Global Positioning System - GPS NAVSTAR GPS NAVigation Satellites providing Time And Range GPS-spoofing

GPS was developed on the instructions of the Pentagon by engineers of the US Air Force base in Los Angeles. The first GPS satellite was launched in 1978. Until 2000, the military deliberately degraded the quality of receiving satellite signals for civilians, as they considered it, first of all, a military tool. Later, US President Bill Clinton intervened, after which the GPS market began to develop rapidly.

The system is used not only in many car navigators and modern smartphones, but also in emergency services, cargo companies, financial institutions and others, many of which, without the presence of a global positioning system, become helpless.

The GPS system remains controlled by the US military command, so other countries are looking to put into operation similar systems that can make them independent.

Russia was a pioneer in the creation of a satellite navigation system, launching its development in the early 1980s. Later, the GLONASS system was successfully put into operation.

Similar GPS systems are being developed by the European Union and China. In the European Union - this is Galileo, in China - Baidu.

GPS monitoring is a technology used to solve transport logistics problems, to monitor the actual routes of vehicles and mobile employees using the global positioning system (GPS). Monitoring allows you to track the current coordinates, direction and speed of a transport or mobile worker in real time. In some systems, it is possible to install additional sensors for opening doors, switching on/off actuators of special equipment, fuel sensors, etc. Monitoring the compliance of the actual route with the planned one allows to increase the discipline of drivers, to stop the use of official vehicles for personal purposes and to steal fuel. According to the estimates of the magazine "Logistics," only by increasing the discipline of drivers in Russian conditions, gsm monitoring systems pay off in several months.

GPS receiver - device for determination of geographical coordinates of the current location based on data on time delays of arrival of radio signals emitted by satellites of NAVSTAR group. The maximum measurement accuracy is 3-5 meters. The accuracy of commercial GPS modules ranges from 150 meters (for old models with poor visibility of satellites) to 3 meters (for new models in the open). In addition, using WAAS/EGNOS/MSAS systems and local correction transmission systems, the accuracy can be increased to 1-2 meters horizontally.

GPS tracker - a data receiving/transmitting device for GPS tracking and monitoring the movements of the object to which it is attached. The tracker can be used to locate people, animals, goods or transport, as well as other objects. The device records the received information at regular intervals and can transmit them through radio, cellular or satellite communications in the form of SMS or over the Internet. It is used in the OPTIMAL GIS geographic information system. Synonyms, possible formulations - gps locator, GSM tracker or GPRS tracker.

GPS bracelets

Main article: GPS bracelets

2022: The Federal Air Transport Agency advised airlines to prepare for flights without GPS

On April 22, 2022, it became known that the Federal Air Transport Agency recommended that Russian airlines prepare for flights without using the American navigation satellite system (GPS). The agency is afraid of GPS malfunctions and refers to a report by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which mentioned more frequent cases of "silencing" GPS signals. EASA wrote that the problems began against the backdrop of the Russian military operation in Ukraine.

Recommendations contain in the letter of the deputy head of Rosaviatsia Dmitry Yadrov. The document was sent to the general director of the State Corporation for the Organization of Air Traffic (ORD) Igor Moiseenko and the heads of the interregional departments of the Federal Air Transport Agency, who forwarded it to airlines. The Federal Air Transport Agency instructed the state corporation for ARVD "to assist aircraft crews when GPS is turned off." Pilots are advised to inform dispatchers about "failures, deterioration and abnormal operation of GPS." Airlines should conduct exercises with flight personnel to work out actions in case of failures in the operation of satellite navigation systems.

Mr. Yadrov wrote that the recommendations are related to the EASA report of March 17. The European air regulator reported that after February 24, when the Russian military operation in Ukraine began, cases of GPS "killing" and "spoofing" (signal substitution) became more frequent. Similar incidents were recorded in the Kaliningrad region, in the Baltic and Black Seas, in eastern Finland, in the Eastern Mediterranean region (near Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Israel) and northern Iraq. In some cases, interference with GPS led to a change in the route of the aircraft or even the destination "due to the inability to make a safe landing," according to the report (.pdf) EASA^[1]

On April 22, 2022, Roscosmos will send proposals to the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the Federal Air Transport Agency to replace GPS on all domestic vehicles with GLONASS equipment. First of all, this applies to aircraft, which are also planned to be connected to the Chinese Beidou navigation system. This was announced on April 22, 2022 by the head of the state corporation Dmitry Rogozin in his Telegram channel.

Despite our repeated warnings, Russian airlines continued to lease and purchase foreign aviation equipment, ignoring the requirements of installing GLONASS equipment on it. Now, in steamed mode, cats will look for a solution. And it is one thing - to install GLONASS stations at all airports to provide a high-precision navigation signal and install GLONASS receivers on all aircraft operating in our country, "writes the head of Roscosmos.[2]

2020: Brazilian authorities have introduced technology to control the location of the population

At the end of March 2020, the Brazilian government announced the deployment of a system that uses user geolocation to limit the spread of COVID-19 coronavirus. More details here.

2019

Previously unknown attack on GPS creates "ghost ships"

Information began to appear in the media about a new, previously unknown GPS spoofing technology, allegedly being tested by the PRC government. For more than a year, ships in the port of Shanghai and its environs have become victims of a new attack. A ^[3]

Unlike previously known GPS attacks, when GPS signal receivers in a certain area displayed their location in a limited spectrum of fixed false coordinates, the new attack causes repeaters of several ships to simultaneously show false coordinates. Together, these coordinates form ring-shaped patterns, which some experts have already dubbed "circles in the fields."

According to MIT Technology Review, in the summer of 2018, the American cargo ship Manukai followed the Huangpu River to the port of Shanghai. Under international law, all commercial vessels (except small ones) must be equipped with an automatic identification system (AIS). Every few seconds, the AIS broadcasts the name, course, location and speed of the ship, and also displays all this data for other ships nearby. AIS location data is obtained from GPS satellites.

Captain Manukai saw on the AIS screen a ship following one course with him at a speed of 8 knots. Suddenly, the ship disappeared, and a few minutes later appeared again, but already in the dock. Then the ship disappeared and appeared in the strait, and then again appeared in the dock and so on several times. In order to find out where the ship was, the captain looked into binoculars. As it turned out, all this time the ship did not leave the dock.

Ultimately, the report on what happened came to the attention of the C4ADS Center for Modern Defense in Washington. Experts studied data from AIS systems acquired from a startup recording AIS data around the world, and found that the greatest intensity of attacks occurred on July 2018. That day, in addition to Manukai, about 300 ships near Shanghai were also victims of spoofing.

When visualizing data covering days and weeks, the coordinates of the vessels formed large circles. Similar "patterns" led C4ADS specialists to bewilderment. Experts also found that mysterious circles formed not only ships. After analyzing the movement map of Shanghai cyclists using the Strava fitness application, researchers also saw circular patterns. That is, the attack affected all GPS-enabled devices, not only ships.

"The ability to fake the coordinates of several ships at once in such a way that they form circles is an extraordinary technology. Akin to magic, "said Todd Humphreys, head of the radio navigation laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin.

According to Humphries, notorious circles are hardly the work of intruders. Most likely, this is the testing of new technologies carried out by the Chinese government. "But I am sincerely puzzled by how this is done," Humphries admitted.

BeiDou ahead of GPS in the number of satellites

In August 2019, the Chinese satellite navigation system BeiDou overtook its rival GPS in the United States in size, which could have serious consequences for both this industry and US national security. More details here.

The American army decided to introduce a new GPS, which "cannot be drowned out"

In early June 2019, the US Army announced that it was ready to introduce the new Mountain Assured PNT Systems (MAPS) GPS system, which is allegedly invulnerable to electronic influence. More details here.

2018

A new algorithm has been created to protect against GPS spoofing

Specialists at the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) have developed a computer algorithm that minimizes the effect of attacks on power plants using GPS spoofing. The algorithm is designed to help cybersecurity experts more effectively detect and prevent real-time cyber attacks^[4][5].

According to researchers, attackers can intervene in the operation of a GPS device and spoil its "understanding" of time and location by sending fake GPS signals. Electric power systems in the United States use GPS to put timestamps on the indicators of stations located throughout the country. These systems are vulnerable to GPS spoofing, which can change real time and location data. Attackers can "clone" a GPS signal and display the wrong time or location, the researchers explained.

Using a new algorithm on mobile devices and computers is as easy as a regular program. The algorithm is able to recognize fake GPS signals and repel attacks in real time. Experts have developed an algorithm primarily to protect American electric power systems, but it can also be used on other devices.

2017

Ship-based satellite communication systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks

Security researcher Ken Munro of Pen Test Partners published^[6] a report on security problems discovered during a study of equipment installed on ships^[7].

As part of the study, Munroe used widely known tools, such as the Shodan search service. With the help of Shodan, the specialist managed to detect many incorrectly configured ship equipment around the world.

Vulnerable devices included, for example, satellite antennas installed on ships to provide round-the-clock radio communication, Internet connectivity, GSM and other communications. Among such devices is the Cobham Sailor 900 antenna, the exploit for which is in the public domain. Thus, any hacker with a proper level of training can exploit a vulnerability in the equipment.

However, in many cases, exploit is not even needed, since the hardware uses the default administrator credentials - login: admin and password: 1234. Such antennas are installed not only on civilian ships, but also on ships of the Navy, as well as on helicopters and aircraft.

In addition, the researcher found that Globe wireless satellite antennas and KVH CommBox private terminals are also incorrectly configured and available for Internet connections.

Both devices processed logins through an unprotected HTTP connection, but the CommBox tool on the login page displayed the name of the ship and even had a special button, clicking on which you could see a list of all active users and access the names of the entire crew of the ship. Moreover, an attacker can obtain detailed information about a private network by simply pointing the mouse pointer to certain elements on the login page.

Recorded the first case of using GPS spoofing in real attacks

Problems with satellite navigation in the Black Sea may be caused by testing of the new GPS interception system conducted by the Russian military. According to the New Scientist, the use of such a system may be a new form of electronic warfare, available to both governments and cybercriminals^[8]

On June 22, 2017, the US Maritime Administration provided at first glance an unremarkable report. According to the document, the captain of the ship traveling from Novorossiysk found that his GPS navigator showed incorrect data. According to the navigator, the ship was 32 km away from the real location - at Gelendzhik airport. The inspection of the navigation equipment revealed no problems, and the captain contacted the nearest vessels. Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals also indicated that they were located at Gelendzhik Airport. The problem affected at least 20 courts.

Despite the lack of confirmation of the incident, experts believe that it is the first documented case of using a spoof attack on GPS. The potential for such attacks has already been reported, but no one has seen them in the case.

Until recently, the greatest threat was the suppression of GPS signals using noise. Such attacks can cause many problems, but they are easy to detect, since when a signal is lost, navigators immediately notify this using alarms. A spoof attack is much more dangerous, because in this case a fake signal sent from land forces the device to show incorrect coordinates, without causing any suspicion.

According to Todd Humphreys, an expert from the University of Texas at Austin, problems with navigators may be associated with Russia's testing of new means for conducting electronic warfare. In particular, players in Pokemon Go faced failures in navigators - in the center of Moscow their applications behaved strangely. A fake signal, allegedly coming from the Kremlin, redirected everyone 32 km to the side, to Vnukovo airport. The signal violation could be explained by safety considerations, since many missiles, bombs and drones rely on GPS data. However, the case at sea occurred far from the Kremlin, and this is hardly a security issue.

Automatic identification system - a system in shipping that serves to identify ships, their dimensions, heading and other data using VHF radio waves.

Leading countries abandon GPS in favor of radar due to the risk of hacker attacks

The risk of cyber attacks aimed at satellite navigation systems of naval vessels forces leading countries to return to history and begin to create backup systems developed on the basis of radio technologies used during the Second World War, Reuters writes in August 2017.

Currently, ships use GPS (Global Positioning System) and other similar technologies, which are based on sending and receiving satellite signals. According to experts, such systems are vulnerable to hacker attacks.

About 90% of world trade is carried out through sea transportation, and unlike aircraft, there is no backup navigation system on ships and if their GPS stops working, ships risk running aground or colliding with other ships.

South Korea is developing an alternative system using ground navigation technology known as eLoran (the heiress to Loran technology used during World War II). In the future, the United States plans to adopt the experience. Britain and Russia are also exploring the possibility of switching to technologies using radio signals. In particular, the Russian Federation considered the possibility of deploying a version of eLoran called eChayka for safe navigation in the Arctic region, but the project has so far been suspended due to lack of funding.

Launching eLoran is considered a reliable way to protect national security. Creating a network of radio transmitting stations or modernizing existing ones will require significant investments, the agency said.

According to cybersecurity experts, the main problem of GPS and GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) systems is weak signals that are transmitted at an altitude of about 20 thousand kilometers above the Earth and can be silenced by hackers using cheap and affordable "silencers." On the other hand, signals eLoran be more difficult to plug, since on average they are 1.3 million times stronger than GPS signals.

In the past few years, reports of malfunctions in the navigation systems of ships have repeatedly appeared. For example, last year, South Korea said that hundreds of fishing vessels were forced to return to port after GPS signals were blocked by hackers from the DPRK^[9].

2016

Soldiers in China banned from using GPS services

Soldiers and officers of one of the military bases of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), the command banned the use of smartphones with GPS due to the threat of leaks of classified information^[10].

At one of the military bases of the PRC army, the command vetoed the use of smartphones with GPS services by military personnel. A similar decision was made after one of the military published on his personal page on the Chinese social network the route of his runs, fixed by the smartphone application. Runs took place, including on the territory of a closed military facility. The incident was widely publicized.

Back in July 2015, the country's Central Military Council decided to ban the use of smartphones and other mobile devices in the army, but in most cases the order was ignored. During the investigation, it was revealed that more than 40% of military personnel regularly post photos taken at various military complexes of the PRC in open access. The PLA high command is concerned about the current situation and sees GPS services as a potential threat to national security.

Errors of the GPS system in the Kremlin

In the summer of 2016, fellow citizens - residents of Moscow drew attention to failures in GPS navigation near the Kremlin - some devices lost contact with satellites, determined the location of the owner in the Moscow region - in Vnukovo.

This behavior of the global positioning system creates difficulties for drivers, taxi customers, runners, fans of the Pokemon Go game, causes conspiratorial itching among bloggers and mystery lovers. Social networks suggest that the FSO is responsible for "jokes" with GPS, this protection of the president deliberately arranges interference near the Kremlin^[11].

GPS navigation failures in the center of Moscow began in the summer of 2016. The first reports of problems appeared on social networks. The owners of the devices reported a complete attenuation of the signal, they said - the navigator determines their location several tens of kilometers from the real one, often in Vnukovo or Domodedovo. As a rule, GPS failed in the vicinity of the Kremlin. Failures were recorded from several minutes to several hours a day. And since that time, the number of complaints about the strange work of navigators has not decreased. Participants in the Moscow marathon on September 25, 2016 told the Medusa publication about the failure of the GPS tracker.

Citing a source in the telecom company, Medusa reported that the first GPS failures were recorded on June 22, 2016.

A Medusa source noted the frequency of failures on average every ten days.

But it happens that two days in a row teleports. And it happens that such problems do not arise for a long time - for example, in August there was a break. "Teleport" usually lasts two to three hours, usually in the afternoon - at 15: 00-16: 00. Then everything recovers. Most often, failures occur within the Boulevard Ring, but on some days they can also occur in the southwestern sections of the Third Transport Ring (from the intersection with the Warsaw Highway to the Shmitovsky passage). Up to 3% of users of map services face technical difficulties. Medusa interlocutor

Problems arise with GLONASS. Different devices will fail, nothing depends on navigation systems - GPS or GLONASS.

What is happening inconveniences fellow citizens: people make runs in the center of Moscow and complain - due to failures, they lose the results of their classes.

Cab drivers have difficulty working with customers. In social networks, they indicate that in the case of teleportation "from the Kremlin to Vnukovo," the taxi billing system begins to consider the cost of a trip at a long-distance tariff, which leads to the need to clarify relations with customers.

Yesterday I drove girls from Taganka to Okhotny for 199 p. Near the Kremlin, GPS glucanulated. The city began to drip. Both gadgets believed that we were in Vnukovo (!). one of the taxi drivers wrote on Twitter

Grigory Bakunov, director of technology distribution at Yandex, tried to figure out the failures.

I took with me several different GPS and GLONASS receivers, a frequency analyzer - and with this backpack of devices climbed onto the sigway. The results of the study relate only to one region - the Kremlin, and only to this particular period of time - from 9 to 12 in the morning. Grigory Bakunov, Director of Technology Distribution at Yandex

Testing showed that the source of radio waves is a special software and hardware complex that simulates the operation of the satellite of navigation systems. It operates on the territory of the Kremlin. Replacing the place that the device performs is called spoofing. According to Bakunov, the transfer to Vnukovo or Domodedovo is explained by the fact that the owner of the device, when spoofing, must set specific fake coordinates that he will inform the navigator. They can be entered directly or selected from the list proposed by the manufacturer. For Russia, there are only centers of large cities and airports. Vnukovo is the first alphabetical airport in the Moscow region. The expert believes that the reason for using such a complex is safety, first of all. In particular, the desire to limit flights over the territory of the Kremlin unmanned aerial vehicles. Bakunov explains that drones operate in the same range as other civilian devices, and that is why distortions affect other user devices.

The programmer suggested that on the territory of the Kremlin there is a source of radio waves, which using special software and hardware systems simulates the operation of the satellite of navigation systems and sends signals at frequencies that are most often used by household navigators. Taking measurements on the direction of the signal source (blue regions on the map) at different points around the Kremlin, Bakunov suggested where the "muffler" could be located specifically (indicated by a star on the map).

According to Vedomosti, an official familiar with the hardware complex of special services suggested that there is a system for electronic warfare on the territory of the Kremlin - Shipovnik-aero or some analogue close to it. According to him, this system was developed with the assistance of the Ministry of Defense and should be used by state structures to protect important objects. The Izvestia newspaper wrote in September that this complex is just capable of drowning out not only the control signal, but also hacking into the onboard systems of an enemy unmanned aerial vehicle. According to the publication, the Ministry of Defense is already testing the product. A special services officer says that he also knows about Shipovnik, but whether it is installed in the Kremlin area, he does not know^[12]

Blogger Ilya Varlamov suggested that this is done to stop drone flights with cameras over the Kremlin.

Right behind the Petrovskaya Tower is a helipad, which Putin regularly uses. Modern household drones without GPS usually do not fly. In addition, when you approach the Kremlin, you will be transferred to Domodedovo or Vnukovo. Most modern drones have a ban on taking off near airports, and it simply will not take off in this zone. Ilya Varlamov, blogger

Information security experts interviewed by Medusa declined to comment on what was happening. One of them, in a conversation with a correspondent for the publication, said: "Who knows [what is the matter] will not tell you, and who does not know will hang noodles on their ears. And do not raise this issue. "

2014

The Russian Federation suspended the work of American stations to transmit a GPS signal on its territory

Since June 1, 2014, Russia has been suspending the work of American GPS signal transmission stations, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said in May 2014 (ITAR-TASS message). In the event that negotiations with the United States on the deployment of GLONASS stations in the United States are not completed, the work of GPS stations will be stopped completely, he stressed. Rogozin recalled that the American side has suspended the decision on the deployment of the GLONASS differential correction and monitoring system in the United States, while GPS signal transmission stations operate in ten constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

"Since in recent months we have not had any progress on a similar deployment of the GLONASS system, the time for resolving this issue remains until May 31. Since June 1, we have been suspending the operation of these stations in the Russian Federation, "Rogozin said

.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that a working group has been formed, which consists of representatives of Roscosmos, the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "We are starting negotiations," Rogozin said, adding that three months are allotted for everything.

"That is, until the end of this summer, we hope that during these negotiations a solution will be found that will allow, on terms of parity and proportionality, to restore this cooperation," he said.

Rogozin emphasized that otherwise cooperation will be curtailed. "If not, from September 1, the work of these stations will be stopped completely," he said.

In total, 11 GPS stations operate in Russia. They are located in the Kaluga and Sverdlovsk regions, Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Republic of Sakha - Yakutia, Irkutsk, Magadan, South Sakhalin, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.

In November, The New York Times, citing unnamed sources in the State Department and the White House, reported that US intelligence agencies and the Pentagon object to the State Department's plans to issue Roscosmos permission to build several GLONASS stations in the United States.

The CIA and the Ministry of Defense fear that if the stations are located, "Russia will receive a bridgehead on American territory, which will increase the accuracy of Russian guided missiles." In addition, in their opinion, these stations can be used to conduct intelligence activities directly in the United States.

According to The New York Times, Russia's attempts to deploy the SDCM in the United States caused strong concern in Congress, especially among Republicans. With their active participation, the publication notes, and a prohibitive measure was adopted.

On June 1, 2014, Roscosmos, together with the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, took measures to exclude the use of GPS ground stations in Russia for military and other purposes not provided for in existing agreements.

"In accordance with the order of the Government of the Russian Federation, Roscosmos, together with the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, on June 1, 2014, implemented measures to exclude the use of information from stations of the global seismographic network operating on GPS signals located on the territory of the Russian Federation for purposes not provided for by existing agreements, including for military purposes," the Roscosmos website says.

According to experts, the shutdown of these stations in Russia will not affect the operation of navigation equipment, including consumer electronics - smartphones, tablets, navigators. According to Rogozin himself, only the US military will suffer.

Great Britain abandons its own coordinate system

The UK Office of Geodesy and Cartography (OS) brought to the public debate the issue of abandoning the use of a national coordinate system based on the Airy 1830 model developed in the 19th century. As emphasized in OS, the UK will not abandon the national coordinate grid, but it can bring it into line with the three-dimensional coordinate system for positioning on Earth WGS84^[13].

Most countries use latitude (location relative to the equator) and longitude to determine coordinates - this is the position in relation to the meridian that passes through the Royal Greenwich Observatory. However, the Earth is not an ideal sphere, but has the shape of an ellipsoid. The OS uses the Airy 1830 ellipsoid developed by the British astronomer George Biddell Airy as the basis.

Most modern maps tied to GPS coordinates use the world-wide ellipsoid WGS84. Due to the broadest use of GPS, the WGS84 model has actually become an international standard, in particular, it recommends the use of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Many modern British maps have two coordinate grids: national blue based on OS Airy 1830 and black based on high-precision GPS data and WGS84 models.

In the UK, they decided not to abandon the national "blue grid" completely, but simply to bring it into line with the "black grid," that is, to switch from Airy 1830 to WGS84. This will slightly shift the blue grid, for example, for maps at a scale of 1:50000, the offset will be 2 mm.

2012

Types of GPS attacks

GPS receivers are increasingly becoming elements of complex systems, including multifunctional software, various communication channels and data formats. The system factor allows you to improve the characteristics of GPS equipment, but carries the risks of new vulnerabilities.

Researchers from Carnegie Mellon University and Coherent Navigation managed to classify new types of GPS vulnerabilities and assess the scale of related threats. In their article "GPS Software Attacks," they noticed that GPS receivers, often perceived as hardware devices, are complex computer systems in which, in addition to hardware, there is software. And the share of their software component is growing.

A modern GPS receiver is built into complex computer systems, and the information circulating in them can, if malicious intent is present, disrupt its work. The authors examined and classified possible types of targeted destructive effects on computer GPS systems, highlighting three main types of attacks: data-level attacks, attacks on GPS receiver software, attacks on GPS-dependent systems.

Using a relatively simple hardware and software system, assembled from commercially available and inexpensive elements, experts conducted several new conceptual attacks on GPS devices. At the same time, in particular, the following techniques were used:

• falsification of ephemeris - regularly updated data sets on the current orbital parameters of GPS satellites;
• Transmission of incorrect information about the current date
• intentional out-of-sync of time scales;
• attack on the system software of the device (intrusion, elevation of privileges in the system);
• disorienting signal distortion - pseudorandom code (spoofing).

New attack methods were practically tested on mass-produced user GPS equipment of various classes (on receivers and their modules, as well as on signal sources). Attacks were carried out mainly through the receiving antenna using vulnerabilities in GPS signal analysis programs, as well as in the OS. Each of the seven devices examined was vulnerable to at least two types of attacks.

"Until today, only such types of attacks on GPS as a signal plug and spoofing, that is, attacks directly on the signal, and not on the receiving devices themselves, were widely known," eScan experts in Russia and the CIS countries comment. - Of course, attacks have been studied through the vulnerabilities of geographic information systems using GPS data, but this type of attack cannot be called attacks directly on GPS. Do not forget about the use of GPS functionality in malware to carry out "geo-directed" attacks. In the course of such attacks, malware acts targeted - only in a certain region or area. "

"This research considers GPS infrastructure as the complex computer system including the various software and communication networks working under different protocols, - experts of eScan add. - This approach gives a more complete picture of the state of security than the traditional attitude to GPS as an exclusively hardware system. "

Experts eScan in Russia and the CIS countries asked experts in the field GIS from the Neogeography group to express their point of view:

"In the course of this study, firstly, the possibility is practically shown not only of temporary, but also of finally disabling existing receiver models by only manipulating the transmitted information. This is an interesting enough conclusion, requiring deep reflection and immediate practical action. Secondly, the special danger of new types of attacks on operational control infrastructures built on the basis of GPS systems - for example, on airfield - has been demonstrated. One can imagine what consequences, for example, the removal by an attacker of an aircraft landing in difficult weather conditions will turn out to be only a few meters from the right course. The computerization of modern satellite navigation systems is their "Achilles heel," and we have yet to find a worthy response to new threats. "

Spanish scientists increased the accuracy of GPS navigation by 8.5 times

Scientists at Carlos III University of Madrid developed at the end of 2012 a technology to increase the accuracy of determining the location of a car on an electronic navigation map by 50-90%.

Currently, the accuracy of satellite navigation is about 17 meters, the researchers said. They managed to reduce the error to 2 meters.

To do this, they equipped the vehicle with an accelerometer and gyroscope and used data from these sensors in combination with data from a GPS receiver.

In addition to improving positioning accuracy, the technology facilitates navigation in the temporary absence of a GPS signal, which happens when driving in large cities.

Scientists believe that their development will help improve the safety of cars with autonomous control. Ultimately, they want to replace the sensors assembled on board the experimental car with sensors in the driver's smartphone.

Researchers intercept unmanned aircraft, tampering with GPS signals

A team of researchers from the University of Texas at Austin showed in the summer of 2012 the ability to send false GPS signals to an unmanned aerial vehicle and thus change its route. The demonstration was held at the request of representatives of the Ministry of Internal Security at the White Sands training ground in pcs. New Mexico.

When falsifying (so-called spoofing) GPS signals, the receiver receives false information about both location and time. There are fears that most GPS devices, including the military, are vulnerable to spoof attacks. These fears intensified when, at the end of last year, a US military unmanned aerial vehicle disappeared in Iran, and a week later appeared unharmed in the hands of the Iranian military, who said they had landed the plane using GPS spoofing. True, they did not provide evidence.

The demonstration, held in New Mexico, was the first, undoubtedly proving the technical possibility of intercepting an unmanned aircraft using GPS spoofing. The researchers controlled the plane at a distance of a kilometer from them. The next time they are going to show the possibility of taking control of the aircraft from a distance of 10 km.

2011: Low GPS protection

According to studies, for 2011, information from geo-positioning devices or personal GPS devices built into a smartphone can be easily intercepted by hackers, who can then accurately determine the location of the device, issue it as another object or fake information about its physical location.

Security researcher Don Bailey at the SOURCE Boston conference revealed a new stage in his study of the shortcomings of security systems of embedded devices and demonstrated how to hack personal GPS trackers to determine their location and give the user or equipment to another object. The researcher emphasized that the threat is quite serious.

"There is enough small hardware knowledge to reverse the device," he said. "Children are at physical risk because these devices can easily be turned into weapons."

The key point is that the low cost and fast filling of the market with these embedded systems precludes the possibility that they are completely safe.

"Developing such programs does not require special costs, and the serious problem is that new developers and new companies have no idea about security. This is an unsafe default product, "Bailey emphasized.

In his opinion, the safety of embedded systems is an ambiguous issue, since the final product contains a lot of components, such as: working with base stations, GPS firmware, software, SIM card software.

During the first attack, Bailey forced the device to send him its physical location using GPS coordinate interception technology and information from a local cell tower. "I can force these devices to bypass the manufacturer's control and provide me with information, and no one will even suspect that I intercepted location information," he said. Once it has fixed the device, it can determine the appearance of the object.

"I can calculate that this is a trailer, a mail van or a teenager driving a family car, observing a moving object for a certain period of time. I can use traffic cameras on Google maps. This can expose the owner of a GPS tracker or a means of delivering cargo to a physical attack, "says Bailey. "If this is a truck on the I-70 highway, I can take the device and force it to send incorrect location information to the server, and in the meantime I can hijack it

."

These devices can be protected by encrypting the connection between the device and the server.

"I can just check the channel and see all the information transmitted in plain text. It shouldn't be that simple, but it turns out that way. "

Another thing to check is to make sure that the device located in the 3G network does not communicate with other 3G devices: it should only communicate with the service provider server. Bailey suggests segmenting network space, which can also help make these devices safer.

2010: GPS upgrade plans

In May 2010, it was announced that the United States plans to spend $8 billion to modernize the global positioning system (GPS) over the next 10 years. During the modernization process, all 24 satellites of the system will be replaced one by one, circling at an altitude of about 20 km above the earth's surface. It was planned to replace the first satellite at the end of May. Twelve new satellites will be manufactured by one of the divisions of the American company Boeing. The other 18 will be produced by Lockheed Martin, Colorado, USA. Six satellites will be in reserve.

The updated system, which should be available not only to the US armed forces, but also to ordinary users in the US and other countries, will be able to offer higher reliability, improved reception quality and accuracy of determining coordinates. According to the team of developers of the updated system headed by the colonel David Goldstein, the accuracy of positioning will be increased to "distance of an outstretched arm" whereas the current system brings an error to 20 and more feet (7 and more meters). The updated system will also receive 3 times more satellite signals than it is now. In addition, the new satellites are equipped with improved atomic clocks that can distinguish one billion seconds.

The first phase of modernization was planned to begin more than 3 years ago. The postponement occurred due to the special requirements of the US military, which wanted the modernized GPS to have a number of additional capabilities. For example, they wanted to make it possible to remotely update satellite software. Whether this is implemented in the updated system is not specified.

In 2011, the United States plans to launch another GPS IIF satellite into orbit. It will be the second in a constellation of 12 satellites, which are planned to replace obsolete GPS spacecraft. It is planned to complete the series of launches by 2014, after which the modernization should continue through the launch of satellites of the new GPS-III system developed by Lockheed Martin. Now the GPS orbital constellation has 31 satellites.

After modernization, the accuracy of determining GPS coordinates, according to Western media reports, should improve from several meters to 60-90 cm. It is worth noting that it is the improved accuracy of navigation that manufacturers of these products bring as one of the advantages of two-system GLONASS GPS receivers and equipment based on them.

For 2010, the accuracy of GPS systems and the Russian GLONASS are comparable. According to the representative of NIS GLONASS Igor Frumkin, now the accuracy of GPS positioning is on average 6-7 meters, and GLONASS - about 10 meters. One of the reasons for this in the company is called the smaller number of GLONASS corrective ground equipment in the world.^[14]

Professional dual-system equipment GLONASS GPS has been produced and used in different countries for several years, including due to the increased accuracy of determining coordinates. At the same time, the cost of two-system equipment is usually higher than single-system. If GPS alone will provide sufficient accuracy, the question may arise of the appropriateness of using the Russian navigation system.

Manufacturers of navigation equipment believe that even with very high accuracy of GPS alone, the need for GLONASS will continue, including in foreign markets. So, according to Alexey Smyatskikh, executive director of M2M Telematics, in addition to accuracy, reliability is an important advantage of using two navigation systems at the same time.

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