US economy
This is an article about the US economy. For the main article on the country, see US
How the wealthy of the United States
In the first quarter of the 21st century, the technological boom and the shale revolution ensured the superiority of the US economy.
GDP
Main article: US GDP
Financial system
Federal Reserve System
Main article: US Federal Reserve, Fed (Federal Reserve System, Fed)
Modern monetary theory
Main article: Modern Monetary Theory (SDT)
The financial policy of the country corresponds to the Modern Monetary Theory (SDT).
Currency: dollar
Main article: US Dollar
Gigantic current account deficit and dependence on foreign investment
2024
The US is more dependent than ever on foreign capital. Net liabilities to non-residents reached 77% of GDP
Total net US liabilities to non-residents relative to GDP reached $22.5 trillion or a record 77.6% vs 51% in 2019 and only 8-10% in 2007.
Over 5 years, the increase in the deficit in the net international investment position of the United States reached almost 12 trillion (10.7 - > 22.5 trillion), over two years the deficit expanded by 6 trillion, and over a year over 3.2 trillion according to Spydell Finance calculations based on BEA and IMF statistics for the 2nd quarter of 2024.
Net international investment position is considered as the difference between the assets of US residents in the outside world and liabilities to non-residents in the United States. Assets and liabilities include portfolio, direct and other investments classified in the balance of payments.
The rapid growth of US liabilities is largely due to the effect of the growth of the stock market (non-residents who have positions in US stocks are displayed as US liabilities in portfolio investments to non-residents).
The United States has assets in the outside world for $36 trillion at market valuation, where direct investments - $11.3 trillion, portfolio investments - $16.1 trillion, other investments - $5.5 trillion, financial derivatives - $2.3 trillion, ZVR - $0.8 trillion.
Other US liabilities rose to $8.7 trillion vs $5.1 trillion in 2016 and at the same level in 2008, which is approximately equally related to the inflow of non-residents into dollar deposits and the use of loans from US residents in currencies other than the dollar. This is probably due to cheaper funding rates, for example, in euros, francs or yen for international divisions of American companies.
As a result, the balance on other investments reached a deficit of more than 3 trillion against the near-zero balance in 2008-2011 and a deficit of about 1.2 trillion in 2014-2016.
The United States has obligations to non-residents by a record $58.5 trillion, which is $20 trillion (!) More than 5 years ago, $9 trillion more than in 2022 and $7 trillion more than last year's level.
In direct investments, obligations are concentrated at $16.6 trillion, and in portfolio investments - $30.9 trillion, where in stocks - $16.7 trillion, and in bonds (Treaseris, MBS and corporate bonds mainly) - $14.2 trillion.
As a result, net portfolio investment liabilities expanded to $14.8 trillion vs 12.1 trillion a year earlier and only 8.1 trillion in 2Q19. Such a gap is mainly associated with a faster growth of the American stock market plus insignificant activity of US residents in investing in European and Asian markets.
Net liabilities in direct investment reached $5.2 trillion vs $3.8 trillion a year earlier and $1.4 trillion 5 years ago.
Stock market bubble needed by US to attract critical foreign investment
Main article: US stock market
The United States is not interested in supporting trading operations in dollars at any cost, but much more critical for them transactions in financial instruments.
Most basic/fundamental literature on monetary policy was written in the 1960-1980s, when foreign trade turnover mattered and the proportion of cross-border financial transactions was negligible. Now everything has changed.
According to Spydell Finance estimates, global exports amount to about 30 trillion per year for all countries of the world, respectively, imports are comparable, i.e. $82 billion per day. This is a daily turnover on Nvidia or Bitcoin papers on a hot day.
The volume of gross cross-border transactions on all financial instruments (shares, bonds, shares, monetary instruments) is two orders of magnitude higher, this is even without derivatives.
Are trading settlements in dollars in favor of the yuan and the euro declining? Yes, but the share of trade settlements in all dollar-denominated transactions is negligible within the margin of error.
Financial transactions are important for the United States, which is why they cherish the stock market bubble so much.
The first investment income deficit in US history. The country began to pay other countries more than to receive from them
In the second quarter of 2024, a unique event took place - the US investment income has never been in deficit at the level of $2.1 billion per quarter. Yes, this is an insignificant volume, but the very fact of the transition to a deficit is important.
Net primary income includes all receipts and payments between residents and non-residents related to the use of production factors: labor, capital and natural resources, but mainly this is, of course, capital. If a country receives more income from non-residents than it pays them, then the balance of primary income will be positive, and vice versa.
The investment income includes interest on bonds, deposits and loans, dividends on shares and a share of profit, not distributed in the form of dividends, but remaining at the disposal of a foreign enterprise and considered to be investor income under the direct investment scenario.
Why is this important? The United States almost always, with very rare exceptions, received more from the outside world than it gave away in investment income (up to $240-280 billion per year from 2017 to 2020), but from 2021 net investment income began to collapse sharply and in 2Q24 came out in minus.
This is due to a more impressive differential of rates in favor of dollar instruments and the accumulation of a record-setting negative international investment position on record, where a sharp acceleration has occurred since 2021.
There is a deterioration in the trade balance of goods and services with a deficit of $229 billion, which is better than the record deficit of $256 billion in 2Q22, but noticeably worse than the deficit that was observed in the range of $100-150 billion per quarter in the period from 2011 to 2019 (average $138 billion per quarter in 2017-2019).
A slight improvement occurred in the deficit of secondary income (mainly included payments of Mexican migrants back to Mexico) - $44.1 billion vs a record deficit of $56 billion in 3q22.
The US for the first time since 3Q 2001 has a triple deficit in balance of payments components, but then it was within the accuracy of the account, the economy was healthy and the system solid. In 2024, the imbalance goes on all fronts.
As a result, the current account in the United States reached a record deficit of $275.1 billion for 2Q24, and in terms of the moving amount for 12 months, the STO deficit reached $951 billion.
To cover gaps in the balance of payments, the United States requires up to $1 trillion per year in net inflows of foreign capital (2.5 times more than in the first presidential term of Donald Trump). Previously, Europe and China were the main suppliers of capital to the United States, but it is Europe and China that despise Trump the most.
This time there is almost no safety margin, and the ruptures became colossal, both in terms of budget deficit and service station deficit, Spydell Finance wrote.
Moreover, the larger the budget deficit, the higher the interest payments and the less opportunities to reduce the deficit.
The larger the STO deficit, the higher the primary income deficit and the higher the STO deficit and dependence on foreign capital.
Allies' money is already struggling to finance the US service station deficit
Over three years, China's current account surplus amounted to $1,049 billion, Germany is in second place - $750 billion, Japan - $438 billion, Russia - $413 billion, the Netherlands - $331 billion, Norway - $329 billion, Singapore - $275 billion, Saudi Arabia - $227 billion, Switzerland - 201 billion, Ireland - $183 billion, Kuwait - $150 billion, South Korea - $146 billion, Denmark - $134 billion, Qatar - $126 billion, Sweden - $117 billion, Hong Kong - $116 billion.
In the Eurozone, the STO surplus is about 580-600 billion, in all countries Europe about 1 trillion.
The above is a list of countries with a STO surplus of over 100 billion over three years. What is the importance of this list?
Over the past 10 years, there have been structural shifts in capital allocation. Until 2011-2013, the United States and Britain concentrated capital from all over the world, but from 2014 and especially from 2018, fragmentation began to increase sharply.
From the list presented, the United States lost China and Russia, as well as partially or completely oil exporters from the Middle East.
For oil exporters, everything is not so clear. Until 2010, oil exporters collectively distributed about 75-80% of the total surplus into the dollar financial system, now closer to 35-45% according to their own calculations. The money goes, but not so intensively anymore.
After the start of the trade war from 2017-2018, China significantly reduced the distribution of the STO surplus in the dollar, reducing to zero at the state level, while private capital is still going, but mainly through offshore and shadow gateways. Russia has consistently reduced the intensity of capital distribution since 2014, and since 2022 it has zeroed.
The United States now relies almost entirely on strategic allies (Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Singapore).
The problem is that the US STO deficit has doubled in 10 years, and the number of capital suppliers in the United States has narrowed to strategic allies, the economic situation for which is ambiguous.
All this means that the United States will have to forcibly reduce the STO deficit, because there is simply not so much money in the world to finance a swollen monster.
2023: Dependence on foreign investment: the continuous deficit of service stations since 1992 is offset by the inflow of foreign funds into stocks and bonds. The negative balance of the international investment position is $20 trillion. Europe is the main donor to the United States
The deficit in the current operations account (STO) does not guarantee the weakening of the national currency, exactly, as the STO surplus does not guarantee the strength/strengthening of the national currency, since many factors affect the foreign exchange market.
The principles and factors of exchange rate formation are a very broad topic, but in the context of the SERVICE, it should be noted that the structure of cross-border capital flows is of particular importance.
For example, in the United States, the expected STO deficit is 3% of GDP in 2023, which is almost twice as much as the 5-6% deficit that was observed in 2004-2008.
A deficit of 3% of GDP means that net capital inflows should be by a comparable amount of 3% (the balance of the service station and the financial account is always zero, taking into account the operations of the CTR), i.e. the United States is structurally always a net borrower of international capital and is dependent on foreign investment. Since 1992, the United States has a continuous shortage of service stations.
In economically developed countries, the mechanism of capital deficit compensation is not used through the management of CTR with rare exceptions, so the deficit is closed by the private sector (direct, portfolio or other investments).
In the structure of net inflows of foreign capital from all sources and directions into the dollar financial system, the share of central banks balances from 7 to 16%, i.e. the United States is focused on private capital.
Direct investment, if the investor buys 10% or more of the company's share, i.e. mainly with the aim of influencing the business. These investments are inherently less fluid and longer-term than portfolio (mostly speculative) investments.
The STO deficit is covered either through the reduction of the CTR and/or through lending by the private sector, which in turn can be in the form of a net increase in external debt or in the form of repatriation of external assets (sales of foreign assets by residents are higher than purchases).
The STO deficit is always a dependence on external funding. Stable capital inflows can only be in conditions of free movement of capital, so any restrictions or expectations of restrictions within Capital Control always negatively affect cross-border capital flows.
The world of developed economy has the highest liberalization of mechanisms and instruments of cross-border funding, which makes it possible to level the WR factor and use cross-funding mechanisms.
Conditions under which companies and the financial sector lend to each other as part of the economic and financial interface on the principle of communicating vessels. For example, countries with a stable service station profile (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Austria) lend to countries with a deficit of service stations (USA , Britain, France).
In other words, a friendly investment cluster is formed, where capital flows occur between conditionally "own," this is cross-funding, Spydell Finance wrote.
Speaking of lending, we do not mean standard bank loans, but mainly investments in securities (shares bonds and). On the other hand, weaker chain links are handled by credits like,,, and Greece. Romania Hungary Portugal
The group of developing countries is mainly funded through bank lending, since the level of development of the financial system and low diversification does not imply investments in stocks and bonds.
The focus of investment flows is formed mainly from economic logic: the capacity, depth of the financial system, the prospects and level of diversification of the economy, the differential of interest rates, and so on.
The United States provides a complete list of parameters that form investment attractiveness - usually rates on bonds and monetary instruments in the dollar zone are higher than in any other currency zone among their "own."
If suddenly international capital flows are sluggish, the United States creates the necessary geopolitical and economic conditions so that investments in the dollar zone look more attractive than in any other currency zone. For all the time there has not been a single failure, the mechanism is still working like a watch.
From 2010 to 2023, the accumulated deficit of service stations in the United States amounted to $7.3 trillion, and the last three years an average of $850 billion per year. In second place in the world is Britain, which since 2010 has absorbed 1.5 trillion dollars of net international investment.
The United States manages to concentrate almost all free world capital.
Since 2020, the net inflow of foreign capital into the United States has sharply increased, reaching an all-time high recorded in 2006-2007. Yes, of course, dollars in 2023 have less purchasing power than dollars in 2007, and the capacity of the dollar financial system has grown significantly, but the trend is upward.
Here is how it happens (net average quarterly flows of non-residents to the United States in billion dollars):
- Direct investments: 98.5 billion in 2023, 91.8 billion from 2020 to 2023 inclusive, 80.2 billion from 2010 to 2019 and 68.5 billion from 2005 to 2007.
- Portfolio investments: 303.2, 237, 125 and 255 billion, respectively, above the published sequence of comparison periods.
- Other investments: 62.6, 74.8, 32 and 151.8 billion
- Total investments: 464, 403, 237 and 476 billion.
In the structure of foreign capital inflows, the main direction of absorption (60-65% of the total inflow) is portfolio investments, which include treasuries, bonds and shares of American companies with a ownership share of less than 10%.
The combined investment of non-residents in the United States has almost doubled since 2020 and in 2023 is maintained at a level close to the record, compared with 2010-2019.
From the point of view of the sustainability of the dollar and capital flows in the United States, sanctions narratives do not work. Previously, the hypothesis was that the seizure of Russian assets and continuous pressure on China in several phases of aggravation (2017-2019 and 2022-2024) will lead to a risk premium on dollar assets and a refusal to invest in the United States, which could undermine the position of the dollar.
On the balance of payments, the dollar's position only strengthened, and capital flows doubled, reaching an all-time high.
Apparently, the US strategy is to abandon control of everyone and immediately disengage from the solvent and loyal base of the allies (Europe, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Australia, Singapore) and everyone else.
Key US allies concentrate technology, economic and market capacity, financial capital, and ideological backbone.
The US needs at least $800 billion a year to close balance of payments gaps.
The concept of "investment attractiveness" is sewn into the architecture gene of the dollar financial system. Year after year and without exception, foreign capital must flow to the United States in any conditions.
From 2010 to 2019, they modestly "operated" at a rate of at least 100 billion per quarter, from 2020 the need doubled to 201 billion, and in the period from 3q21 to 3q22 it took at least 250 billion per quarter (1 trillion per year) to close the STO deficit (now returned on average to 200 billion).
What are the options for covering the STO deficit? Balancing through the reduction of COR (what developing countries do), the return/sale of US external assets (compression of US participation in the outside world) or net inflow of foreign capital.
The United States has never engaged in balancing the WR, like most advanced economies.
Reducing external participation - undermining geopolitical and geo-economic superiority, the United States will not voluntarily go for it. In fact, since 2020, the United States has increased the intensity of investments in the outside world from the average quarterly 138 billion in 2010-2019 (74 billion direct, 66 billion portfolio and minus 2 billion other investments) to 243 billion from 2020 to 2023 (100 + 97 + 46 billion). But they have not kept pace with the rise in foreign capital inflows to the US, which almost doubled in 2020-2023 compared to 2010-2019.
The total turnover of cross-border transactions (external distribution of assets of US residents + inflow of foreign capital) has doubled since 2020, while so far there is NO tendency for the dollar to collapse in financial transactions (stocks, bonds, monetary instruments, financial derivatives).
However, the share of the dollar in trade settlements is decreasing due to the growth of integration of the national currency of China, India, Russia and other countries.
In December 2007, the United States had a negative balance of the international investment position (IIP) by only $1.2 trillion, by the beginning of 2024 the negative balance had grown to $20 trillion.
The balance sheet is negative when external liabilities (net investments of non-residents in the USA) are larger than external assets (net investments of residents in the outside world) in all areas (direct, portfolio and other investments). The negative balance sheet assumes that the US is a net international debtor, and the rate of foreign capital inflow is faster than the rate of resident capital allocation to the outside world.
The negative balance sheet began to intensify gradually from 2011 to 2015 (from 2.7 to 5.8 trillion). By 2q18, the balance was minus 8 trillion, and finally from 2q18 to 4q21 fell off the chain (from 8 to 18.8 trillion or almost $11 trillion in 3.5 years.
After stabilization in 2022, from 1Q23, the negative balance began to expand again to break through $20 trillion.
In 4Q23, the United States had 34.5 trillion external assets with 54.3 trillion liabilities, including direct investments - 10.8 trillion assets and 14.9 trillion liabilities, portfolio investments - 15.3 trillion assets and 28.7 trillion liabilities, and other investments - 5.4 trillion and 8.6 trillion liabilities.
The United States remains extremely voracious towards foreign investment, the pace of which has doubled since 2020 relative to the average pace of 2010-2019, but the United States has lost interest in external investment, Spydell Finance wrote.
Since 2018, the United States has become more closed to itself in terms of the actions of residents, where residents finance mainly domestic cash gaps and, for a complex of reasons, are not interested in international expansion and globalization as it was from 1995 to 2007.
This can be traced to the increase in the negative balance of the IIP. This pattern of behavior coincided with a sharp aggravation of the US geopolitical track since 2018 (a sharp increase in confrontation with China).
The "pupation" strategy is probably meaningful, but at the same time the United States squeezes and absorbs all the world's free capital.
Despite the contradictions, the connection between Europe and the United States is inextricable. Europe is the main donor to the United States and over time this dependence will increase not in favor of Europe, of course.
The United States needs at least $800 billion in net foreign capital inflows in all directions for the year (in 2022 it was worse - about $1 trillion) as part of covering the current account deficit.
The main donor of the United States is Europe and the trend of the IIP balance in the Eurozone is completely opposite in comparison with the United States - if the United States expands net obligations, and in Europe, on the contrary, decreases with the transition to a IIP surplus.
Since 2022, for the first time since the founding of the currency bloc, the Eurozone countries have entered a positive IIP balance sheet by 0.4-0.8 trillion compared to a negative balance sheet of $2.8 trillion in 2013, mainly due to a decrease in net portfolio investment obligations with a stable private equity balance sheet.
By 4Q23, Europe had $38.6 trillion in external assets with $38 trillion in liabilities, of which $13.2 trillion in direct investments among assets and $10.6 trillion in liabilities, portfolio investments over $13.5 trillion with $15.8 trillion in liabilities, and other investments $7.4 trillion with $8.3 trillion in liabilities.
The problem is that the excessive gluttony of the United States on the verge of record indicators requires incommensurable resources and opportunities for an external surplus of liquid capital concentrated in the net inflow of foreign capital into the United States. This design is short-lived and extremely vulnerable.
Sooner or later, there may be an out of sync between the US need to cover the cash gaps and the possibility of their satellites to cover this deficit.
Non-financial debt
Non-financial debt consists of credit instruments issued by government agencies, households and businesses that are not included in the financial sector.
2022: Total non-financial debt 275% of GDP
National debt
Federal and state debt
Government bonds
- US government bonds (Treasurys) - who and how lends to the United States.
Money supply
2023
M2 cut by record 3% for the year
The volume of money supply (M2) USA in the last year by December 2023 decreased by 3%, which was a record 12th consecutive month of decline on an annualized basis. It comes after a record 40% rise in 2020-21.
Decrease in the money supply for 5 months in a row to $20.7 trillion
The money supply in the United States in April 2023 fell for the fifth month in a row, which is an unprecedented period. M2, which includes cash in circulation, as well as bank and money market accounts, fell 4.6% to $20.7 trillion. compared to the same month last year.
2022: Money supply M2 began to decline for the first time in years
In November 2022, the real money supply in the United States is declining at a record pace in history - minus 6.6% YoY compared to the previous anti-record in April 1980 (minus 6.5%).
But it is still very far from the complete disposal of the excess money supply formed during the period of monetary and fiscal madness 2020-2021. Compression should occur by another 13-14%, wrote the Spydell Finance channel.
The deviation of the real money supply from the 2010-2019 trend by September 2021 was over 25%, the last year the money supply has been declining in real terms.
There are two mechanisms for recycling - inflation and the forced withdrawal of the money supply from the economy/financial system.
Now the first mechanism (inflationary) is mainly operating, although the nominal money supply did not increase over the year (21.35 trillion in November 2022 compared to 21.35 trillion in November 2021), and compared to December 31, 2021, a reduction of 140 billion or 0.7%.
There are several reasons for such dynamics.
Firstly, the budget policy is the most stringent since mid-2008 in terms of the rate of withdrawal of money from the population (net state subsidies, as the difference between what the state distributed and withdrew from the economy regarding operations with the population).
Secondly, monetary doping has been disabled since March after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine and there has been a gradual reduction in the Fed's balance sheet since June, which has an impact on the money market in the aggregate.
Thirdly, the record gap between inflation, bond rates and deposit rates leads to the transfer of cash flows from the money market to the bond market, since deposit rates are pressed to zero.
It is important to note that the expenses of the population and the money supply are out of sync in real terms. Usually, with a decrease in M2, spending also falls (according to the experience of the inflationary crisis of the 1970-80s), but now this is not happening.
The unsynchronization is due to the record pace of lending to the population and the record low rate of savings, as an attempt to compensate for lost income and inflationary absorption.
However, such a compensation mechanism has a very limited safety margin.
Inflation
Main article: US inflation
Budget
Main article: US Budget
US budget expenditures exceed revenues (the so-called budget deficit) since the late 60s of the XX century (since 1970, the US budget surplus has been recorded only 4 times - in 1998-2001).
Stock market
Main article: US stock market
- Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) - stock index on the 30 largest companies USA
Banks
Main article: Banks in the United States
Lending in the United States
Main article: Lending in the United States
Household savings
Main article: Household savings in the United States
Remittances from the United States
2023: El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala are most dependent on US transfers
2017: Mexico, China and India lead in US transfers
U.S. Electronic Payment Systems
2022: 25.6% of the population pay for smartphone purchases
2020:58% of Internet users prefer cashless payment
Investments
2023: Growth in investment from Japan, Korea and Taiwan over several years
2022
Investment in the digital economy bypasses all other sectors
The battle for sovereignty is the ability to shape trends in technology in the modern world as part of the transition from the fifth to the sixth technological order.
Leadership in the creation of innovative products (as the evolution of existing ones or on other architectural or even physical principles) can ensure the dominance of technology companies in capturing sales markets and shaping a regional and even global political agenda.
At least for the past 150 years, breakthrough business (if we take the United States and Europe), which is at the forefront of technological solutions, has acquired significance and subjectivity in the political elite. Resources, capital were concentrated under the breakthrough business, political decisions were pushed through.
At the beginning of the XIX century - these were metallurgists, at the end of the XIX century - oil companies, at the beginning of the XX century - the auto industry, then mechanical engineering and aviation, in the mid-1950s the nuclear and chemical industries played a dominant role, in the 1970s - the pharma industry was developed, in the 1980s microelectronics, in the 1990s software companies. In the 2020s, the greatest impetus is in AI and nanotechnology, combining IT and biotechnology.
The United States began to lose momentum in technological development from 2010 to 2017-2018, when in some areas the championship began to intercept China, especially in microelectronics, culminating in the political and trade bitterness of China and the United States in 2018 with a known series of scandals, including sanctions against Huawei.
Political bitterness is reflected in the costs of building technology in the US. The trajectory of confrontation with China has a correlation with the trend of increased spending on technology creation in the United States, where explosive growth was from 2017 to 2020. R&D spending GDP has relatively increased by a record 30% (there has not yet been a similar rate in US history).
Almost 15 years of stagnation (2000-2014) with the exponential development of China created a significant technological gap in favor of China (not everywhere and not in everything), but China reduced the lag. By 2023, the US is investing in technology in a way it has never before.
In the United States, technology investments by early 2023 exceeded all other investments (equipment, residential and commercial real estate). Technology investments include business spending on R&D, patent creation and purchase, intellectual property creation, and software spending.
The material world outside IT in the US is shrinking. A growing segment is the digital economy in all its diversity. The growing trend is not interrupted by crises, unlike sensitive and more mobile spending on equipment and infrastructure.
Once, technology investments exceeded all other investments in Q2 2020, but this time the trend is more stable and it is likely that for the first time in history technology investments will become dominant in the structure of investments in the United States.
Technologies outstripped commercial real estate (including factories and industrial structures) in Q1 2008, a year later exceeded residential real estate and no longer lost leadership, and the "last bastion" remained in the form of machines, equipment and components.
The category "equipment" includes all material means intended for the reproduction of capital - any type of vehicles for doing business, industrial machines, machines, equipment, computers and hundreds of other nomenclature of material means, with the exception of capital structures (they are included in commercial real estate).
If you single out computers, servers, components and everything related to electronics in a separate category and close with technologies, calling the category "IT and R&D," here is unconditional leadership by a clear margin.
While commercial and production equipment, with the exception of computers, has been stagnating since 2014.
Investment in infrastructure and commercial real estate at the minimum since the crisis of 2009. Residential real estate predictably collapsed to the level of 2015 amid a slowdown in construction by 25-30% and a collapse in home purchases by 35-40%.
You might think that there are manipulations with deflators, but investments in technology in nominal terms are at their maximum, the Spydell Finance channel noted.
Reduced investment from Singapore, Spain and China
2018: Sharp decline in investment from China
Investment abroad
2021: U.S. investment in manufacturing assets in China
2020: Third largest investment in Africa
Foreign exchange reserves
Sovereign Wealth Fund
Businessmen
Business in the United States
Main article: Business in the United States
The richest people in the United States
Main article: The richest people in the United States
Bankruptcies
Main article: US bankruptcies
Foreign trade
Main article: US Foreign Trade
Minerals
Oil production
Main Article: U.S. Oil Production
Copper mining
Main article: Copper mining and production
2024: Plan to expand fossil controls in international waters
The U.S. claim to a section of the seabed rich in minerals is disputed by Russia and China because Washington has not ratified a treaty governing access to resources in international waters.
Chinese and Russian diplomats said in March 2024 that US claims to expanded sections of the seabed were unacceptable.
2023: Strong lag behind China in mining and processing many minerals
2022
Second place in the world in the extraction of rare earth metals
Lithium reserves - 12 million tons
The "triangle" of South America and Mexico as of April 2022 accounts for 60% of the world's lithium deposits.
Exporter No. 6 coal in the world
12th in the world in uranium mining with 75 tons
2021: U.S. share of global rare earth mineral production - 15.4%
2018
2nd place in terms of mining volume
Among the top 10 countries in terms of silver production
Copper production - 1.2 million tons
2017: Gold reserves - 3,000 tonnes
Energy carriers
Energy consumption per capita
and
Gasoline price
Main article: Gasoline prices
2024: $3.5 a gallon
2022: Rise and fall in price amid special operation in Ukraine
The average price of a gallon of regular gasoline rose to a record $4.25 as of March 8, 2022, up 59 cents in just a week, according to the AAA. In California, where drivers pay some of the highest gasoline prices in the country, the average price jumped to $5.57.
That means refueling can cost up to $100 dollars or more.
2018
Transport
2023: In the United States, all domestic flights have been postponed due to a failure in the IT system
On January 11, 2023, massive delays and cancellations of flights began in the United States. The reason was a serious failure in the computer system of the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Read more here.
Power
Main article: US power
R&D
2023: Rivalry with China in R&D investment
Some conflicts are a priori intractable. The United States and China have never reached a consensus in trade disputes, they have not reached a consensus in political confrontation, because we are talking about global leadership, the Spydell Finance channel noted.
World leadership in the modern world is achieved through two main directions - the projection of the value system and technological development, which is the basis for financial and economic superiority and geopolitical dominance.
Socio-cultural expansion China into the Western world is impossible due to fundamentally different cultures and value systems, and the struggle for sales markets and technological superiority is possible.
The conflict between the United States and China is a multifaceted, complex complex of contradictions that lies in the plane of the battle for economic and trade leadership.
The winner is the one with the best technology. Not only in innovative industries at the junction of the fifth and sixth techno-structure, but even the advanced development of basic industries from the third and fourth technological structure is important and important.
For too long, the United States has parasitized its own success after a deafening victory in the Cold War with the USSR and a successful globalization project. During this time, China has significantly grown stronger and has acquired subjectivity in the formation of techno-trends.
In the mid-1990s, comprehensive spending on research and development by business and the state in all areas amounted to no more than $5 billion, compared with 200 billion in the United States.
In the early 2000s, China increased spending to 10-15 billion against 270 billion in the United States. By the world crisis of 2009, China spent about 75 billion on R&D, and the United States over 400 billion.
In 2015-2018, China's rapid and uncontrolled expansion began to create problems in the political and business elite of the United States, because they first realized the scale of China and the threat to US technological leadership.
By 2018, China's R&D was 300 billion, and in the United States $615 billion, in 2023 China almost doubled spending, and in the United States 877 billion.
The United States has significantly increased spending since 2017, but this is not enough. China's PPP-enabled R&D is far ahead of the US.
2022: China bypasses US in advanced technology research
In 2022, China came forward in the fight against the United States in the field of the emergence of new technologies. Chinese companies have taken the lead in 37 of 44 new technology industries. This was announced by the Strategic Policy Institute in Australia on March 2, 2023. Read more here
2020: R&D spending - $476.5 billion
2019: Second most patented in the world
At the end of April 2020, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) ranked countries by the number of new patents. In 2019, the United States accounted for 57,840 patents. Read more here.
Astronautics
Main article: Cosmonautics USA
Retail
2023: 3.3% decline in real retail sales
By April 14, 2023, retail sales in the USA last year increased by 1.5%, which is the lowest growth rate since May 2020 and significantly below the average historical level of 4.8%.
However, after adjusting for inflation, the situation becomes much worse. Real retail sales fell 3.3% over the past year, marking the 7th consecutive decline from last year.
The combination of wages not keeping up with inflation (a record 24 consecutive months) and higher interest rates (credit card rates hit a record high of 20%) is taking a toll. U.S. consumers are retreating.
2021
15.0% of total retail sales are online
Largest retail chains by state
2020: Retail sales slump during COVID-19 pandemic
In May 2020, the US Census Bureau published preliminary information on retail sales for April, where another historical decline is visible. Retail and catering sales fell 16.4% and that's after a decline of 8.3% in March. In general, sales in amounted to $403 billion, this is the lowest figure since August 2012, and inflation is not taken into account here.
But some market players, such as grocery and online stores, were not affected, but were even able to increase turnover.
2018: Retail dynamics since 2007
Restaurant market
2021: Top 50 fast food chains
Industrial production
Main article: U.S. Industry
Tourism
2022: Reduced number of foreign tourists to 51 million
2020:24 UNESCO-protected World Heritage Sites
2018: United States - among the top countries in terms of tourism revenue
Real estate
Main article: Real estate in the USA
Information Technology and Communications Markets
Data centers
2024:5388 data centers
Video Surveillance (US Market)
2022: More than 7,000 CCTV cameras on the roads
Car market
2023: Second in the world in terms of the number of cars sold - 16 million units
2021: Toyota takes 1st place in car sales in the USA for the first time in history
In 2021, Toyota for the first time in history took 1st place in car sales in the United States. US car giant General Motors has lost the title of best car seller in America for the first time in 90 years.
Toyota took first place, selling more than 2.3 million cars in 2021, increasing sales by 10%.
GM said its sales, down 13%, were hit by widespread semiconductor shortages that plague the entire auto industry.
2019
2.5 million cars produced
837 cars per 1000 people
Cars per 1,000 people (World Bank, June 2019):
- UNITED STATES: 837
- Australia: 747
- Italy: 695
- Canada: 670
- Japan: 591
- Germany: 589
- Britain: 579
- France: 569
- Malaysia: 433
- Russia: 373
- Brazil: 350
- Mexico: 297
- Saudi Arabia: 209
- Turkey: 199
- Iran: 178
- SOUTH AFRICA: 174
- China: 173
- Indonesia: 87
- Nigeria: 64
- India: 22
Agriculture
2022
Marijuana is the sixth most valuable agricultural crop in the United States
The legalization of marijuana in the United States led to the fact that in 2022 it entered the sixth place in the ranking of the main crops of the United States with a harvest of $5 billion. The leader - corn - has a noticeably higher result: 82.6 billion, but marijuana has a chance of reaching fifth place.
Compared to 2021, the cost of marijuana harvest in 2022 increased immediately by 24%. Marijuana has only been legalized in 23 states in the country this time.
Average level of state support for agriculture
2021: Share of farmland - 44%
2019: Average use of pesticides in agriculture
2018: USA world leader in horse count
The largest number of horses in 2018 is in the United States - 10, 26 million heads. The equestrian industry has a direct impact on the US economy of $39 billion, and the total impact is $102 billion, which determines the caused costs. In addition, the equestrian industry provides 1.4 million equivalent full-time jobs.
Light industry
2024: Cotton processing collapses to a low since 1885
Demand for cotton from US textile factories in 2023-2024 fell to a minimum since 1885.
American factories will process 1.74 million bales of cotton this year: USDA. The forecast shows that cotton consumption in factories will fall by almost 15% compared to last year.
Media market
Labour market
Main Article: U.S. Labor Market
Salaries and pensions in the United States
Poverty in the United States
2023
An increasing proportion of low-income Americans don't pay for housing and can't afford food
An increasing proportion of low-income Americans do not pay for housing and cannot afford food, adding to signs of a growing financial crisis in the economy.
Among households using increased pandemic benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 42% missed meals in August 2023 and 55% ate less because they could not afford food, more than twice last year's figure, Propel Inc said in a report released on Wednesday. SNAP recipients tend to be households with incomes at or below the poverty line. In the survey of households receiving food benefits, 67% are in debt.
Most Americans do not have $400 to cover emergency costs
Most Americans don't have enough financial resources to cover an unexpected 400 without dollars going into debt, a new study released in May 2023 says.
These data indicate widespread financial instability, even in an economy where unemployment is at a 50-year low, and the erosion of the airbag that some households have created during the COVID-19 pandemic.
2019: 183,000 Americans die due to poverty
In mid-June 2023, specialists from the University of California at Riverside (UCR) published a report stating that the death of 183 thousand Americans aged 15 years and older in 2019 may be associated with poverty, defined as income below 50% of median income in the United States.
The researchers calculated the number of Americans living in poverty, taking as a basis funds below half of the average income in the United States, and compared them with the causes of deaths in various social strata. As it turned out, dying in poverty after 40 years is much more likely than dying as a result of suicide, gunshot wounds, murder, complications of obesity and diabetes mellitus, as well as substance overdose. It is noteworthy that the first 39 years, people from different walks of life have approximately the same mortality rate.
About 21% of Americans in the survey don't make enough money from their primary job to pay bills or maintain their family's standard of living, and 52% work multiple jobs to cope with daily living expenses. More women (24%) than men (18%) said they didn't make enough money to pay bills, while more men (57%) than women (49%) said they worked multiple jobs. The age cohort with the highest percentage of people doing more than one job is 35-44 years old, with 77% of respondents working multiple jobs.
The researchers found that the survival rate of poor people was about the same as that of wealthier people until they reached the age of 40, after which they died significantly more often than those with higher incomes and resources. Poverty as a risk factor could be considered the fourth leading cause of death in the U.S. after heart disease, cancer and smoking, according to the study.
The results of the UCR study show another way in which ethnic and racial minorities are disproportionately affected by inequality-related issues, as these groups are more likely to live in poverty than white people, experts say. In terms of age, race and gender, the poor of America are a heterogeneous group of people.
It is important to note that the main body of analyzed data dates back to the time before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a massive economic crisis around the world, waves of unemployment and housing problems. Now scientists hope that the study they conducted will help draw the attention of the American authorities to the problem of the "silent killer," revise social policy programs and eventually reduce deaths from poverty in the country.[1]
Jewelry Market
2021: Gold Jewelry World Market# 3
Alcohol market
2022: 2nd in the world in terms of beer production
2021: USA is the 2nd country in the world in terms of beer consumption
2019: Popularity of drinks in the US
2018: Minimum age to purchase alcohol - 21
Consumption
Main article: Consumption in the United States
See also
Notes
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