to bid. The department denied the request on Jan. 19 .

According to the US government, the cross-border transfer of some American technologies in the field of nuclear power is impossible without the permission of Washington.

The problem stems from APR1400, South Korea's most advanced reactor, developed from its own technology but with support from Westinghouse.

In October 2022, the American company Westinghouse filed a lawsuit, stating that the South Korean reactor is subject to export restrictions under the US export control law.

2022

Leadership in the global commercial markets of nuclear reactors passed from the United States to Russia - IAEA

The United States has lost its primacy in the world commercial markets of nuclear reactors, it has passed to Russia, said IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi on October 29, 2022.

Agreement on the construction of 9 power units in Ukraine using AP 1000 technology

Energoatom and Westinghouse signed agreements on June 2, 2022 to increase the number of nuclear power units that will be built using AP 1000 technology in Ukraine from five to nine, and to create the Westinghouse engineering and technical center in Ukraine.

2019

US authorities thwart Bill Gates' plans to build a nuclear reactor in China

At the end of November 2019, Bill Gates said that the disruption of his project to build an experimental nuclear reactor in China slowed down the development of this technology for five years. An attempt to build a prototype in China failed due to restrictions on cooperation and foreign investment in the nuclear sphere, which were introduced by the United States in October 2018. Read more here.

Continued discussion of construction of 6 nuclear power plants in India

Six American nuclear power plants are planned to be built in India. The United States and India have already confirmed plans for the construction of such facilities. This was reported by Interfax with reference to the US State Department.

The parties reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral cooperation in the field of security and civilian use of atomic energy, including the construction of six American nuclear power plants in India, the statement said. The agreements were reached at a meeting in Washington.

The Indian side was represented by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Vijay Gokhane, the American side by US Deputy Secretary of State Andrea Thompson.

At the same time, the official Washington urged India and other market participants to stop buying Venezuelan oil. India remains an important oil market for Venezuela, while the US has imposed sanctions on Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA.

In 2018, oil exports from Venezuela to India averaged 340,000 barrels per day. In February 2019, Indians purchased 297 thousand barrels per day from Venezuelans.

2018

US plans to stop China's nuclear power development

On September 15, 2018, the American The Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed American officials, reported that the United States intends to strengthen control over the export of nuclear technology to China.

"The strengthening of control will be aimed at prohibiting China from acquiring nuclear technology not within the framework of a bilateral agreement"[1] the[1].

If this is true, then this means that the United States in its trade wars with China intends to expand restrictive measures to such an important industry as nuclear power. The most unpleasant thing for China is that in this case America has a completely correct justification for the alleged restrictive actions. The fact is that in 1985 the PRC and the United States signed Agreement 123 for a period of 30 years, the validity of which in 2015 was extended for the same period.

By agreement, the "Gold Standard" is a ban on uranium enrichment in the territory of a partner country and the transfer of SNF either by the United States itself or the allied countries indicated by it, a ban on the transfer of technology to third parties. A feature of the "Agreement 123" with the PRC was a deviation from the "gold standard" - China immediately got the opportunity to cooperate on SNF with France, and uranium enrichment work was not prohibited for it.

The "Agreement 123" signed by China allowed him in the mid-1990s to begin negotiations with Russia on the construction of the Tianwan nuclear power plant and on the construction of a uranium enrichment plant in China using our technologies, on the same basis China signed a protocol of intent with the American company Westinghouse in 2007 to build four AR-1000 reactors. It was possible to build only two, late in terms and exceeding the contractual estimate. But over the years, China has developed the technology of SAR-1400 reactors (China AP-1400) and, under an agreement with Westinghouse, received the right to build these reactors in third countries.

The 123 Agreement allows the United States to impose restrictions on these clauses of the treaty between China and the private company Westinghouse at any time, thereby violating all China's plans to export its atomic technologies to it. The 123 Agreement gives America the right to demand that China stop importing French and Russian technology, which could become a serious problem for the PRC. Under the agreement with France, a project is being developed for the construction of a plant for the processing of spent nuclear fuel in China using French technologies. Rosatom continues to work on the third and fourth power units of the Tianwan NPP.

Time will tell whether the WSJ message is true, what China's reaction will turn out to be.

Westinghouse unable to develop projects in India due to bankruptcy proceedings

In 2018, almost ten years have passed since the end of India's nuclear isolation and the conclusion of a nuclear agreement with the United States, but in the country by this time only one nuclear energy project had been implemented in partnership with a foreign state - and this is Russia, according to a Nuclear Asia article.

According to Nuclear Asia, one of the main reasons for Rosatom's success is the close relationship between India and Russia. In particular, the Russian-Indian agreement on cooperation in the field of atomic energy differs from similar agreements with other states - the document lacks a clause on the termination of the treaty if India tests nuclear weapons, the publication explains.

According to the specialized portal, two major projects with the American and French nuclear companies have been postponed indefinitely and no specific agreement is expected with the Indian Atomic Energy Corporation (NPCIL), a state-owned enterprise responsible for electricity production in the country.

Nevertheless, by the end of 2018, the French operator of nuclear power plants EDF plans to submit its proposal to the Indian side, and the American corporation Westinghouse, which also works in the field of atomic energy, expects to withdraw from bankruptcy proceedings. While the Russian state corporation Rosatom is already looking forward to the completion of construction at units No. 3 and No. 4 of the Kudankulam NPP. At the same time, Nuclear Asia notes, both Westinghouse and EDF intend to focus their proposals on the supply of nuclear reactors and other equipment, transferring to their Indian colleagues obligations to build^[2] themselves^[2] in^[2].

The joint project of the Jaitapur NPP in Maharashtra with the French company could become the largest nuclear power plant in the world with a total capacity of 9.6 GW. However, when French energy giant Areva ran into financial trouble, the future of the project was in doubt. In 2017, EDF acquired the company and since then the project has been under French negotiations with the Indian Atomic Energy Corporation. If they are successfully completed, EDF will only be responsible for engineering and procurement, with the Indian side taking over the construction.

Negotiations with Westinghouse to create six reactors worth $20 billion began back in 2009. But here, too, an obstacle arose - in 2017, an American company announced the passage of bankruptcy proceedings. After that, Westinghouse was bought by a Canadian consortium for $4.6 billion. But it is worth noting that Westinghouse's contract with the Indian side can only be signed after the completion of bankruptcy proceedings, which can only happen in 2019. Linking its financial problems with construction, the company said that it would only deal with the supply of reactors, and would give the construction of the nuclear power plant to. outsourcing

The only foreign partner who successfully implemented the project to create a nuclear power plant in India was the Russian state corporation Rosatom, writes Nuclear Asia. The construction of power units No. 1 and No. 2 of the Kudankulam NPP has already been completed, and in 2017 the procedure for pouring the first concrete was carried out at the site of the third power unit. The construction of the Kudankulam NPP - one of the largest nuclear power plants in India - is on schedule and equipment delivery has already begun.

Permit for fuel loading at the world's first AP1000 NPP in Sanmen

On April 27, 2018, the China State Nuclear Energy Technology Corporation (SNPTC) and CNNC Sanmen Nuclear Power Company Limited (SMNPC) reported that the world's first AP1000 nuclear power plant unit in Sanmen (Zhejiang province, China) had received permission to load fuel from China's National Nuclear Safety Authority (NNSA) and commenced initial loading.

"Today we have reached an incredibly important milestone for Westinghouse and our AP1000 technology," said Westinghouse President and CEO Jose Emeterio Gutiérrez. - "This is another significant step in the delivery to our customer of the world's first AP1000 power unit, demonstrating to the world the benefits of our advanced passive protection technology."

Block 1 of the Sanmen Nuclear Power Plant has successfully pass through all necessary functional tests, technical and safety checks, as well as through approvals with Chinese regulators. The fuel loading process will be followed by the achievement of initial criticality, initial synchronization with the power grid and conservative, step-by-step, power output in test mode until testing is reliably and successfully completed at maximum power.

"This important stage in the implementation of the project means the start of the final commissioning program for Block 1 of the Sanmen nuclear power plant," said David Durham, senior vice president of Westinghouse's new projects business. "I am confident that our teams will continue to work at the highest level - both in Sanmen and on the Haiyan and Vogtl projects, providing our constant support to existing power units around the world."

Strike against Westinghouse chief India visit

On February 13, 2018, a strike took place in India against the visit of a Westinghouse Electric executive. The Indian government plans to sign an agreement with Westinghouse to build six AP1000 nuclear reactors. Several Indian organizations have prepared a petition saying that "the AP1000 project has not yet been tested in practice and has faced licensing challenges, rising construction costs and time, and serious questions about its safety in the US, UK, China and other countries." The authors stress that "Westinghouse is pushing India to acquire untested nuclear technology"^[3].

2017: Reactors in China never launched

Winter 2016 - the expansion of some materials of the outer containment turned out to be higher than the design one. And such episodes in different areas arose almost weekly, and by that time, as you know, the work on the construction of the AR-1000 in the United States was finally overwhelmed. The Americans could only hope that the Chinese and Benjamin would somehow stretch out, somehow finish, somehow save their reputation.

SNPTC in early 2017 was given the main task - to launch Sanmen-1 and Haiyan-1, the Chinese leadership has already ceased to understand what the final price of the American miracle of technology will be. The attitude towards both AR-1000 and Westinghouse itself in China is becoming more skeptical, since attempts to start reactors in 2017 did not bring success. In August, hot tests were passed, but they did not start loading fuel - there are suspicions that the problems with biological protection were too big^[1].

Officials and the media are China silent, the Western press musing a letter from an environmental activist who in November 2017 called for a thorough rechecking of what was built. Westinghouse's European plants reported that they produced two batches of fuel for Chinese AR-1000 - the initial and first reboot, in January 2018, hot runs of the second units at both nuclear power plants took place, but there was no permission to load fuel either. Most likely, a series of control rechecks will follow - the Chinese do not want to take risks, so the presentation of the "world's most advanced reactor of the leading American" company will have to continue to wait.

2016: Indian Prime Minister Modi and US President Obama discuss building 6 nuclear power plants in India

Preliminary agreements to build Westinghouse six nuclear power plants in India were reached in 2016.

Then, following a meeting between President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the parties issued a joint statement that the American company Westinghouse will build six nuclear reactors in India. In particular, it was a question of Westinghouse building a nuclear power plant in Andhra Pradesh.

In 2016, India and the United States negotiated the provision of an American Export-Import Bank credit line for $8-9 billion for the construction of a nuclear power plant.

2015: Continued problems in the construction of nuclear power plants in China. Rescheduling by Years

In early March 2014, representatives of the KYAN arrived in China to listen to the claims of their Chinese colleagues about the technical parameters of the AR-1000. American experts tried to fulfill the role of lawyers - everything is fine, everything is in order, all 18 '000 changes and additions to the project expressed during its licensing in the United States, Westinghouse has already taken into account, you can safely finish the work. The Chinese, however, did not react to the demonstration of snow-white smiles - instead, they dumped another carriage and a small trolley of claims. As a result of the negotiations, the parties concluded that being two and a half years late is not a deadline, but an extra year to eliminate Westinghouse will only benefit. Support columns will be replaced, steel base plates will be welded, the transport lock will be redone - well, and so on. To say that SNPTC was upset - not to say anything, and this time it was not about money, something more terrible and terrible happened - the company was disrupting the plan of the five-year plan, which ended in 2015. It was so terrible that SNPTC did not even protest against this nonsense - the company's management almost kneeled before the Americans with pleas to launch at least at 23:59 on December 31.

In general, the Chinese bravely fought the skill and professionalism of the American company, but they lost this battle. It remained to agree to climb the scaffold with its head proudly raised - in January 2015, SNPTC officially announced that the launch of Sanmen-1 was postponed to 2016. The representative of the company, who read this text, hardly escaped a heart attack and stroke, although the comment of the CPC Central Committee tore into pieces of the heart of the SNPTC leaders, the bell buzzed in his heads:

"The

PRC authorities are definitely very disappointed."

But, surprisingly, the Earth did not run into the celestial axis, the execution sentences did not take place either, and the embezzled SNPTC began to confess in May 2015: in 2016 it is also unlikely, but in 2017 - for sure. And in general, it cannot be ruled out even that normally working pumps will come from America in the summer, and we are already doing everything else in China itself. This was pure truth - the case, cover, block of the protection control system were produced, everything was carefully delivered and mounted and, it would seem...

It turned out that it seemed that the pumps did not arrive in the summer, because they simply did not pass factory tests. No, not checks by the customer or the KYAN - even the naked American eye saw cracks in the shoulder blades in a centimeter wide. The CPC Central Committee did not give statements on this matter - it seems that the set of censorship words is over.

In October, the factory OTK in America "gave the go-ahead," the pumps sailed to the Chinese coast. We do not know this secret route - they arrived at the place of the RCP only in December, but this was still a victory, since this time they passed all the tests. Chinese customers immediately confirmed the order of all other pumps and began to pray to their Chinese gods so that American partners could cope with this work in the foreseeable future. The gods were complacent - the pumps began to go according to a new schedule, and in the first half of the year they were able to be installed in regular places, the nuclear scientists began cold running the reactor at Sanmen-1, in July the same stage was successfully carried out at the first reactor of the Haiyan NPP.

2013: China sends back defective equipment from US

In the winter of 2013, the deadline for the delivery of Xianmen-1 was finally postponed to the beginning of 2014, officially setting the Fukushima accident as the reason, although they had previously said that American technology was so good that the project did not require AR-1000 adjustment. Well, then in the American project on Chinese territory, the French accent began to be heard more and more clearly - in the fall of 2013 it turned out that the first block would be completed in 2014, but somewhere in November-December, one and a half years later than the contract term. Such frankness was due to the fact that since the beginning of 2013, the head of the Chinese division of Westinghouse had changed - the head of the company at that time, Danny Roderick, could not stand what Shaw people were doing at the venues, and persuaded him to accept the post of his old friend Jeff Benjamin, who worked at Rolls-Royse.

Benjamin was able to reveal the mystery of constant deadlines and cost increases - it was all about... discipline of the Chinese responsible for civil works and installation of equipment. They just did the work on time - that's what a surprise! There are drawings - we cook reinforcement, pour concrete, hand over the stage of work. In a week - we get the next change in the project, break up the concrete, dismantle the reinforcement, mount the reinforcement, pour the concrete. The equipment arrived - we are installing according to the schedule. A couple of weeks after the assembly are American specialists for... equipment quality checks - well, they did not have time to do this earlier. Defect, dismantling, often - dismantling is also construction (the unit was installed, partitions were completed on the floor, ceilings were made, they went higher, the equipment could no longer be pulled out of the existing door windows). The Chinese would work as expected - without haste, with absenteeism, drunkenness, staff turnover - everything would be in order, but here is such a bad luck! Benjamin tried to put at least some order, but it turned out so-so - changes in the project still appeared, they still did not always have time to check the equipment coming from different parts of the world.

In December 2013, another batch of four RCPs from Curtiss Wright arrived from America to China, in January an audit revealed another marriage on two of them - and the pumps sailed back. At the same time, the deadline for delivery also sailed away - now for 2015, but the Chinese, with cheerful voices, reported that already three Chinese plants were ready to produce the same RCPs on their own. But - then, for now, it is necessary that expensive American teachers from Westinghouse finish fulfilling their obligations. The Chinese stood on the pier, smiled and waved after the floating steamer with pumps that were not completely alone on board - along with them they also sent "home" squirrels, clumsily made by SPX. There was an explosive in them, as it were, but they did not want to explode, and these cartridges had to put into operation the reactor safety systems in case of accidents.

2012: Westinghouse calls on Chinese with experience in building US nuclear power plant

At the beginning of 2012, the Chinese leadership was forced to admit the fact of a double rise in the price of AR-1000 projects, clumsily explaining this by a catastrophic change in the yuan against the dollar. SNPTC suspected that the rise in price can be stopped if you hurry up with the localization of equipment production. The Americans agreed and in the summer of 2012 handed over all the necessary documentation, after which the Chinese nuclear scientists realized that it would not be possible to overcome the increase in cost over the next five years. Taking into account all the changes made to the project according to the requirements of the KIAN, the Chinese accepted from Westinghouse 140,000 (one hundred forty thousand - in words) text documents and drawings. The weight of this engineering and bureaucratic miracle was 20 tons - it was far from easy for Chinese nuclear scientists to figure out what exactly they got.

So the rest of 2012 passed - the Chinese tried to figure out the carriage of documents, the Americans tried to solve the problem of the RCP, and time passed. At the end of the year, the Americans lost their nerves - Westinghouse officially admitted that the launch of Xianmen-1 would be postponed for at least six months. The frankness of the Americans had reasons related not only to China - Westinghouse in 2012, after much torment, received a license to build a AR-1000 in the United States. And a number of leading engineers of the company began to fight their own bosses for the gentlemen-leaders... persuaded the Chinese to go to the States, since there was simply no one to build there, and the Chinese had already gained experience in building a AR-1000 in China. That is, arriving in China in 2009 as teachers, in 2013 the Americans already understood that it was more expedient to become students. Westinghouse management, however, did not go to such a breakdown in reputation. As a result, the police caught drug addicts and alcoholics at construction sites in the States, the car with the reactor vessel flew downhill, and so on. This is what the engineers could not listen to - after all, the Chinese would go to such a job only after an interview with the CPC Central Committee, they would work for "five points with a plus"...

2011: China forced to abandon increased safety measures at Westinghouse nuclear power plant

China's state supervisors have been closely monitoring how the U.S. Nuclear Oversight Commission (NIC) is licensing the AR-1000 project. Chinese experts understood that the KIAN had more experience and qualifications, so almost one to one transferred these requirements to Westinghouse and to facilities being built in China. But at the same time, they also understood that the fulfillment of some requirements for Westinghouse was impossible. The KYAN demanded to change the design of the containment (external reactor shell) so that it was able to withstand the crash of an aircraft on it, the Chinese estimated how long Westinghouse would kill to do this, and even observing its main idea - the modularity of the design. A containment of individual modules, which must be mounted on the construction site so that planes jump off it? And the Chinese felt sorry - we will not have falling aircraft, we also cross out modularity, cast it from pre-stressed concrete, we were trained in this at the TAES. Westinghouse engineers were only delighted with this relaxation, the situation at both sites began to develop a little more vigorously. The project became increasingly "Chinese."

Construction continued, in the summer of 2011, the first reactor vessel arrived from South Korea at the Sanmen NPP site. One could hope that the problems of the initial stage managed to outgrow, that everything would improve, but the situation around the RCP became sharper and angrier. The tests that took place throughout 2010 and most of 2011 revealed more and more shortcomings - bearings warmed up, the case overheated. Curtiss Wright in the fall of 2011 officially informed SNPTC that the delivery of the first batch of pumps, which eliminated all the identified shortcomings, will occur with a delay of at least six months - until the second quarter of 2012, but Westinghouse continued to promise that everything would be fine that the start of the reactors will be strictly on schedule, in 2013. It is difficult to say on what such enthusiasm was based, because after three series of unsuccessful tests it was obvious that the Chinese would be as picky as possible when testing the next version of the RCP. For Westinghouse, such a failure was fraught not only with a blow to reputation - it led to direct financial losses, the amount of the contract with Curtiss Wright was $223 million, which had already been paid, threatened and fines for failure to meet deadlines.

2009

New Japanese hosts Westinghouse delay building blocks at India AR-1000

In April 2009, India decided to study the issue of building energy units No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 at the Kudankulam NPP, and in May there was a breakthrough in negotiations on the supply of natural uranium with Kazakhstan - Astana "gave the go-ahead" for 2 "000 tons. The chronological coincidence is absolutely random - it happens so.

In June 2009, India announced that "it is ready to begin negotiations with Westinghouse on the details of the future construction of units with AR-1000 reactors," but these negotiations have been going on for many years. Why so long? Yes, because of the globality of the global economy, of course. The fact is that, in addition to China, Japan, which is one of the NSGs, was extremely dissatisfied with India's refusal to sign the NPT. It would seem - and what does the Americans care about the claims of Japan, which first refused to agree to lift the "atomic blockade" from India, and then did not sign an agreement on cooperation in nuclear power with India for several more years? The most direct - after all, Westinghouse in 2007 became the property of the Japanese Toshiba. And exactly the same problem arose in the second American company, which intended to build its reactors in India - the initiative came not from General Electric, but from the international concern GE/Hitachi. So it turned out that peaceful Russian nuclear scientists continued to build the Kundakulam blocks, and our American competitors were engaged in diplomatic games, giving Russia several years of advantages^[4].

Americans fail timeline and budget to build nuclear power plant in China

In 2007, Westinghouse secured the signing of the protocol of intentions for the construction of four AR-1000 reactors in China at once. The lack of reference units did not interfere with the confident statements of the United States that the commissioning of reactors will take place in 2013 - the affairs of American nuclear scientists confidently went uphill, to everyone's envy. As of March 2018, the launch of the AR-1000 in China has not yet taken place.

In 2007, under a contract with the Americans in China, they created a new nuclear concern State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC). The concern had to adopt the technology, localize the production of all components of nuclear units in China, and obtain from its specialists a level of qualification that would allow the further development of this technology. They agreed with the Americans almost amicably: they transferred the technology to the AR-1000 Chinese customer with the right of the latter to build a AR-1000 with a "Chinese accent" on the territory of the Celestial Empire, with the right to export a project only modified to a capacity of 1300 MW and higher. It is said - done, the parties have each started their work. The Americans had to show, "as it should," the Chinese - to plan and try to learn high craft.

This, excuse me, the serious part of the article ended, because then we will describe what representatives of the "most advanced and highly developed power" did in China when trying to build power units based on the AR-1000 reactor. We will try to give as few comments as possible, we will simply list the facts. And one more important point - China remains a fairly closed country, the terms of the contract were initially covered with a "commercial secret," therefore, not always what happened on construction sites could be found out from the official press. Part of the information is the result of the work of experts who studied the provincial and even municipal press, who communicated with Chinese nuclear scientists at all kinds of international meetings.

To begin with, Westinghouse told the Chinese that Shaw Group Inc.

After solving all organizational issues, 2008 became the start of construction, the commissioning of power units was provided for in 2013-2014. Earthworks at the Sanmen nuclear power plant in Zhejiang province started in February 2008, while the Chinese watched with some surprise as the Americans scattered contracts for the production of hulls, covers and containers (steel shells), steam generators, pumps and other equipment in white light - South Korean and Japanese factories and others came into play. There were only two US representatives on the list - Westinghouse undertook to independently manufacture the drives of the protection control system unit, and Curtiss Wright contracted under its strict control to produce RCP (main circulation pumps) for all reactors - 4 for each and two as spare.

In April 2009, at the Sanmen site, it came to pouring the first concrete, and then they finally decided on the second nuclear power plant - the Americans had to start work at the Hayanang nuclear power plant in Shandun province. Chinese experts, having studied the drawings of the reactor vessel and looking at how their production was organized at the factories of the South Korean Doosan Heavy Industries, in the same year identified the future domestic manufacturer - Shandong Nuclear Power Equipment Manufacturing Co. However, the suspicions of the Chinese that a contract was signed for the construction of a reactor that did not have a reference block in the United States themselves began to not only appear, but also gradually grow stronger - only the lazy did not talk about how the American nuclear supervision drives Westinghouse with the AR-1000 project. However, the changes and additions requested by the supervisory authorities in relation to the concrete "shirt" of the reactor began at + 30 meters - the Chinese still had time to see how all this would end.

In the summer of the same 2009, work began on the Haiyan site - the difference was only a few months. The fact that the pause was so short, as it later turned out, was a strategic mistake - without filling the bumps on the head reactor, the Americans did not get experience, could not find weaknesses, shortcomings. Look at how Rosatom works with the VVER-1200 reactor. The first of them was launched at the Novovoronezh NPP in 2016, and only in 2018 are the final stages with the same reactor at the Leningrad AES-2. The work of the manufacturers of all equipment has been debugged, errors in the organization of technological processes have been taken into account - all this has reduced the cost of the power unit, the following reactors will gradually make it possible to compensate for overspending that occurred during the construction of the very first. The Americans tried to squeeze into the contract amount, knocking down supplier prices at the expense of wholesale orders, replicating any miscalculation with a coefficient of 4, and then were forced to correct all this, disrupting the deadlines and inevitably spending extra money. As a result, they saved on everything that did not slow down to affect, and in the most tragic way.

On September 15, 2009, concrete work began on Haiyan, and on September 24, scaffolding collapsed - five corpses, 21 injured in the hospital. The Americans tried to make Chinese builders work in three shifts with salaries of $200 − 300, and even saving on elementary safety rules. The central Chinese press tried to silence this episode, but did not have time to "close the mouths" to the journalists of the provincial media - the information gradually began to leak out.

At the end of 2009, the alarm bell became more clearly heard - the US supervisory authorities rejected the sample of the main circulation pump, demanding a multiple increase in reliability. To comply with the project, the RCP was required, capable of working inside the reactor for the entire period of operation - 60 years without replacing gaskets, gears and other things, but in the presence of high pressure and radiation levels. The Americans promised to come up with something, hoping that there was a margin of time - civil construction was underway at the facility, the construction of the nuclear island should have begun much later.

The Chinese did not inflate the scandal this time either, but the click on the nose of the States received a thorough one. China continued negotiations with Pakistan, the parties moved to conclude a contract for the construction of six reactors for Islamabad by Chinese atomic scientists at once.

"Do not like that we are dragging atomic technologies into a country that has atomic weapons and has not signed the NPT? We look at your relationship with India - we see no differences. I don't like that these are our technologies, our reactors? We look at the results of the RCP inspections - sorry, we doubt the quality of the work under the contract. "

The calculation turned out to be accurate - not a word of objection from Washington was heard.

Of course, the Chinese could continue to try to keep quiet about the problems that have grown around AR-1000, but they turned out to be too significant. The interim results were summed up in the summer of 2010 - chaos at construction sites, clarifications and changes in the project, safety violations, and so on. It became obvious that at the units of the Sanmen NPP, the delivery period should be moved by two years, the estimate growth will be 50%, and according to unofficial estimates of independent experts, the price has risen 2.5-3 times. This, we repeat, after the first year of work. The Chinese again did not inflate the scandal - they simply began negotiations with Orano (formerly Areva) about the EPR-1600.

2010

US allows India to build SNF reprocessing plant without own technology

Indian negotiators in 2010 issued a gracious permit from the United States for the construction of a nuclear fuel processing plant, which will be developed at American reactors. Consider the absurdity - India asked America for permission to build a plant with technology that the States did not possess then and do not now.

India introduces a requirement for supplier liability for accidents. The United States is against. Negotiations drag on

Apparently, having spent too much time negotiating with American atomic bureaucrats, Hindus themselves became absurd, and therefore in 2010 came up with a new obstacle to signing contracts for the construction of nuclear power plants with US-Japanese corporations. In India, there was no law, which is necessarily included in the package of nuclear energy legislation - on the responsibility of the equipment supplier and the author of the NPP project for possible accidents. It is generally accepted that after the NPP is transferred under the control of the customer, this customer is responsible for the safety of the plant and is responsible, including financially, for all possible accidents. Indian nuclear scientists and politicians wanted to say a new word - they came up with the idea that responsibility from the equipment supplier and designer is not removed until the end of the NPP operation. Absurd, but that's how they wanted it. Rosatom and Orano (formerly Areva) clarified what the amount of responsibility could be, and quickly agreed that the amount could not exceed one billion dollars, after which our nuclear scientists continued to build Kundakulam, and the French to negotiate the signing of a contract for the construction of their EPR-1600.

The state-owned company AREVA at that time could afford such a risk, Rosatom did not really understand and still does not understand what a "VVER-1000 accident" is. But for Westinghouse and GE/Hitachi, such a demand from the customer became a stumbling block - private companies could not afford billions of dollars in risk, and they somehow had no confidence that everything would be accident-free on the reactors of their projects. Unlike Rosatom, which in those years conducted the real construction of reactors simultaneously in Russia, China and Iran, American "super professionals" built models of nuclear power plants on paper and in 3D format. Beautiful, elegant, excellent models made an indelible impression and delighted the audience, but how and what would turn out "in iron," American nuclear scientists had no idea. Therefore, the US government was very much outraged by the alogical demand of India - and the negotiations continued and continued.

In the summer of 2013, a press release from Westinghouse officially announced "incredibly powerful progress" towards signing the contract - the company was able to sign a memorandum of understanding with Indian customers. Rosatom employees gasped enviously and continued to bring the first Kudankulam reactor to the minimum controlled level.

In July 2014, Rosatom brought the reactor to 100% capacity. Moreover, Russia has just commissioned Kudankulam-1 into commercial operation, as US Secretary of State John Kerry sensationally announced "some progress in the negotiations" in January 2015. A breakneck pace.

In February 2015, Reuters reported that the triumph was getting closer:

"Actions to complete the breakthrough understanding reached during Obama's visit to India will be carried out before the end of the year."

In December 2015, India really signed the most important document! With Japan. Nuclear power Cooperation Agreement. With Westinghouse - did not sign. India was tired of such a frenzied rhythm, took a break for six months. It was necessary to observe the physical launch of the second block of Kudankulam, sign a contract with Rosatom for blocks No. 3 and 4, the Americans were not up to it.

In July 2016, Westinghouse Americans reached an agreement to conclude a contract with an Indian customer in a fantastically short time - by June 2017.

In the spring of 2017, Westinghouse went bankrupt. All hopes for the revival of the American company in the reactor construction market are now related only to China.

2006

Westinghouse gets contract in China for 4 reactors AR-1000 for $5 billion

In the fall of 2004, China, the charter to beg Russia for the transfer of technology, decided to "throw the ball," announcing an international tender for the construction of four reactors, injecting the consent of applicants for the transfer of technology into the conditions. Rosatom preferred not to notice the tender, but it was at that time that the Japanese-American company Westinghouse and the French Orano (formerly Areva) appeared to participate - their obligation suited them. And the reasons for such malleability were very serious - both the United States and France by that time had not built new nuclear power plants either abroad or at home for 20 − 25 years. If AREVA could still boast of its victory in the 2003 tender in Finland, Westinghouse had nothing at all but drawings and 3D models of the AR-1000 reactor. At the same time, both companies were completely confident that the proposed design solutions meet all safety requirements and are economically very profitable.

The Chinese were in no hurry, the results of the tender were announced by the end of 2006. For these two years, AREVA has brilliantly demonstrated how wonderful it can work and what it does with the initial price. Was there great confidence China that Westinghouse's offer in terms of technology and security was no worse, and the Americans' ability to fulfill the terms of a possible contract would be better? It is difficult to say, but the political and accounting situation was then extremely beneficial for the Chinese. To begin with, they assured the Americans that China would need from 20 to 30 new reactors in the near future, and then began to closely look at how the negotiations on the "123 Agreement" between the United States and India were going.

After the 1974 nuclear bomb test, nuclear-supplying states (NSGs) blocked the supply to India of any technology and materials related to atomic technology, and India refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Indian politicians assured the world community that their country also needs about 30 new reactors, the Americans, with difficulty breathing from an attack of greed, undertook to resolve all the problems with the NSG - and a series of negotiations began.

But, whatever the result of the final version of the "123 Agreement," the Americans had to negotiate with the NSG, and with the IAEA, and with the parties to the NPT, and even with the UN Security Council. In all organizations, China's "weight" is very significant, so the upcoming bidding for its agreement with US efforts in relation to India pleased Beijing with the obvious prospects in negotiations with Westinghouse. The game turned out to be a win-win - the Americans were invited to agree once with the Chinese and get two wins at once - contracts for the construction of reactors in both China and India. True, it is not very clear at what point the Americans should have sung the liberals' anthem about the effectiveness of private business - the interests of the private company Westinghouse in the international arena were defended by almost the entire State Department, vice president and president of the country, leaders of the Senate and Congress.

Areva in November 2006 refused to continue the struggle, and in December Westinghouse received a coveted contract: two reactors in Zhejiang province and two reactors in Guangdong province, the total amount is $5.3 billion, the execution period is 5 years.

Few people heard the calm voice of the expert of the nuclear industry Andrei Cherkasenko:

"Victory on such terms will undermine the position of the American company in the Chinese market for the construction of reactors. These four blocks will be Westinghouse's last construction in China. "

It was said in December 2006, and after 12 years we see that Cherkasenko was 100% right.

"Agreement 123" for India

The fate of the "123 Agreement" between the United States and India was dramatic. After India conducted a nuclear test in 1974, the NSG (Association of Nuclear Supplier States) decided to ban the supply of any products and technologies to this country that have at least something to do with nuclear energy. There are no serious resources of uranium on the territory of India, with other energy resources on the Hindustan Peninsula it is also not good - there is no decent amount of oil, gas or coal.

India resisted, stubbornly refusing to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the "atomic blockade" lasted more than 30 years. It is not known how this could end, but, apparently, someone in the leadership of India found a weak point - the craving of overseas democracy for the golden calf and the desire of the United States to maintain the status of a world hegemon.

At the same time, the pride and ambition of the Indian leadership has entered into a brutal battle with the demands of the country's power. Its population is not just huge, it also lives along all major rivers, which reduces the chances of building a hydroelectric power station to almost zero. What's the dam and reservoir if tens of millions of people have to be relocated? India's growing dependence on oil and gas imports reached 80% by the early 2000s.

In 2006, the adviser to the Government of India on scientific issues R. Chidambaram made a natural conclusion:

"Nuclear power is becoming inevitable for India. In the future, the importance of nuclear power plants will only increase

"

If other countries of the world can afford to think about the choice between gas, coal, oil, uranium, hydroelectric power plants and renewable exotics, then China and India have no alternative. With rising living standards, demand for nuclear reactors in India and China will skyrocket, with two huge nuclear power plant construction markets growing here. Since the mid-2000s, a round dance of representatives of energy concerns has been going on in India.

After the Hindus gave a signal that they were ready to pay for the construction of dozens of nuclear power plants, the Americans considered it possible to begin negotiations on the "123 Agreement" and with this state. Negotiations were not easy, stubbornly, intermittently - Indian politicians did not want to agree with all the demands of the United States, which in turn did not want to agree with the desire for independence of the country.

Among the requirements that the Americans wanted to see in the cooperation agreement were four points that Indian politicians did not like from the word "at all":

• Complete ban on SNF processing and heavy water production;
• Control over the use of American equipment supplied to India;
• Annual certification by the President of the United States of India's compliance with the rules of the non-proliferation regime;
• Limiting future nuclear fuel supplies to operational needs, preventing India from stockpiling.

In addition, Washington considered it necessary to get the opportunity to unilaterally interrupt all contacts, supplies, work if the next test of nuclear weapons is carried out in India. Manmohan Singh rightly believed that a treaty that contained all these provisions would not have passed ratification in the Indian Parliament. But the situation was not limited only to negotiations with the United States - China was also in the case with all its contradictions in relations with India. The Chinese were well aware that the planned agreement on cooperation in the nuclear industry would become an unofficial recognition of India's right to nuclear weapons, and therefore very persistently demanded India's accession to the NPT. It is possible that China would have managed to prevent the lifting of the "atomic blockade" of India, if not for the headlines of the American press:

"American companies can make more than $100 billion from the construction of nuclear power plants in India..."

So think - could American politicians who genuinely wanted to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons resist all lobbying groups?

The resistance was broken in a short time. In the final version of the US-India treaty, most of the amendments that provoked protests from New Delhi were either softened or transferred to "toothless" (non-binding) articles. For example, the measures of strict control by the United States were lowered to "mandatory information messages," and the preface of the treaty was decorated with the following phrase:

"Peaceful

atomic cooperation between the United States and India will not be aimed at deterring India's military nuclear program."

But Washington did not fail to rouse:

"The United States will not assist India in obtaining fuel from third countries unless there are reasons of a market or other similar nature."

It sounds very tough, just recall that at that time the Russian-American contract HEU-NEU was in effect, according to which the States received from Russia up to half of the uranium required for their nuclear power plants. What could these people put in India? Indian negotiators with a convulsive effort wiped smiles from their faces, depicted upset and almost directly flew from Washington to Paris and Moscow. Orano (formerly Areva) was able to find 300 tons of uranium in its bins, TVEL - 2 "000 tons.

Russia treated and treated the restrictions imposed on India by its treaty with the United States with great attention and respect. On March 30, 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed a decree on changes in customs legislation that facilitated the export of nuclear materials and technologies to India. But - with attention and respect for the demands of Americans:

"It is necessary

to receive assurances from the authorized government bodies of India that the received export items will be used only in nuclear facilities put under IAEA guarantees"

2006, November - A delegation of representatives from Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel Power, BWXT, Thorium Power Company and a dozen other energy companies arrive in India. Following the Americans - the Japanese and Canadians, the French, because India in all seriousness said that in the next 25 years it needs 25-30 "thousandth" reactors.

In 2006, the "123 Agreement" signed by US President Bush Jr. and Indian Prime Minister Singh began its journey through Washington's bureaucratic labyrinths. The Senate and Congress voted "yes" with a huge advantage. The signing of the "123 Agreement" was fully paid for by India - in the same year it entered into contracts for the supply of S-130, F-16 and F-18.. aircraft.

But the 123 Agreement is only a prerequisite for signing a more detailed nuclear cooperation treaty. On the one hand, India really needed the treaty. America proposed to clearly separate India's military and peaceful, energy nuclear programs, putting the latter under the control of the IAEA, the NSG group and... themselves. The agreement was supposed to allow the NSG to turn a blind eye to the Indian-unsigned DNYP and resume deliveries - read as "to proceed with sharing the pie of Indian orders for nuclear power plants."

With all this excitement, there was only one country that did not take part in the round dance - Russia, since Minat continued to use at least something decent that remained after Gorbachev - an agreement on the construction of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant.

1998: Russia and India sign contract to build Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India

In 1998, the Minister for Atomic power Yevgeny Adamov and the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission R. Chidambaram signed the agreed contract for the construction of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India.

In the spring of 2002, the first concrete was laid, in the fall of the same year, Russian specialists began work on the site. In fact, the USSR, and after it Russia, recognized India's right to possess nuclear weapons without joining the NPT, but the Kudankul treaty did not relieve India's alarm about the lack of fuel for its other nuclear power plants, so negotiations with the United States continued.

1992: Agreement between Rosatom and China on the construction of power units with VVER-1000 reactors at the Tianwan NPP

Nevertheless, in 1992, China signed an intergovernmental agreement with the Russian Federation on the construction by Atomstroyexport of two power units with VVER-1000 reactors at the Tianwan NPP (TAES). The reason for this friendliness was, among other things, that Russia was the only owner of uranium enrichment technology using gas centrifuges, which many times exceeded the technologies available to both France and the United States. Together with the agreement on reactors, there was also an agreement on the construction of a centrifugal uranium enrichment plant in China. The plant in China has been built, cascades of centrifuges have been mounted and launched, that's just how the sixth generation centrifuges stood there, and Rosatom is already mastering the tenth in 2018. The "focus" was that Russia did not transfer the technology itself, and Russia did exactly the same with VVER-1000 - despite the armful situation in our nuclear industry that developed in the dashing nineties, the technology of these reactors was never transferred to Chinese customers. Our proposal to China can be read as - "We are ready to solve your problems with electricity generation, but the technologies we offer will remain ours."

1988: Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi sign agreement to build Kudankulam NPP

On November 20, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an interstate agreement on the construction of the first stage of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant from two power units with VVER-1000 reactors.

1985: "Agreement 123" for China

Main article: Nuclear power plants in China

After the start of cooperation with French nuclear companies, China went to sign the 123 Agreement - among other reasons, the allies on NATO USA France and wanted at least in this way to insure that China does not use the resulting technologies for the development of the nuclear defense complex. The signing of the Agreement took place in 1985 - from that moment China "became one of the civilized peoples," all the formalities necessary for the adoption of Western atomic technologies were observed.

"Agreement 123" China and the United States signed for a period of 30 years, so Westinghouse's participation in the tender for the construction of nuclear power plants in China was completely "legitimate." A feature was the retreat from the "gold standard" - China immediately got the opportunity to cooperate on SNF with France, and uranium enrichment work was not prohibited for it. The ban on enrichment made no sense at all - China is among the countries with nuclear weapons. But China did not rush to adopt the diffusion method enrichment technology - its nuclear scientists were aware of the USSR centrifuge technology and they did not spend money and effort on what is economically much less profitable.

The "Agreement 123" signed by China allowed him in the mid-1990s to begin negotiations with Russia on the construction of the Tianwan nuclear power plant and on the construction of a uranium enrichment plant in China using our technologies. The states "ate" everything - and work with SNF with France, and the construction of a nuclear power plant and an enrichment plant with Russia. The Americans could not intercept the French and Russian initiatives - they simply had nothing to offer in these areas.

1954: U.S. Atomic Energy Act

Bet on private companies

US President Dwight Eisenhower signed the thoroughly amended and expanded Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which for a long time remained the "main instruction" for the American nuclear power project and which the United States tried to make fundamental to the rest of the world. For us, this law is interesting in two of its articles. According to one of them, private companies came to the nuclear project - the state gave them the development, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

There was a time when the United States began to build ten to one and a half reactors in a year, when American companies simultaneously built nuclear power plants in different countries. The times of "atomic romance," when the world did not yet know major accidents at nuclear power plants, when nuclear scientists did not think much about safety systems, about the need to solve the problem of spent nuclear fuel, about how and what to do with reactors after their service life ends.

But even then, misses began to accumulate - private traders confidently marched past gas centrifuges, could not cope with the development of the technology of fast neutron reactors.

After the disaster of 1979 at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant , private traders completely abandoned the construction of new reactors - strengthening safety systems was required, for their development they needed serious investments that did not promise quick profits. Well, the worst thing happened to the US state machine - intensively telling everyone about the effectiveness of the private owner compared to the oblique state economy, American politicians... began to believe in this myth themselves. Ideological dogmas forced the Bill Clinton administration to privatize the USEC American Enrichment Company, which brilliantly went bankrupt after many years of trying to cope with centrifuges.

By signing an agreement with Russia on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium, the Americans entrusted the construction of a MOX fuel plant not to a state, but to a private company.

Article 123 of the law on US nuclear cooperation with other countries

Article of Law-1954, number 123, part "a," determined the procedure for building US cooperation in the field of nuclear power with other states. The 1954 law requires a special agreement, which is usually called the "123 Agreement." The states imposed certain rules of conduct on countries that wanted to become their partners with these agreements.

"If you want to get our technology - be kind to meet our requirements"

The Gold Standard is a ban on uranium enrichment on the territory of a partner country and the transfer of SNF either by the United States itself or its designated allied countries, a ban on the transfer of technology to third parties.

The first "123 Agreements" were signed with Great Britain, but even then it became obvious that the declared technological superiority of the United States was only an attempt to "inflate the cheeks." Here is the chronology of the creation of the nuclear power plant:

• 1954 - USSR (nuclear power plant in Obninsk),
• 1956 - England, and
• only 1958 - USA.

The former empire put its former colony in its place - to power Great Britain no assistance was required in atomic weapons, it created its own reactor technology.

France started much later, but since the state developed nuclear power in it, the French bypassed America in the processing of SNF and in MOX fuel technology, because the "123 agreements" with other countries provided for the transfer of SNF not to the States, but to France.

The procedure for signing and ratifying "123 Agreements" is furnished with intricate bureaucratic procedures. Negotiations on the signing of "123 agreements" are conducted by the Secretary of State, while he is obliged to consult with the Minister of Energy. The Minister of Energy, in turn, consults with specialists from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In fact, the following is happening: the Secretary of State and the Minister of Energy sign a joint memorandum for the President, setting out in it their opinion and recommendations on the signing of the "123 Agreement," the NRC presents its opinion to the President separately.

Another document is being prepared by the State Department - "an unclassified Statement on assessing the state of affairs with the proliferation of nuclear weapons." This is, in fact, an assessment of the sufficiency of security measures and control over the use of nuclear power - can the States be sure that the provided technological assistance will not be further used for military purposes.

But this is not all - except for the State Department, in the case of the CIA, which is preparing a secret appendix to the Statement. The US President can approve the "123 Agreement" only after he states in writing that "the implementation of the agreement will not create an unjustified threat to joint defense and security, but will strengthen them." In fact, all of the listed US officials are conducting months-long, or even many years-long negotiations with a country that wants to receive technological assistance from the States until it agrees to all their demands. But, sooner or later, a bundle of documents gets to the president, he "states them in writing" and signs them, then sends them to parliament for ratification.

1946: US passes law banning the transfer of nuclear technology information

Immediately after the US bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they began to legally formalize the existence of the nuclear industry. The Atomic Energy Act was signed by Truman on August 1, 1946, and entered into force on January 1, 1947. The law was aimed, of course, at maintaining a nuclear monopoly, for which the US government needed a "whip" - a law on the basis of which it was possible to send to trial anyone who tried to divulge technological secrets. Any information related to the production or use of fissile materials was classified as closed information in the law. The exchange of information on the military and peaceful use of atomic energy was completely prohibited, including with allied countries. But, in addition to restrictions and prohibitions, the law provided for the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission consisting of 9 senators and 9 congressmen, this civilian state body seized control from the military.

The level of secrecy was raised high, but this did not become an obstacle for comrades who received salaries in the NKVD and in the GR, and made every effort to help our Special Committee. The atomic explosion in 1949, the thermonuclear explosion in 1953 were clearly shown - the Americans could not hide the sewing in a bag, the USSR captured all the secrets of the atom.

1942: Enrico Fermi receives first nuclear chain reaction