Belt and Road (BRI, New Silk Road)

Main article: China's Foreign Trade

Participants in the Chinese Belt and Road project for October 2023

2023

China's exports to Belt and Road project countries exceeded exports to the US, EU and Japan

Perhaps China's exports to developed markets went through third countries.

Slowdown in the development of the initiative after the COVID-19 pandemic

"Belt and Road" - "Project of the Century" by Chinese President Xi Jinping by the fall of 2023 faces an uncertain future. The Green Finance & Development Center, a think tank, estimates that the project raised US $1 trillion in the first decade, but the momentum has weakened in recent years.

With the world's second-largest economy slowing, China's overall activity in the BRI countries is down about 40% from its 2018 peak.

One of the Chinese officials believes that the BRI initiative has died because it was dealt a double blow - the COVID-19 pandemic and China's economic problems. The official, who asked not to be named, said the government hoped a summit in October to mark the 10th anniversary of the BRI would give the project new impetus.

China is reconsidering how to lend to developing countries, a strategy that could help those countries' largest official lender maintain a shrinking advantage over the United States and its G7 allies.

By November, Beijing had begun abandoning major bilateral deals it sought to strike 10 years ago - when it first launched its flagship Belt and Road initiative, which credits mostly infrastructure projects - in favor of joint lending, which reduces its exposure to financial risks.

Managing 100 Port Terminals in 50 Countries

According to the Washington Post, ten years ago, the PRC had a stake in 44 ports. And for 2023 , it already operates 100 terminals in 50 countries.

China buys up shares in seaports in Southern and Eastern Europe as part of the Belt and Road Initiative:

• In 2016, COSCO Shipping Ports acquired a 40% stake in the Vado Ligure terminal from Vado Holding B.V., as well as the only container terminal in Italy. In the same year, the Chinese bought 51% of the shares of the largest Greek port of Piraeus, subsequently bringing their stake to 67%.

• At the end of 2017, COSCO Shipping Ports became the main shareholder of the Spanish Noatum Port Holding and gained control over the ports of Bilbao and Valencia (the fifth largest container port in Europe). And Montenegro almost lost for the debts of its key port of Bar, through which NATO equipment regularly passes .

• The Chinese bought a 90% stake in the container terminal in the Belgian Zeebrugge, one of the key logistics facilities needed by the United States to transfer troops to Europe. They are also the owners of part of the shares of the ports of Antwerp (Belgium) and Rotterdam (Netherlands).

By buying up port stocks, China primarily creates entry points, or as the Chinese themselves say, a "gateway" for export to Europe.

Chinese private security companies in Africa to protect government organizations and private companies

"Security companies" in Africa consist mainly of veterans of the People's Liberation Army of China.

Also, to avoid attracting more attention and comparison with the Russian PMC Wagner or the American Blackwater, Chinese contractors work exclusively at Chinese facilities, only occasionally training local African military and police units, and do not want to interfere in any way in the domestic politics of the countries of the African continent.

Thus, the PRC has created new paramilitary structures that will not be pressured from other countries, which the government trusts to fulfill their tasks, and which creates jobs for military veterans who have not found a place in civilian life and are dissatisfied with the usual benefits from the government.

Employees of most Chinese security firms are prohibited from carrying weapons both domestically and abroad, forcing them to interact with local companies or security forces to whom they provide additional remuneration, training, technical means, intelligence and equipment.

In conditions Sudan South Sudan and companies, VSS Security Group and DeWe Security Service, for example, work with local armed forces on the ground, and in some cases accompany them on missions to ensure the safety of workers in mines and oil enterprises.

Chinese security companies VSS Security Group, DeWe Security Service, Frontier Services Group, Shandong Huawei Security Group and China Security and Technology Group, in addition to organizing the protection of Chinese enterprises, infrastructure and logistics routes, are also engaged in: intelligence, training hired African "mercenaries," consulting services for the organization of logistics, protection of dignitaries.

Zhongjun Junhong Security Service, China Overseas Security Group and Huaxin Zhong An Security Group were accredited not only by the PRC government, but also by the Association of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. This association, based in Switzerland, sets internationally recognized standards to ensure compliance with international law on the use of force.

That is, these companies actually received permission to use weapons when performing their tasks. Accordingly, in addition to the tasks already listed, these private security companies are also engaged in sea and ground support, direct protection of Chinese enterprises, dignitaries and even embassies abroad, as well as the fight against piracy. Access to weapons and permission to use force make the services of these three companies highly sought after in the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden, where there is a high risk of pirates attacking the merchant fleet.

The main customers of the services of Chinese "private" security companies are: government structures of the PRC in Africa, state-owned enterprises, Chinese transport, logistics and oil and gas companies.

2022: New energy supply route through Pakistan in case Americans block the Strait of Malacca

As of 2022, the PRC imports more than 10 thousand barrels of oil per day, most of which comes through the Strait of Malacca. The leadership of the Communist Party of China (CCP) is concerned that the passage through the busy sea corridor may be at risk. In the event of a military conflict with the United States for Taiwan, the Americans will easily be able to block the strait.

This scenario was an incentive to diversify energy supplies and create alternative routes, including through Pakistan.

Pakistan's access to the Indian Ocean opens up access to strategic trade zones (Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf). This path is more costly, unlike the Strait of Malacca, but safer from a geopolitical point of view beyond the reach of the United States and allies.

2021: Leadership on investment in developing countries

China and G7 investments in developing countries

2018: Chinese workers in Africa reach 1m

As of 2018, more than 200,000 Chinese workers had moved to Africa in search of Belt and Road work opportunities, bringing the total number of Chinese immigrants to more than 1 million.

2017: 10,000 Chinese companies operate in Africa

As of 2017, more than 10 thousand Chinese companies operated in Africa.