Global Positioning System - GPS NAVSTAR GPS NAVigation Satellites providing Time And Range GPS-spoofing

GPS was developed on the instructions of the Pentagon by engineers at the US Air Force base in Los Angeles. The first GPS satellite was launched in 1978. Until 2000, the military deliberately degraded the quality of receiving satellite signals for civilians, as it was considered, first of all, a military tool. Later, US President Bill Clinton intervened in the situation, after which the GPS market began to develop rapidly.

The system is used not only in a variety of car navigators and modern smartphones, but also by emergency services, cargo companies, financial institutions and others, many of which become helpless without a global positioning system.

The GPS system remains controlled by the US military command, so other countries are seeking to commission similar systems that can make them independent.

Russia was a pioneer in the creation of a satellite navigation system, launching its development back in the early 1980s. Later, the GLONASS system was successfully put into operation.

Systems similar to GPS are being developed by the European Union and China. In the European Union - this is Galileo, in China - Baidu.

GPS monitoring is a technology used to solve transport logistics problems, to control the actual routes of vehicles and mobile employees using the Global Positioning System (GPS). Monitoring allows you to track the current coordinates, direction, and speed of a vehicle or mobile worker in real time. In some systems, it is possible to install additional sensors to open doors, turn on/off actuators of special equipment, fuel sensors, etc. Monitoring the compliance of the actual route with the planned one increases the discipline of drivers, prevents the use of official vehicles for personal purposes and fuel theft. According to the Logistics magazine, only by increasing the discipline of drivers in Russian conditions, gsm monitoring systems pay off in a few months.

GPS receiver - a device for determining geographical coordinates of the current location based on data on time delays in the arrival of radio signals emitted by satellites of the NAVSTAR group. The maximum measurement accuracy is 3-5 meters. The accuracy of commercial GPS modules ranges from 150 meters (for older models with poor satellite visibility) to 3 meters (for new models in an open place). In addition, with WAAS/EGNOS/MSAS systems and local correction transmission systems, accuracy can be increased to 1-2 meters horizontally.

GPS tracker - a device for receiving and transmitting data for gps tracking and monitoring the movements of the object to which it is attached. The tracker can be used to locate people, animals, goods or vehicles, as well as other objects. The device records the received information at regular intervals and can transmit them via radio, cellular or satellite communication in the form of SMS or over the Internet. Used in OPTIMUM GIS geoinformation system. Synonyms, possible formulations - gps locator, GSM tracker or GPRS tracker.

GPS bracelets

Main article: GPS bracelets

2023: Global GPS Antenna Market Growth by 5% to $2.91 Billion

In 2023, the global GPS antenna market reached $2.91 billion. This is 5% more compared to 2022, when costs in this area were estimated at $2.77 billion. Industry trends are addressed in the Market Research Future survey published in mid-December 2024.

Analysts call the active introduction of satellite navigation tools in various sectors such as automotive, aerospace, telecommunications and construction as the key driver of the market in question. Businesses around the world are looking to improve operational efficiency and security as well as logistics, driving demand for positioning systems. In the transportation industry, the use of location tools allows you to update traffic data in real time, optimize routes and track the movement of goods. In aerospace, GPS antennas are critical for navigation and surveillance, ensuring the safety of air traffic control. Construction companies use navigation tools to improve accuracy during work.

The growth of GPS antenna sales is facilitated by the development of the concept of a smart city. Megacities are focused on integrating digital technologies to improve infrastructure and improve the quality of life of citizens. At the same time, positioning tools are an integral part of various applications, including intelligent transport systems, public safety and urban planning. Efficient traffic management relies on accurate location data to monitor vehicle traffic, optimize traffic lights and provide real-time information to passengers. In public safety, GPS-enabled systems help emergency services respond more quickly to incidents. Plus, navigation receivers and antennas are integrated into a variety of consumer devices, including smartphones, smartwatches, laptops and tablets. The continued development of automotive technologies and the Internet of Things further increases the demand for navigation products.

The authors of the study distinguish four groups of GPS antennas: active, passive, geodetic and built-in. In 2023, products of the first type accounted for $1.2 billion, the second - $0.8 billion. Another approximately $0.6 billion was provided by geodetic solutions, $0.3 billion - built-in. Geographically, in 2023, she was in the North America lead with an estimate of $1.2 billion, which reflects the high level of development of technological infrastructure. In second place is Europe with expenses at the level of $0.8 billion. The Asia-Pacific region lags slightly behind with a result of $0.75 billion South America. It provided a contribution of $0.1 billion, dollars while Middle East Africa it brought in $0.06 billion. The list of significant market players includes:

• Antenova;
• Trimble;
• Quectel Wireless Solutions;
• GPS Source;
• Taoglas;
• Melexis;
• Hirschmann Car Communication;
• Laird Connectivity;
• NovAtel;
• Navcom Technology;
• Cobham Antenna Systems;
• Skyworks Solutions;
• ublox;
• Tallysman Wireless;
• AeroAntenna Technology.

At the end of 2024, revenue in the GPS antenna segment is estimated at $3.06 billion. Market Research Future analysts believe that in the future, the CAGR will be 4.95%. As a result, by 2032, costs on a global scale could increase to $4.5 billion.^[1]

2022: Rosaviatsia advised airlines to prepare for flights without GPS

On April 22, 2022, it became known that the Federal Air Transport Agency recommended that Russian airlines prepare for flights without using the American navigation satellite system (GPS). The agency fears GPS failures and refers to a report by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which mentioned more frequent cases of GPS jamming. EASA wrote that the problems began against the background of the Russian military operation in Ukraine.

Recommendations contain in the letter of the deputy head of Rosaviatsia Dmitry Yadrov. The document was sent to the general director of the State Air Traffic Management Corporation (ATM) Igor Moiseenko and the heads of the interregional departments of the Federal Air Transport Agency, who forwarded it to the airlines. Rosaviatsia instructed the state corporation for ATM "to assist aircraft crews when turning off GPS." Pilots are advised to inform dispatchers of "GPS failures, deterioration and abnormal operation." Airlines must conduct classes with the flight personnel to work out actions in case of failures in the operation of satellite navigation systems.

Mr. Yadrov wrote that the recommendations are related to the EASA report of March 17. The European aviation regulator reported that after February 24, when the Russian military operation in Ukraine began, cases of GPS "jamming" and "spoofing" (signal substitution) became more frequent. Similar incidents were recorded in the Kaliningrad region, in the Baltic and Black Seas, in the eastern part of Finland, in the eastern Mediterranean region (near Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Israel) and northern Iraq . In some cases, interference with GPS led to a change in the route of the aircraft or even the destination "due to the inability to make a safe landing," according to the report (.pdf) EASA^[2]

On April 22, 2022 Roskosmos , he will send Ministry of Transport of Russia proposals to the Federal Air Transport Agency to replace GPS at all domestic transport facilities with equipment. GLONASS First of all, this applies to aircraft, which are also planned to be connected the Chinese to the navigation system. " This was Beidow announced on April 22, 2022 by the head of the state corporation Dmitry Rogozin in his Telegram channel.

Despite our repeated warnings, Russian airlines continued to lease and purchase foreign aircraft, ignoring the requirements for installing GLONASS equipment on it. Now, in scalded cat mode, they will look for a solution. And it is one thing - to install GLONASS stations at all airports to provide a high-precision navigation signal and install GLONASS receivers on all aircraft operating in our country, - writes the head of Roscosmos.[3]

2020: Brazilian authorities introduce population location control technology

At the end of March 2020, the Brazilian government announced the deployment of a system that uses user geolocation to limit the spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus . Read more here.

2019

Previously unknown GPS attack creates' ghost ships'

Information began to appear in the media about a new, previously unknown GPS spoofing technology, allegedly tested by the PRC government. For more than a year, ships in and around the port of Shanghai have been victims of the new attack. A ^[4]

Unlike previously known GPS attacks, when GPS signal receivers in a certain area displayed their location in a limited spectrum of fixed false coordinates, the new attack causes repeaters of several ships at once to show false coordinates at the same time. Together, these coordinates form ring-shaped patterns, which some experts have already dubbed "circles in the fields."

According to MIT Technology Review, in the summer of 2018, the American cargo ship Manukai followed the Huangpu River to the port of Shanghai. According to international law, all commercial vessels (except small ones) must be equipped with an automatic identification system (AIS). Every few seconds, the AIS broadcasts the name, course, location and speed of the vessel, and displays all this data for other vessels nearby. AIS position data is obtained from GPS satellites.

The captain of Manukai saw a ship on the AIS screen, following one course with it at a speed of 8 knots. Suddenly the ship disappeared, and a few minutes later it appeared again, but already in the dock. Then the ship disappeared and appeared in the strait, and then again ended up in the dock and so several times. In order to find out where the ship was, the captain looked into binoculars. As it turned out, all this time the ship did not leave the dock.

Ultimately, the report on what happened came to the attention of the C4ADS Center for Modern Defense in Washington. Experts examined data from AIS systems purchased from a startup that records AIS data around the world and found that the greatest intensity of attacks occurred on the July day of 2018. On that day, in addition to Manukai, about 300 ships near Shanghai were also victims of spoofing.

When visualizing data spanning days and weeks, the coordinates of the vessels formed large circles. Such "patterns" led C4ADS experts to bewilderment. Experts also found that mysterious circles formed not only ships. After analyzing a map of the movements of Shanghai cyclists using the Strava fitness app, the researchers also saw circular patterns. That is, the attack affected all GPS-enabled devices, not only ships.

"The ability to fake the coordinates of several ships at once in such a way that they form circles is an extraordinary technology. Akin to magic, "said Todd Humphreys, head of the radio navigation laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin.

According to Humphries, notorious circles are hardly the work of intruders. Most likely, this is testing of new technologies conducted by the Chinese government. "But I'm genuinely puzzled by the way it's done," Humphreys admitted.

BeiDou ahead of GPS in the number of satellites

In August 2019, the Chinese satellite navigation system BeiDou overtook its rival GPS in the United States in size, which could have serious consequences for both the industry and US national security. Read more here.

The American army decided to introduce a new GPS that "cannot be drowned out"

In early June 2019, the U.S. Army announced it was ready to implement the new Mounted Assured PNT Systems (MAPS) GPS system, which is said to be invulnerable to electronic influence. Read more here.

2018

A new algorithm has been created to protect against GPS spoofing

Specialists at the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) have developed a computer algorithm to minimize the effect of attacks on power plants using GPS spoofing. The algorithm is designed to help cybersecurity experts more effectively detect and prevent cyber attacks in real time^[5][6].

Attackers could interfere with the GPS device and ruin its "understanding" of time and location by sending fake GPS signals, the researchers said. Electric power systems in the United States use GPS to time-stamp the performance of stations located throughout the country. These systems are vulnerable to GPS spoofing, which can change real time and location data. Attackers can "clone" the GPS signal and display the wrong time or location, the researchers explained.

Using the new algorithm on mobile devices and computers is as easy as a regular program. The algorithm is able to recognize fake GPS signals and repel attacks in real time. Experts have developed an algorithm primarily to protect American electric power systems, but it can also be used on other devices.

2017

Ship's satellite communication systems vulnerable to cyber attacks

Security researcher Ken Munro of Pen Test Partners has published^[7] report on security problems found during a study of equipment installed on ships^[8].

As part of the study, Munro used well-known tools such as the search service Shodan. With the help of Shodan, the specialist managed to find many incorrectly configured ship equipment around the world.

Among the vulnerable devices were, for example, satellite antennas installed on ships to provide round-the-clock radio communications, Internet connections, GSM and other communications. Among such devices is the antenna of the Cobham Sailor 900 model, the exploit for which is in the public domain. Thus, any hacker with the proper level of training can exploit a vulnerability in the equipment.

However, in many cases, the exploit will not even be needed, since the hardware uses the default administrator credentials - login: admin and password: 1234. Such antennas are installed not only on civilian ships, but also on ships of the navy, as well as on helicopters and aircraft.

In addition, the researcher discovered that Globe wireless satellite antennas and private KVH CommBox terminals are also incorrectly configured and available for Internet connections.

Both devices processed logins through an unprotected HTTP connection, but the CommBox tool on the login page displayed the name of the vessel and even had a special button, clicking on which you could see a list of all active users and access the names of the entire crew of the vessel. Moreover, an attacker can get detailed information about a private network by simply hovering the mouse over certain items on the login page.

The first case of using GPS spoofing in real attacks was recorded

Problems with satellite navigation in the Black Sea may be caused by testing a new GPS interception system conducted by the Russian military. According to New Scientist, the use of such a system may represent a new form of electronic warfare available to both governments and cybercriminals. ^[9] has^[10]

On June 22, 2017 USA , the Maritime Administration provided a seemingly unremarkable report. According to the document, the captain of the vessel following from Novorossiysk discovered that its GPS navigator showed incorrect data. According to the navigator, the vessel was 32 km away from the real location - the c. The inspection of Gelendzhik Airport the navigation equipment did not reveal any problems, and the captain contacted the nearest vessels. Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals also showed that they were at the airport. Gelendzhik The problem affected at least 20 vessels.

Despite the lack of confirmation of the incident, experts believe it is the first documented case of using a spoofing attack on GPS. The potential for such attacks has already been reported earlier, but no one has seen them in the case.

Until recently, the greatest threat was the suppression of GPS signals by noise. Such attacks can cause many problems, but they are easy to detect, since when the signal is lost, navigators immediately notify you of this using an alarm. A spoofing attack is much more dangerous, because in this case a fake signal sent from land makes the device show incorrect coordinates, without causing any suspicion.

According to Todd Humphreys, an expert at the University of Texas at Austin, problems with navigators may be associated with Russia testing new means of electronic warfare. In particular, players in Pokemon Go faced failures in navigators - in the center of Moscow, their applications behaved strangely. A fake signal, allegedly coming from the Kremlin, redirected everyone 32 km to the side, to Vnukovo airport. The signal violation could be explained by security concerns, as many missiles, bombs and drones rely on GPS data. However, the incident at sea occurred far from the Kremlin, and it is unlikely that this is about security.

Automatic identification system - a system in shipping that serves to identify ships, their dimensions, heading and other data using VHF radio waves.

Leading countries abandon GPS in favor of radar due to risk of hacker attacks

The risk cyber attacks aimed at satellite navigation systems of sea vessels forces leading countries to return to history and begin to create backup systems developed on the basis of radio technologies used during the Second World War, writes in August 2017. Reuters

Currently, ships use GPS (Global Positioning System) and other similar technologies based on the sending and receiving of satellite signals. Experts believe that such systems are vulnerable to hacker attacks.

About 90% of world trade is carried out through sea transportation, and unlike aircraft, there is no reserve navigation system on ships, and if their GPS stops working, ships risk running aground or colliding with other ships.

South Korea is developing an alternative system using ground navigation technology known as eLoran (the heiress of Loran technology used during World War II). In the future, the United States plans to adopt the experience. The UK and Russia are also exploring a switch to technologies that use radio signals. In particular, the Russian Federation considered the possibility of deploying a version of eLoran called eChayka for safe navigation in the Arctic region, but the project has so far been suspended due to lack of funding.

The launch of eLoran is considered a reliable way to protect national security. To create a network of radio transmission stations or modernize existing ones, significant investments will be required, the agency notes.

According to experts in the field, cyber security the main problem of GPS- and GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) systems is weak signals that are transmitted at an altitude of about 20 thousand kilometers above the Earth and can be jammed by hackers using cheap and affordable "jammers." On the other hand, eLoran signals are more difficult to drown out, since on average they are 1.3 million times stronger compared to GPS signals.

In the past few years, there have been repeated reports of failures in the navigation systems of ships. For example, last year South Korea said that hundreds of fishing vessels were forced to return to port after GPS signals were blocked by hackers from the DPRK^[11] to ^[12].

2016

Soldiers in China banned from using GPS services

Soldiers and officers of one of the military bases of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) command banned the use of smartphones with GPS due to the threat of leaks of classified information^[13].

At one of the military bases of the PRC army, the command vetoed the use of smartphones with GPS services by military personnel. A similar decision was made after one of the military published on his personal page in the Chinese social network the route of his runs, recorded by the smartphone application. Jogging took place, including through the territory of a closed military facility. The incident was widely publicized.

Back in July 2015, the country's Central Military Council decided to ban the use of smartphones and other mobile devices in the army, but in most cases the order was ignored. During the investigation, it was revealed that more than 40% of military personnel regularly upload photos taken at various military complexes of the PRC to the public. The PLA high command is concerned about the current situation and see GPS services as a potential threat to national security.

GPS errors at the Kremlin

In the summer of 2016, fellow citizens - residents of Moscow drew attention to failures in GPS navigation near the Kremlin - some devices lost contact with satellites, determined the location of the owner in the Moscow region - in Vnukovo.

This behavior of the global positioning system creates difficulties for drivers, taxi customers, runners, fans of the Pokemon Go game, causes conspiratorial itching for bloggers and secret lovers. Social networks suggest that the responsibility for "jokes" with GPS is borne, FSO this is the president's guard deliberately arranges interference near the Kremlin^[14]

GPS navigation failures in the center of Moscow began in the summer of 2016. The first reports of problems appeared on social networks. The owners of the devices reported a complete attenuation of the signal, they said - the navigator determines their location several tens of kilometers from the real one, often in Vnukovo or Domodedovo. As a rule, GPS failed in the vicinity of the Kremlin. Failures were recorded from several minutes to several hours a day. And since that time, the number of complaints about the strange work of navigators has not decreased. Participants in the Moscow marathon on September 25, 2016 told Meduza about the failure of the GPS tracker.

Citing a source in the telecom company, Meduza reported that the first GPS failures were recorded on June 22, 2016.

A Medusa source noted the frequency of failures on average every ten days.

But it happens that he teleports for two days in a row. And it happens that such problems do not arise for a long time - for example, in August there was a break. "Teleport" usually lasts two to three hours, usually in the afternoon - at 15: 00-16: 00. Then everything is restored. Most often, failures occur within the Boulevard Ring, but on some days they can also occur on the southwestern sections of the Third Transport Ring (from the intersection with the Warsaw Highway to Schmitovsky Passage). Up to 3% of users of mapping services face technical difficulties. interlocutor of "Medusa"

Problems arise with GLONASS. Different devices will fail, nothing depends on the navigation systems - GPS or GLONASS.

What is happening causes inconvenience to fellow citizens: people make runs in the center of Moscow and complain that due to failures they lose the results of their studies.

Difficulties in working with customers are experienced by taxi drivers. In social networks, they indicate that in the event of teleportation "from the Kremlin to Vnukovo," the taxi billing system begins to consider the cost of a trip at an intercity tariff, which leads to the need to clarify relations with customers.

Yesterday I was carrying girls from Taganka to Okhotny for 199 p. Near the Kremlin I glucked GPS. The inter-city began to drip. Both gadgets believed that we were in Vnukovo (!). one of the taxi drivers wrote on Twitter

Grigory Bakunov, director of technology distribution at Yandex, tried to figure out the failures.

I took with me several different GPS- and GLONASS-receivers, a frequency analyzer - and with this backpack I climbed onto the sigway. The results of the study relate only to one area - the Kremlin, and only to this specific period of time - from 9 to 12 in the morning. Grigory Bakunov, Director of Technology Distribution at Yandex

Testing has shown that the source of radio waves is a special software and hardware complex that simulates the operation of a satellite of navigation systems. It operates on the territory of the Kremlin. Changing the place that the device makes is called spoofing. According to Bakunov, the transfer to Vnukovo or Domodedovo is explained by the fact that the owner of the device, when spoofing, must set specific fake coordinates that he will inform the navigator. They can be entered directly or selected from a list offered by the manufacturer. For Russia, there are only centers of large cities and airports. Vnukovo is the first alphabetical airport in the Moscow region. The expert believes that the reason for using such a complex is safety, first of all. In particular, the desire to limit flights over the territory of the Kremlin of unmanned vehicles. Bakunov explains that drones operate in the same range as other civilian devices, and that is why distortions affect other user devices.

The programmer suggested that on the territory of the Kremlin there is a source of radio waves, which, using special software and hardware systems, simulates the operation of a satellite of navigation systems and sends signals at the frequencies that are most often used by household navigators. Having taken measurements on the direction of the signal source (blue areas on the map) at different points around the Kremlin, Bakunov suggested where the "jammer" could be located (indicated by a star on the map).

According to Vedomosti, an official familiar with the hardware complex of the special services suggested that a system for electronic warfare is operating on the territory of the Kremlin - Rosehip-aero or some analogue close to it. According to him, this system was developed with the assistance of the Ministry of Defense and should be used by government agencies to protect important facilities. The Izvestia newspaper wrote in September that this complex is just capable of not only drowning out the control signal, but also hacking into the onboard systems of an enemy unmanned aerial vehicle. According to the publication, the Ministry of Defense is already testing the product. An intelligence officer says he is also aware of the Rosehip, but whether it is installed in the Kremlin area, he does not^[15]

Blogger Ilya Varlamov suggested that this is being done to curb drone flights with cameras over the Kremlin.

Right behind the Petrovsky Tower is a helipad, which Putin regularly uses. Modern household drones without GPS usually do not fly. In addition, when you approach the Kremlin, you will be transferred to Domodedovo or Vnukovo. Most modern drones have a ban on taking off near airports, and it simply won't take off in that zone. Ilya Varlamov, blogger

Information security specialists interviewed by Meduza declined to comment on what was happening. One of them, in a conversation with a correspondent for the publication, said: "Who knows [what is the matter] will not tell you, and who does not know - he will hang noodles on his ears. And do not raise this issue. "

2014

Russia suspended the work of American stations to transmit a GPS signal on its territory

Since June 1, 2014, Russia has been suspending the work of American stations to transmit a GPS signal, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said in May 2014 (ITAR-TASS message). If negotiations with the United States on the placement of GLONASS stations in the United States are not completed, the work of GPS stations will be finally terminated, he stressed. Rogozin recalled that the American side has suspended the decision on the placement of stations for the GLONASS differential correction and monitoring system in the United States, while GPS signal transmission stations are operating in ten constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

"Since in recent months we have not had any progress on a similar placement of the GLONASS system, the time to resolve this issue remains until May 31. From June 1, we suspend the work of these stations on the territory of the Russian Federation, "Rogozin said

.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that a working group has been formed, which consists of representatives of Roscosmos, the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "We are starting negotiations," Rogozin said, adding that three months have been allotted for everything.

"That is, by the end of the summer of this year, we hope that during these negotiations a solution will be found that will allow, on conditions of parity and proportionality, to restore this cooperation," he said.

Rogozin stressed that otherwise cooperation will be curtailed. "If not, from September 1, the work of these stations will be completely stopped," he said.

In total, 11 GPS stations operate in Russia. They are located in the Kaluga and Sverdlovsk regions, Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Republic of Sakha - Yakutia, Irkutsk, Magadan, South Sakhalin, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.

In November, The New York Times, citing unnamed sources in the State Department and the White House, reported that American intelligence agencies and the Pentagon object to the State Department's plans to issue Roscosmos permission to build several GLONASS stations in the United States.

The CIA and the Ministry of Defense fear that if the stations are deployed, "Russia will receive a bridgehead on American territory, which will increase the accuracy of Russian guided missiles." In addition, in their opinion, these stations can be used to conduct intelligence activities directly in the United States.

According to The New York Times, Russia's attempts to secure the placement of SDKM in the United States have caused strong concern in Congress, especially among Republicans. With their active participation, the newspaper notes, a prohibitive measure was taken.

On June 1, 2014, Roscosmos, together with the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, took measures to exclude the use of GPS ground stations in Russia for military and other purposes not provided for by the current agreements.

"In accordance with the instructions of the Government of the Russian Federation, Roscosmos, together with the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, implemented measures on June 1, 2014 to exclude the use of information from global seismographic network stations operating on GPS signals located in the Russian Federation for purposes not provided for by current agreements, including for military purposes," the Roscosmos website says.

According to experts, the shutdown of these stations in Russia will not affect the operation of navigation equipment, including consumer electronics - smartphones, tablets, navigators. According to Rogozin himself, only the US military will suffer.

UK abandons its own coordinate system

The Office of Geodesy and Cartography of Great Britain (OS) submitted for public discussion the issue of refusing to use the national coordinate system based on the Airy 1830 model, developed in the 19th century. As emphasized in OS, the UK will not abandon the national coordinate grid, but may bring it in line with the three-dimensional coordinate system for positioning on Earth WGS84^[16].

Most countries use latitude (location relative to the equator) and longitude to determine coordinates - this is a position relative to the meridian that passes through the Royal Greenwich Observatory. However, the Earth is not an ideal sphere, but has the shape of an ellipsoid. In OS, the Airy 1830 ellipsoid, developed by British astronomer George Biddell Airy, is used as the basis.

Most modern maps tied to GPS coordinates use the Earth-wide ellipsoid WGS84. Thanks to the widespread use of GPS, the WGS84 model has already actually become an international standard, in particular, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recommends using it.

Many modern British maps have two coordinate grids: national blue based on OS Airy 1830 and black - according to high-precision GPS and WGS84 model data.

In the UK, they decided not to abandon the national "blue grid" completely, but simply to bring it in line with the "black grid," that is, to move from Airy 1830 to WGS84. This will shift the blue grid slightly, for example, for 1:50000 scale cards, the offset will be 2 mm.

2012

Types of GPS attacks

GPS receivers are increasingly becoming elements of complex systems, including multifunctional software, various communication channels and data formats. The system factor allows you to improve the characteristics of GPS equipment, but also carries the risks of new vulnerabilities.

Researchers from Carnegie Mellon University and Coherent Navigation were able to classify new types of GPS vulnerabilities and assess the scale of related threats. In their article "GPS Software Attacks," they noticed that GPS receivers, often perceived as hardware devices, are complex computer systems that, in addition to hardware, also have software. And the share of their software component is growing.

A modern GPS receiver is built into complex computer systems, and the information circulating in them can, in the presence of malicious intent, disrupt its work. The authors reviewed and classified possible types of targeted destructive effects on computer GPS systems, highlighting three main types of attacks: data-level attacks, attacks on GPS receiver software, attacks on GPS-dependent systems.

Using a relatively simple hardware and software system assembled from affordable and inexpensive elements on the market, experts conducted several new conceptual attacks on GPS devices. At the same time, in particular, the following techniques were used:

• falsification of ephemeris - regularly updated datasets on the current orbital parameters of GPS satellites;
• sending incorrect information about the current date;
• intentional out-of-sync of time scales;
• An attack on the system software of the device (intrusion, elevation of privileges in the system)
• disorienting distortion of the signal - pseudo-random code (spoofing).

New attack methods have been practically tested on mass-produced user GPS equipment of various classes (on receivers and their modules, as well as on signal sources). Attacks were carried out mainly through the receiving antenna using vulnerabilities in GPS signal analysis programs, as well as in the OS. Each of the seven devices examined was vulnerable to at least two types of attacks.

"Until now, only such types of GPS attacks as a signal plug and spoofing, that is, attacks directly on the signal, and not on the receiving devices themselves, have been widely known," comment eScan experts in Russia and the CIS countries. - Of course, attacks through vulnerabilities of geoinformation systems using GPS data were also studied, but this type of attack cannot be called attacks directly on GPS. Do not forget about the use of GPS functionality in malware to carry out "geo-directed" attacks. In the course of such attacks, malware acts targeted - only in a specific region or region. "

"This study considers GPS infrastructure as a complex computer system that includes a variety of software and communication networks that operate according to different protocols," add eScan experts. "This approach gives a more complete picture of the state of security than the traditional attitude towards GPS as an exclusively hardware system."

eScan experts in Russia and the CIS countries asked to express their point of view of specialists in the field of GIS from the Neogeography group:

"In the course of this study, firstly, the possibility of not only temporary, but also the final disabling of existing receiver models through only manipulations with transmitted information is practically shown. This is a rather interesting conclusion, requiring deep understanding and immediate practical action. Secondly, a special danger of new types of attacks on operational control infrastructures built on the basis of GPS systems - for example, on airfield - has been demonstrated. One can imagine what consequences, for example, will result in the removal by an attacker of an aircraft landing in difficult weather conditions, only a matter of meters from the correct course. The computerization of modern satellite navigation systems is their "Achilles heel," and we have yet to find a worthy answer to new threats. "

Spanish scientists have increased the accuracy of GPS navigation by 8.5 times

Scientists at the Carlos III University of Madrid developed at the end of 2012 a technology to increase the accuracy of determining the location of a car on an electronic navigation map by 50-90%.

Currently, the accuracy of satellite navigation is about 17 meters, the researchers said. They also managed to reduce the error to 2 meters.

To do this, they equipped the vehicle with an accelerometer and gyroscope and used data from these sensors in combination with data from a GPS receiver.

In addition to improving positioning accuracy, the technology helps navigation in the temporary absence of a GPS signal, which happens when driving in large cities.

Scientists believe their development will help improve the safety of self-driving cars. Ultimately, they want to replace the sensors assembled on board the experimental machine with sensors in the driver's smartphone.

Researchers intercept unmanned aircraft by faking GPS signals

A team of researchers from the University of Texas at Austin showed in the summer of 2012 the ability to send false GPS signals to an unmanned aerial vehicle and thus change its route. The demonstration was carried out at the request of representatives of the Department of Homeland Security at the White Sands training ground in pcs. New Mexico.

When falsifying (the so-called spoofing) GPS signals, the receiver receives false information about both location and time. There are fears that most GPS devices, including the military, are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Those fears were heightened when a U.S. military drone went missing in Iran late last year and a week later emerged unscathed in the hands of the Iranian military, which said it landed the plane using GPS spoofing. True, they did not provide evidence.

The demonstration, held in New Mexico, was the first to undoubtedly prove the technical possibility of intercepting an unmanned aircraft using GPS spoofing. The researchers flew the aircraft, located at a distance of a kilometer from them. Next time they are going to show the possibility of taking control of the aircraft from a distance of 10 km.

2011: Low GPS protection

According to research, for 2011, information from geo-positioning devices built into a smartphone or personal GPS devices can be easily intercepted by hackers, who can then accurately determine the location of the device, pass it off as another object, or fake information about its physical location.

Security researcher Don Bailey at SOURCE Boston revealed a new stage in his research into security flaws in embedded devices and demonstrated how personal GPS trackers can be hacked to locate them and pass off a user or equipment as another object. The researcher stressed that the threat is quite serious.

"There is enough little hardware knowledge to reverse the device," he said. "Children are at physical risk because these devices can be easily turned into weapons."

The key point is that the low cost and rapid filling of the market with these embedded systems precludes the possibility that they are completely safe.

"Developing such programs does not require much cost, and the serious problem is that new developers and new companies have no idea about security. This is an unsafe product by default, "Bailey emphasized.

In his opinion, the security of built-in systems is an ambiguous question, because the final product contains a lot of components, such as: working with base stations, GPS firmware,, software ON for - SIM cards.

During the first attack, Bailey forced the device to send him its physical location using technology to intercept GPS coordinates and information from a local cell tower. "I can force these devices to bypass the manufacturer's control and provide me with information, and no one will even suspect that I intercepted location information," he said. Once it has locked in the device, it can determine the appearance of the object.

"I can figure out that this is a trailer, a mail van or a teenager driving a family car, having watched a moving object for a certain period of time. I can use traffic video cameras on Google maps. This can expose the owner of a GPS tracker or a means of delivering cargo to a physical attack, "says Bailey. "If this is a truck on I-70, I can take the device and force it to send incorrect location information to the server, and in the meantime I can steal it

."

These devices may be protected by encryption of the connection between the device and the server.

"I

can just check the channel and see all the information being passed on in plain text. It shouldn't be that simple, but it turns out.'

Another point for verification is to make sure that the device located in the 3G network does not interact with other 3G devices: it must only communicate with the service provider server. Bailey suggests segmenting the network space, which can also help make these devices safer.

2010: GPS Upgrade Plans

In May 2010, it was announced that the United States plans to spend $8 billion to upgrade the global positioning system (GPS) over the next 10 years. In the process of modernization, all 24 satellites of the system will be replaced one after another, circling at an altitude of about 20 km above the surface of the earth. It was planned to replace the first satellite at the end of May. Twelve new satellites will be manufactured by one of the divisions of the American company Boeing. The other 18 will be produced by Lockheed Martin, Colorado, United States. Six satellites will be in reserve.

The updated system, which should be available not only to the US military, but also to ordinary users in the US and other countries, will be able to offer higher reliability, improved reception quality and accuracy in determining coordinates. According to the team of developers of the updated system led by Colonel David Goldstein, the positioning accuracy will be increased to "arm's length," while the current system carries an error of 20 or more feet (7 or more meters). The updated system will also allow you to receive 3 times more satellite signals than now. In addition, the new satellites are equipped with improved atomic clocks that can distinguish between one billionth of a second.

The first phase of modernization was planned to begin more than 3 years ago. The postponement occurred due to the special requirements of the US military, which wished that the modernized GPS had a number of additional capabilities. They, for example, wanted to make it possible to remotely update satellite software. Whether this is implemented in the updated system is not specified.

In 2011, the United States plans to launch another GPS IIF satellite into orbit. It will be the second in a constellation of 12 satellites with which it is planned to replace outdated GPS spacecraft. It is planned to complete a series of launches by 2014, after which the modernization should continue by launching satellites of the new GPS-III system developed by Lockheed Martin. Now the GPS orbital grouping has 31 satellites.

After the modernization, the accuracy of determining GPS coordinates, according to Western media reports, should improve from several meters to 60-90 cm. It is worth noting that it is the improved navigation accuracy that manufacturers of these products cite as one of the advantages of dual-system GLONASS GPS receivers and equipment based on them.

For 2010, the accuracy of GPS systems and the Russian GLONASS are comparable. According to the representative of NIS GLONASS Igor Frumkin, now the GPS positioning accuracy averages 6-7 meters, and GLONASS - about 10 meters. One of the reasons for this in the company is called a smaller number of corrective ground GLONASS equipment in the world.^[17]

Professional dual-system GLONASS GPS equipment has been produced and used in different countries for several years, including due to increased accuracy of coordinate determination. At the same time, the cost of dual-system equipment is usually higher than single-system equipment. If GPS alone provides sufficient accuracy, the question may arise of the advisability of using the Russian navigation system.

Manufacturers of navigation equipment believe that even with the very high accuracy of GPS alone, the need for GLONASS will continue, including in foreign markets. So, according to Aleksei Smyatskikh, executive director of M2M Telematics, in addition to accuracy, an important advantage of using two navigation systems at the same time is reliability.

Notes